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An Alternative Scenario for Solution of Property Issue

PostPosted: Mon Jun 13, 2005 10:22 pm
by Kifeas
How the property problem arising from the huge gap between the pre-1974 property ownership of the two communities the post solution situation as per A-Plan-V provisions, can be solved with the introduction of an alternative scenario.

Present Situation
This is the official data of the RoC land registry as it was in 1974 after the Turkish invasion.

Image
Table 1 -Notes:
1. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
2. One square kilometre is equal 747 donums and one donum is equal to 1338 square meters.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.

Provisions of A-Plan-V.
Below follows what would have been the most likely situation after territorial adjustments and all the other property provisions of the A-Plan-V. I include 3 tables which show what the end result would have been, based on the property ownerships of the two communities. I will continue later with another set of tables showing my approach as to how it can possibly be arranged so that both bi-zonality is not affected and also GC property owners are not victimised to such a grate extend.

Less favourable scenario.
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Table 2 - Notes:
1.This is the most likely situation that will emerge after territorial adjustments as per A-Plan-V, if we assume the following:
a.) All the 1/3 of GC property within the TCCS is properly re-instated and all 1/3 of TC property within the GCCS is also re-instated.
b.) All the TC land within the buffer zone and the areas returned to the GCCS after territorial adjustments, do not abide by the 1/3 rule, as it was prescribed in A-pan.
c.) Assuming that in all the areas that are subject to territorial adjustment, the ownership ration is the following: State land is equal to 15%, Other ownership land (non GC or TC) is equal to 0.5% and that there is also only about 6% of TC ownership within these areas, which is about half the general TC ownership percentage. The remaining 78.5% of this area is assumed to be of GC ownership.
2. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.
4. Column headings such as "GC owner." or "TC owner." denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.

More favourable scenario.
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Table 3 -Notes:
Here please take into account all the above notes for table 2, with the exception that none of the TC properties within the current RoC control areas are re-instated (not even the 1/3,) but instead they are all used as an exchange land.

Property area and value gaps between pre-1974 ownership and the two scenarios based on A-Plan.
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Table 4 -Notes:
1. Column headings such as "GC ownership" or "TC ownership" denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
2. The term "Average Gap between the two scenarios" refers to the average gap of the two scenarios in terms of area and also in terms of value, based on the assumption that the average value per donum is equal to Cy£ 28,000 /donum. This figure is based on the assumption that about 15% of the properties are of prime use both for residential and tourism development (along the coast line) and their average value is equal to about Cy£90,000 per donum, 15% of these properties are in areas of residential use and their average value is about Cy£ 50,000 per donum, and the remaining 70% are agricultural land with average value of Cy£ 10,000 per donum. [(15% x 90,000) + (15% x 50,000) + (70% x 10,000)] = 28,000 Cy£

Conclusions:
What we immediately see from this table is that based on the Annan plan formula dealing with the property situation, the value gap between the properties that the two communities had before 1974 and the properties that the two communities will be asked to settle and/or absorb after the solution, ranges from 30.84 billions US$ in the less favourable scenario to 21.89 billions US$ in the more favourable scenario. The average of the two scenarios is 26.36 billions US$. That means that this huge amount of GC properties in the north, will have to change hands and will either be absorbed only by the individual TCs, TC companies or the TC state, or sold. Sold to whom and at what prices? GCs will not be entitled to buy any of them.

It is obvious that it is beyond the economic capacity of the TC community to absorb properties of such a value, if it will have to pay the GC ex- owners the corresponding market value of these properties. Not even in the next 100 years! To give an idea of the magnitude of this amount, it is equal to the entire military and armament expenditure of the Turkish Army during all the last 3 years, it is 1.7 times bigger than the entire annual GDP of the RoC and it is 26 times more than the "TRNC" annual GDP.

Also, one needs to take a note of the following fact. In 1974, the TC community (individuals and Evkaf,) had in its possession (ownership) the 16.6% of the total private land. This is obtained by subtracting the state (public) land and then the total private land is taken as a basis of 100%.
This 16.6% was slightly less than the population ration of the TC community, which was 18%. After the Annan plan formula is applied, the TC community can potentially become the legal owner of between 23.2% and 25.9% of the Total private land, but of course without having the money to compensate the GC owners, in the expense of whom it will gain legal control of that substantially extra land.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO

I propose an alternative scenario, which will alleviate this huge value gap problem, without affecting bizonality, but also without victimizing the GC property owners to such a scandalous degree. This is based on the idea of reducing the TCCS territory down to the 24.3% of the total Cyprus territory or 25% of the United Cyprus Republic (British bases are excluded from the calculation,) and also by allowing up to 50% (1 /2) of GC property reinstatement within the TCCS.

Less Favourable Alternative Scenario.
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Table 5 - Notes:
1.This is the most likely situation that will emerge after territorial adjustments according to the ALTERNATIVE, if we assume the following:
a.) All the 1/2 of GC property within the TCCS is properly re-instated and all 1/2 of TC property within the GCCS is also re-instated.
b.) All the TC ownership land within the buffer zone and the areas to be returned to the GCCS after territorial adjustments, do not abide by the 1/2 rule, but they are fully re-instated, as it was also prescribed in A-pan.
c.) Assuming that in all the areas that are subject to territorial adjustment, the ownership ration is the following: State land is equal to 15%, Other ownership land (non GC or TC) is equal to 0.5% and that there is also only about 6% of TC ownership within these areas, which is about half the general TC ownership percentage. The remaining 78.5% of this area is assumed to be of GC ownership.
2. Black figures represent square kilometres of land.
3. Percentage figures (in red) must be read horizontally, except the last column that reads vertically.
4. Column headings such as "GC owner." or "TC owner." denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.

More Favourable Alternative Scenario.
Image

Table 6 -Notes:
Here take into account all the above notes for table 5, with the exception that none of the TC properties within the current RoC control areas are re-instated (not even the 1/2,) but instead they are all used as an exchange land.

Property area and value gaps between pre-1974 ownership and the two options based on the Alternative Scenario.
Image

Table 7 -Notes:
1. Column headings such as "GC ownership" or "TC ownership" denote amount of land that will potentially come in control of only individual members of the corresponding community or state, or that it can only absorbed by that community on an individual or state level.
2. The term "Average Gap between the two scenarios" refers to the average gap of the two scenarios in terms of area and also in terms of value, based on the assumption that the average value per donum is equal to Cy£ 28,000 /donum. This figure is based on the assumption that about 15% of the properties are of prime use both for residential and tourism development (along the coast line) and their average value is equal to about Cy£90,000 per donum, 15% of these properties are in areas of residential use and their average value is about Cy£ 50,000 per donum, and the remaining 70% are agricultural land with average value of Cy£ 10,000 per donum. [(15% x 90,000) + (15% x 50,000) + (70% x 10,000)] = 28,000 Cy£

Conclusions:
What we immediately see from this table is that based on the ALTERNATIVE scenario dealing with the property situation, the value gap between the properties that the two communities had before 1974 and the properties that the two communities will be asked to settle and/or absorb after the solution, ranges from 15.37 billions US$ in the less favourable scenario to 1.95 billions US$ in the more favourable scenario. The average of the two scenarios is 8.86 billions US$. If one compares the two average value gaps, i.e. the one arising from the A-plan-5 and the ALTERNATIVE scenario, there is a very substantial decrease from 26.36 billions US$ down to 8.86 billions US$. This new, much lower value gap, is well within the capacity of the TC to cover over a long-term period of 20-30 years, if at the same time there is a foreign assistance and equivalent guarantees.

The TC community under this alternative scenario will potentially become the legal owner of between 21.2% and 17.2% of the total private land, with an average of the two to be around 19.2%. This figure is still more than the 16.6% of ownership that it had before 1974, but it is quite close to the population percentage of the community, which was 18% before 1974.

PostPosted: Tue Jun 14, 2005 1:00 am
by magikthrill
sweet. did you get this done by your own kifeas?

i feel your proposal seems qutie fair, but fair doesnt mean TCs would be willing to accept it once the puppets start dancing around.

will look more into your data though.

PostPosted: Tue Jun 14, 2005 9:18 pm
by MicAtCyp
Kifeas,

I read very carefully your work and your proposals, and I applaud your effort and time for preparing the tables and the alternative scenarios.Obviously this is a creditable work. Frankly speaking I printed the whole thread and I suggest everyone who wants to study it carefully to do the same, as it is impossible to read it on screen.

Personally I don't agree with any procedure that will deprive people of their ownership rights either they are GCs or TCs, although I accept the current user can have priority in case he wants to buy/rent or exchange on a value basis.As surprising as it might seem there are a lot of TC refugees who turned down the Anan plan simply because they would lose their properties the same way the GCs would lose them.

Certainly your scenario as described in table 7 is the most lets say "fair" on the other hand I think there is a basic error in the calculation of the price gaps.This is due to the fact that the TCs left behind in 1974 properties whose average value was CYP 206/scala(donum) whereas they got properties in the north worthing 1346 CYP/donum/scala. If we assume that the TC properties left behind were of low value because they were undeveloped and consider they should have equal value with the GC properties i.e 663 CYP/donum/scala still the value gap of in all your scenarios should be multiplied by at least 2.

Heres the data I posted some time in the past:

wrote: Average price of land in 1974 in CYPounds per scala
Free areas

GC:663
TC:206
State: 104
Other: 1547
Total:481 (average)

Average price of land in 1974 in CYPounds per scala
Occupied areas

GC:1346
TC:519
State: 363
Other: 1432
Total:990 (average)


Furthermore there are other unknown data: Every TC that I met says he either received less or about equal to what he left behind.Yet the GC properties in the northern part were 3 times as much. What happened to the other 2/3rds?? Erol said we have to take into account the huge military areas. Another part went to the settlers.Other properties were domolished and now stand as empty land. Why should there be an agreement on a fixed percentage any refugee can take back.If for example someones property is in a military area, why should he be deprived half his property after the military leaves? In my opinion these fixed percentages will only create injustices and hate between the people.

Anyway if my only option would be to chose something along the "philosophy of the Anan Plan" -like I said- your scenario on table 7 is my choice.

I have posted my complete views on the property issue at the thread of Alexandros regarding his last bicommunal poll, in case you are interested please have a look.

PS.Why do you say Anan plan VI :?: VI means 6 :!:

PostPosted: Tue Jun 14, 2005 10:45 pm
by Kifeas
micatcyp wrote:Personally I don't agree with any procedure that will deprive people of their ownership rights either they are GCs or TCs, although I accept the current user can have priority in case he wants to buy/rent or exchange on a value basis.As surprising as it might seem there are a lot of TC refugees who turned down the Anan plan simply because they would lose their properties the same way the GCs would lose them.


Mic, I know what you mean and I am the first one that would have loved such a solution. However, it is out of reality, if we aim in solving the Cyprus problem through peaceful means.

micatcyp wrote:Certainly your scenario as described in table 7 is the most lets say "fair" on the other hand I think there is a basic error in the calculation of the price gaps.This is due to the fact that the TCs left behind in 1974 properties whose average value was CYP 206/scala(donum) whereas they got properties in the north worthing 1346 CYP/donum/scala. If we assume that the TC properties left behind were of low value because they were undeveloped and consider they should have equal value with the GC properties i.e 663 CYP/donum/scala still the value gap of in all your scenarios should be multiplied by at least 2.


I know your point and I know the discrepancy in terms of value between the free and the occupied areas before 1974, mainly due to the less developed south in comparison to the north. However, we have to take into consideration that this situation in the south has changed and now the market values in the south are very high and that extends proportionally to the TC properties in the south. In fact, we (GC refugees) would have been extremely happy, if the compensation for our properties in the north is done on the basis of today’s corresponding market values in the south. This however was not the case in the Annan plan. As you know, in A-plan the value was determined not on the basis of the market value of equivalent properties in the south, but instead a new term was invented which was called “current value.” This current value would have been substantially lower than the market value of similar properties in the south. The A-plan property board was assumed to be buying land from the legal (pre-1974) owners on the basis of “current value” and sell to current users or those “eligible” to buy those properties, on the basis of the real market value at the time the solution was agreed.

My above work is based on the A–plan definition of “current value.”

However, I do not know how the TC properties in the south will be accommodated under this definition. The best way out is to equate everything with market values in the south for equivalent properties, minus some 10%-15% and ignore completely the value in 1974. It will be fairer for both GCs and TCs. After all, the market value of all properties in the north will immediately upon a solution, skyrocket and reach the market value in the south. Actually, I expect the market value in the south to immediately drop about 10-15% and stay like this for 2-3 years and the market value in the north to immediately raise and meet it up to this figure. However, there is a problem with the way the property board will handle the selling of excess land that it will accumulate, because if the GC are not allowed to buy from this land in the north, but instead they will be required to sell because of the quotas, then the supply of land will be much higher than the demand, and this would have made the market values to drop in general. The A-plan provision for properties was a very stupid formula, any way. It wouldn’t work and would have created a total chaos. The best way is to follow the alternative scenario of my proposal above. This will require by far less land to have to change hands (ownership.) However, the way TCs are dealing now with GC properties in the north, I am afraid is making this approach unworkable too.


P.S.: Thanks for the correction on the latin number of A-plan 5.

PostPosted: Wed Jun 15, 2005 4:37 pm
by MicAtCyp
Kifeas wrote: However, it is out of
reality, if we aim in solving the Cyprus problem through
peaceful means.


Why is it out of reality? Because we came to the point of beleiving whatever nonsense the TC leadership implanted in the minds of the TCs? Or because we have to surrender one way or another? I beleive our job is to stay firm to our rights and insist on them until we get them. The same way they wanted their bizonality and their Federation and we accepted it considering their reasons, they must also accept our demands for our properties for our very logical reasons too. After all we are asking for what WAS IS AND WILL ALWAYS BE- OURS! We are not asking to steal anything from them!

wrote: As you know, in
A - plan the value was determined not on the basis of the
market value of equivalent properties in the south, but
instead a new term was invented which was called
"current value. "


No, it was not exactly like that. It was "on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations. " I can claim a comparable location for Lapithos is not Lapithos but Paphos. Anyway I agree the Anan Plan was vague and it did not take into account the difference of values between the occupied and the free areas.

My friend the Anan Plan was a nonsense and a product of the always drunk Klerides and the ones like him. Forget about it or you will get crazy. Its philosophy was all wrong. Don't try to fix it, it's unfixable.
Ask, demand, work and fight for your complete and full rights. Or you will get nothing. The 4 houses of my wife and other empty land she inherited are all in the barbed Famagusta area 30 meters from the sea just behind the houses of Xenides Aresiti in Esperidon street. She will get them ALL back. I am not fighting for my personal interest. I am fighting by your side for your rights. Don't make me say what the hell. . . .

PostPosted: Wed Jun 15, 2005 6:33 pm
by Kifeas
MicAtCyp wrote:
As you know, in
A - plan the value was determined not on the basis of the
market value of equivalent properties in the south, but
instead a new term was invented which was called
"current value. "

No, it was not exactly like that. It was "on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations. " I can claim a comparable location for Lapithos is not Lapithos but Paphos. Anyway I agree the Anan Plan was vague and it did not take into account the difference of values between the occupied and the free areas.


The definition of “current value” based on which the compensation was going to be estimated, had changed in A-plan 5 into a different definition, which reads as follows. “The market value at the time of dispossession, adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable, if possible, locations and which have not been affected positively or negatively by the events of 1963 or 1974.”

The previous definition (A-plans 1,2 & 3) read as follows. “The market value at the time of dispossession, adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations, which have not been affected negatively by the events of 1963 or 1974.”

Therefore, according to A-plan 5, a comparable location for Lapithos could not have been Pafos, because it can be argued that Pafos was affected positively by the events of 1974. In the same way, all coastal areas of the free areas can be regarded as having been positively affected and therefore it is not possible to compare Lapithos with any other coastal area, town, or village.
:roll:

PostPosted: Thu Jun 16, 2005 2:18 pm
by MicAtCyp
Kifeas for the sake of the record and perhaps for helping other people follow this discussion I would like to quote here the relevant paragraphs referring to those tricky terms "current price" "market price" etc that so masterfully those who designed the Anan Plan aimed at foolling the GC refugees.

This is what the Anan Plan 3 says about compensations

wrote: 3a. Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation or whose properties
are not reinstated under the property arrangements shall receive full
and effective compensation on the basis of value at the time of
dispossession adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in
comparable locations;



and this is what Anan plan 5 says

wrote: Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation, as well as
institutions, shall receive full and effective compensation for their
property on the basis of value at the time of dispossession adjusted
to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations.
Compensation shall be paid in the form of guaranteed bonds and
appreciation certificates;


The term "current value " in Anan Plan 3 is defined as

wrote:Attachment 1 definitions

4. Current value36 – value of a property at time of dispossession, plus an
adjustment to reflect appreciation based among other things on increase
in average sale prices of properties in Cyprus in comparable locations37
in the intervening period up to the date of entry into force of the
Foundation Agreement. The current value of property shall be assessed
as at the date of entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. This
value shall bear interest, at the same rate as interest on compensation
bonds, from the date of entry into force of the Foundation Agreement
until compensation bonds are issued.

36 Observation: Expert advice shall be sought from quantity surveyors, economists and/or
specialists in property valuation on the final formulation of provisions relating to assessment
of value.
37 Observation: The calculation of the increase should be based on the hypothesis that
events between 1963 and 1974 had not taken place, i.e. not take into account depreciation in
values due to those events; it should if possible therefore be based on comparable locations
where property prices were not negatively affected by those events.




And in Anan Plan 5 is defined as

wrote: Current value31 – value of a property at time of dispossession, plus an
adjustment to reflect appreciation based among other things on increase
in average sale prices of properties in Cyprus in comparable locations32
in the intervening period up to the date of entry into force of the
Foundation Agreement. The current value of property shall be assessed
as at the date of entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. This
value shall bear interest, at the same rate as interest on medium-term
government bonds, from the date of entry into force of the Foundation
Agreement until compensation bonds and property appreciation
certificates are issued.


31 Observation: Expert advice shall be sought from quantity surveyors, economists and/or
specialists in property valuation on the final formulation of provisions relating to assessment
of value.
32 Observation: The value at the time of dispossession and the calculation of the increase
should be based on the hypothesis that events between 1963 and 1974 had not taken place,
i.e. they should not take into account alteration in values due to those events; it should if
possible therefore be based on comparable locations where property prices were not
positively or negatively affected by those events.



And here is what Anan Plan 3 and 5 say later about the compensation committe

wrote: Entitlements to compensation shall be assessed and paid by the
Property Board at current value, unless otherwise specified in these
provisions.

*****************

Entitlements to compensation shall be assessed and paid by the
Property Board at current value , unless otherwise specified in these
provisions.


Now the first question is why the plan uses such a misleading term like "current value" which does not even mean "current value" but rather "adjusted value"? Why is it hiding it many pages away from the subject to which it refers? Why it does not specifically use the term "current value" in the paragraph were it talks about compensations and hides it inside the paragraph of the compensation committe? Why does it use the term "current value" in numerous other occassions as for example the compensation payable for properties for public use? What happens to the properties expropriated by RoC at different value all these years?
To all these questions I personally cannot give any answer.

Then we come to another set of questions:How seriously can anyone take the term "current value"? Whereas in Anan Plan 1,2,3 this term was presumably set to take into account TC and GC properties that were left undeveloped due to 1963 and 1974 (perhaps near the green line) it then intoduces the same criterion for all properties that developed as well! How can anyone evaluate the degree any property was developed due to specifically the events of 1974 excluding all other factors like increase in tourism, infrastructure etc. How can anyone find any comparable location that was not affected positively or negatively? To what degree is that clause of "if possible" applicable, to zero degree perhaps? And what happens then, do we use clause 31 that refers to expert evaluators and economists? How those people are going to work when there is no current data available? How can they calculate values of properties without at least 5 years recent data under free market conditions? Where are those data when at the same time the property committee will sell massively under distorted market conditions? Furthermore what if the owner disagrees? How can any court decide without turning down all the provisions of the Anan Plan and look at the current market value? Can any court decide by turning down the provisions of Anan Plan?

To all these questions again I have no answer.

So in the end if we assume that term "current value" or better "adjusted price" to be taken seriously, then you might be right that all coastal areas in the free areas were affected possitively by 1974 on the other hand nobody can tell to what degree that was due to 1974 and not any other factors (with the exception of course of Ayia Napa and Paralimni).Similarly nobody can tell to what degree the coastal area of Lapithos was affected negatively since we all know the first boom in villas occured near there before 1974. So where do we end up, only God knows.

In my opinion the Anan Plan was the work of a schizophrenic. Each and every issue that I examined is completely contadictory and inapplicable.Except of course everything that has to do with GCs losing.

PostPosted: Thu Jun 16, 2005 6:12 pm
by Kifeas
MicAtCyp wrote:In my opinion the Anan Plan was the work of a schizophrenic. Each and every issue that I examined is completely contadictory and inapplicable.Except of course everything that has to do with GCs losing.


No Mic, the A-plan was not the work of some schizophrenic minds! The A-plan was the natural outcome of Anglo-American cynicism and political amoralism, facilitated by consecutive GC, Greek and eventually EU defeatist leaderships.

MicAtCyp wrote:So in the end if we assume that term "current value" or better "adjusted price" to be taken seriously, then you might be right that all coastal areas in the free areas were affected possitively by 1974 on the other hand nobody can tell to what degree that was due to 1974 and not any other factors (with the exception of course of Ayia Napa and Paralimni).Similarly nobody can tell to what degree the coastal area of Lapithos was affected negatively since we all know the first boom in villas occured near there before 1974. So where do we end up, only God knows.


It is called constructive (destructive) ambiguity. And when there is ambiguity in something, guess what? The one who holds the knife and the melon is the one whose definition prevails. Obviously this one would have not been the poor refugee /property owner.

MicAtCyp wrote:Furthermore what if the owner disagrees? How can any court decide without turning down all the provisions of the Anan Plan and look at the current market value? Can any court decide by turning down the provisions of Anan Plan?


Had A-plan been approved by the people in the referendum, no court whatsoever would have been able to do anything. Neither local nor any international court, nor the ECHRs. The reason? It would have become our new constitution, perfectly approved by the people in a referendum. The new constitution of the URC would have replaced the old constitution. The new constitution provided that the all property rights of all those affected by the events of 1963 and 1974, should be regulated according to the provisions of the foundation agreement. It would have become the new law.

MicAtCyp wrote:Now the first question is why the plan uses such a misleading term like "current value" which does not even mean "current value" but rather "adjusted value"? Why is it hiding it many pages away from the subject to which it refers? Why it does not specifically use the term "current value" in the paragraph were it talks about compensations and hides it inside the paragraph of the compensation committe? Why does it use the term "current value" in numerous other occassions as for example the compensation payable for properties for public use? What happens to the properties expropriated by RoC at different value all these years?


“Current value” is indeed a misleading term, if you do not read its definition in the appendix. It is not the same as the “market value.” Market value is the actual value in the open market. The property board was assumed in A-plan to expropriate refugee’s properties on the basis of “current value” and sell them on the basis of “market value.”

That means that for my 9 donums of land on the coast of Lapithos, I would take the 3 donums (1/3,) if they were available and if they wouldn’t fell under the various preconditions (in my case they would,) and “compensation” for the remaining 6 donums. If I could not take my 1/3 of land, and there was also no other land available in the same area (this is the most probable scenario for most Kyrenians due to the very unfavourable preconditions for GCs,) all my property (9 donums) would have been “compensated” according to the following method. For the first 1/3 I would receive “compensation” in government guaranteed bonds exchangeable in 30 years (if I would still be alive,) and for the other 2/3 I would receive some toilet papers called “property appreciation certificates.” (Or maybe diplomas. I do not remember which one of the two.) These “Property Appreciation Certificates” (PAC) would have not been guaranteed by anyone and their cash value will depend on how well the property board manages the selling of properties and what net revenues it does, but also based on the demand and supply of these PAC in the stock market. I would have not been able to use them in order to buy other property, nor any bank would accept them for loan purposes. Only the 1/3 government bonds could be used for these purposes.

Now, how much I would be “compensated” with? The market value of my property in 1974 was around £6,500 per donum. Total £54,000 (9 x 6,500.) The multiplying factor for the value appreciation was estimated to be around 14 times the 1974 value. That makes a total “current value” of £756,000 (14 x 54,000.) I would then receive £252,000 in bonds and 504,000 PAC shares (assuming a face value of £1 per PAC share.)

Now, besides not taking back my property, I was also not going to be aallowed to return back to Lapithos any time soon after the solution, due to the time and quota (%) restrictions. That means that I could only live where I am now, in Pafos. Most probably that’s where I will stay forever, since I am now 39 y.o. I need to buy some property, since mine is taken. It so happens that there is some similar in terms of location, TC property, somewhere in Pafos or Polis area, that I can buy form the property board. It is only about 2 donums but that is what has been left available, due to the fact that TC properties in the south were very few and also because most TC owners of such properties have chosen to make full use of their 1/3 allowance, due to their very high market value versus what they would get as “compensation” from the property board. The property board will only sell to me this property on the actual market value of this area, which in the case of Pafos it is around £200,000 per donum. So for these 2 donums, I will use my £252,000 bonds but I will still need another £150,000 to make up the total market value. Being an average GC refugee who has spend all his last 30 years working for a salary, most likely I will not have these extra £150,000. Therefore, I will have to settle down for a one donum or perhaps 2 housing plots in the city. From the 9 donums in Lapithos -on which I could very easily built a mid size hotel, to the 2 plots in Pafos! Guess who will buy most of the TC land in the south that will remain in the hands of the property board. Definately not the GC refugees, but rather the big developers and capitalists and those who have the necessary cash, already in their hands. The same will happen in the north for the same reasons. The ordinary people will remain with the PAC shares in their hands and will be trying to sell them in the stock market, in order to raise some money and manage to buy some property before the big developers buy it all. That will eventually lead the value of these PAC shares to drop below their nominal value, like it happens with the Cyprus stock exchange now.

PostPosted: Thu Jun 16, 2005 11:39 pm
by MicAtCyp
Extremely interesting and enlightening discussion kifeas. Thank you for your time explaining everything in detail. Honestly I feel very sad after reading your post.

Re: An Alternative Scenario for Solution of Property Issue

PostPosted: Thu Jun 23, 2005 12:27 pm
by sadik
Kifeas, the plan you propose is definitely within the parameters of a federation. And it definitely reduces the financial burden after a solution and makes it more acceptable to GCs. I feel that your alternative scenarios might be acceptable to most TCs in the overal solution plan. Actually, this is a very good example of what the GC leadership should do at the negotiation table.