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Turkey go out!

How can we solve it? (keep it civilized)

Turkey go out!

Postby Maronite » Fri Mar 05, 2004 12:30 am

A tale of strategic importance: 1953-2004
For three decades, the pillar of Turkish arguments on Cyprus was the island's strategic (and security) importance. Hence the common belief that the concept was a Turkish invention. Actually, it was British.

In September 1953, Greek Prime Minister Marshal Papagos raised the subject of enosis in a private meeting with Sir Anthony Eden, British foreign secretary. However, Sir Anthony curtly dismissed the issue with a comment to the effect that as far as England was concerned the problem of enosis did not exist.

Soon after this meeting, his views were echoed by the colonial secretary who, in a speech in the House of Commons, declared with finality that "Cyprus occupied a strategic position and that as such it belonged to that category of territories for which the principle of self-determination could never apply."

More than half a century after that, the Turkish military, by nodding to Kofi Annan's binding terms to resume negotiations for a settlement on the troubled island, has practically scrapped the idea of Cyprus's strategic/security importance -- along with Turkey's sine qua nons for a settlement.

On Feb. 15, the top brass in Ankara sent a note to the government to reaffirm their security/derogation red lines over the U.N. blueprint -- two days after the Cyprus game was over. It is now time they must ask themselves tough questions.

It is a fact that neither the Turkish nor the Greek Cypriots will have too much leverage on the process leading up to the final text. It is, therefore, most futile to talk of security matters and derogations. The text for referenda will not be produced in Nicosia, Ankara or Athens but, like it or not, on the Washington-New York axis. That's the deal.

When the government and military leaders in Ankara pushed Rauf Denktas to a point of no return, they practically negated Turkey's position on Cyprus in the past three decades.

There is an inconsistency here. If Ankara is genuinely concerned about security and derogations it should not have given Annan a carte blanche. If not, no one should be talking about red lines any longer.

All the same, the Turks and Turkish Cypriots say they have common red lines that Annan must not cross when he fills in the gaps before calling joint referenda -- red lines concerning derogations and security. Last week, a lieutenant general at the Turkish General Staff headquarters reaffirmed the military's stand that "any deal must not compromise national security" -- a coded reference to derogations and troops.

The men in uniforms keep on talking about security risks of the reunification of Cyprus. It's too late. In reality, Turkey, on Feb. 13, abandoned the fundamentals of its Cyprus policy -- possibly not to ruin its own hopes of joining the EU. But it cannot admit to have done so. All the tension over ground-to-air S-300 missile systems in Cyprus, over a tiny islet on the Aegean Sea less than a decade ago, it seems, was only trivial.

Some very important men on both sides of the Atlantic have given assurances to Ankara, through back and front channels, that "Annan will take into account Turkey's red lines and eventually produce a fair text." Of course, these assurances may or may not materialize. But it is a little bizarre when the Turkish military talks of "security concerns." One should be able to see that the game was over on Feb. 13.

That date marks a strategic choice for Turkey. It may or may not prove to be a well-calculated risk. The real question is why did Denktas (and his traditional supporters in Ankara) categorically reject Annan's plan a year ago if Cyprus, as they have now silently admitted, did not occupy a strategic position for Turkey's security interests? Could the island have lost its entire strategic position in the span of a year?

Like in Ankara and Athens, it's all play-acting in Nicosia. But never mind if half-hearted Turkish and Greek Cypriot negotiators made virtually no progress in a week of talks. It is not surprising if the talks have not produced real negotiations -- no one should expect they will. Annan's binding terms rule out the possibility of real talk. The New York deal on Feb. 13 made sure the Cypriots, not their negotiators, will decide if they want to co-habit once again after three decades.

It's time to talk sense and leave the historic decision, without pressure for a "yes" or a "no" vote, to the Cypriots. Only the Cypriots should be praised/accused of the goods/bads of reunification/division.

2 March 2004, Turkish Daily News, Burak Bekdil


In 1963, Kucuk agreed to the 13 Points but <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:City w:st="on">Ankara</st1:City></st1:place> overruled him because they didn't want a solution based on a *unitary* (read G/C-dominated) democracy. Taksim served Turkey's strategic interests.

Had the 13 points been accepted, in 1963, the Cyprus wouldn't have sufferred conflicts, attrocities invasions, refuigees, corruption, repression etc. Cyprus could have been an EU member now, with all her communities (Greek, Turks, Armenians, Maronites, Latinos) living in peace and prosperity. The British bases of course, wouldn't have been affected.

What were these dreadfull 13 points?

Suggested Measures For The Removal of Causes of Friction Between the Two Communities ... ntents.htm

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abolished.

2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for or replace the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. In consequence, therefore, all the constitutional provisions in respect of joint action by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be modified accordingly.

3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.

4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for or replace the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

6. The constitutional provision regarding the establishment of separate Municipalities in the five main towns to be abolished. Provision should be made so that: (a) The Municipal Council in each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councillors in proportion to the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such town by whom they shall be elected respectively. (b) In the Budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deducting any expenditure required for common services, a percentage of the balance proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of such town shall be earmarked and disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Turkish Councillors. 7. The constitutional provision regarding Courts consisting of Greek Judges to try Greeks and of Turkish Judges to try Turks and of mixed Courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to try cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks to be abolished.

8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished, (Provision to be made in case the Head of the Police is a Greek the Deputy Head to be a Turk and vice versa).

9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Army to be determined by Law and not by agreement between the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to either five or seven.

12. All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. If there is an allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the Turkish members of the Commission, its Chairman to be bound to refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished".

It is evident to me, that the 13 changes were designed to bring the two communities closer, to work together towards the common benefit of all Cypriots.

The last time the two communities worked together as one people, was in 1931, when they rose against the British, in protest to the heavy taxation imposed on them.

From "History of Cyprus" by Costas P. Kypris

xiii. The October 1931 Uprising:

Causes, Political and Economic Background, Nature and Results. Governor Storrs's AndConsul Kyrous's Responsibilities (page 342)

"The elections of 1930 brought a majority of unionist M.P.s in the Greek Community and of anti-British M.P.s among the Turks; the latter voted against Mounir, a man of the British confidence, and for the Kemalist candidates, among them Nejati bey, Turkish Cypriot nationalist, who were supported by the Kemalist Turkish consul in Cyprus, Assaf bey. this defeat reversed, at the expense of the British, the long-established balance in the Legislative Council: the results of the change appeared soon when both Greek and Turkish M.P.s voted against the new Tarrif Law introduced in May 1931 by Sir Ronald Storrs, in order to cover the deficit of 127,643 (pounds) in the Budget caused by his disastrously wrong financial policy and fragrant extravagance."

page (343) " Within 48 hours the rebellion spread all over Cyprus in about 400 villages. The participation of many Turkish Cypriots in and the solidarity of others with the movement confirms its economic basis and illustrates the still, at the time, existing peaceful co-existence and collaboration of the two communities beyond any national antagonism"

With the 1931 rebellion, the British erased the "democratic" involvement of the people in the governing of Cyprus by abolishing the Legislative Council. The Governor had absolute power from then on. (loose translation from the Greek "History of Cyprus" by Katia Hadgidimitriou

After 1931, the British began a campaign to cultivate the division between the "Christian majority and the Moslem minority" on the island. The terms "Greeks" and "Turks" were adopted after 1946.

Turkey's rejection of the 13 points aimed to divide the Cypriot people and bring disaster and taksim, all in the interest of Ankara.

Today, history repeats itself. Ankara, through their puppet Denktash, introduces another divisive plan for the people of Cyprus. 1963 will repeat all over again.

Are the Cypriot men going to wake up, one of these years? Are they that stupid?

I propose a common democratic goverment system with only one condition. 50-50% representation between men and women. The president and vice-president should be females.

Nothing else.

Postby Humanoid » Fri Mar 05, 2004 12:31 am

Nothing else? Are you sure?... Oh my friend... I must emphasize once more...

The Greek Cypriot Debate on Enosis, 1929, by G.S.

In the autumn of 1954 the Greek prime minister, Field Marshal Papagos, who had been personally offended by Eden's dismissive treatment of the case for enosis (in a conversation in Athens in September 1953), and Archbishop Makarios both gave the go-ahead to Grivas who, in hiding in Cyprus, had called his underground organization EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, National Organization of Freedom Fighters) and himself 'Dighenis' to launch a campaign of sabotage. On 1 April 1955 the transmitters of the Cyprus Broadcasting Station were blown up and a series of simultaneous, but less effective, explosions took place across the island. The revolt had begun*.

Turkish Cypriot Reaction to the Campaign for Enosis, 1930s

Turkish Cypriot reaction to the campaign for enosis

It is often alleged that Turkish Cypriots were roused to oppose enosis by the British colonialists, but there was a core of opposition in the Turkish Cypriot community from an early stage. Consider the following excerpt from a speech made by Zekia, a Turkish Cypriot member of the Legislative Council, in 1930.


We vehemently protest against this [pro-enosis] representation as we have always done in the past. We believe that if Cyprus were annexed to Greece there would be no chance of life for the Moslems in Cyprus. We know that the Greeks are in the majority in Cyprus, but there are many other countries in the world similar to Cyprus which are being administered by foreigners in spite of the fact that the majority of the people belong to another race. As is known to you, there is no principle in international law providing for the annexation of every country to the country which is homogeneous to it. Therefore I am surprised that my honorable Greek colleagues feel able to base this claim on international law. It would be possible to benefit the island much more if the question of union were set aside and of all the members of the Council were united in the taking of measures calculated to promote the development and progress of the country . . . . The divergent national feelings and sentiments prevailing in the island would make impossible the administration of justice in the island.


From Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs, by George Georghalides.

British attempts at a solution


The Cyprus problem could either be tackled domestically--that is, as between Britain and her colonial subjects, or internationally. And, if internationally, a solution might be attempted between Britain and Greece or at a three-power level (Britain, Greece and Turkey); at a NATO level which would include particularly the United States and the Secretary-General of NATO (at first Lord Ismay but later Paul-Henri Spaak); and at the level of the United Nations, where the diplomacy was essentially of a declaratory nature. The domestic politics of Greece, Turkey and Britain (in which a section of the Labour party, led by Barbara Castle, was markedly pro-Greek Cypriot) at various times obtruded. There was a basic absence of understanding between the British and the Greek Cypriots in their analysis of the political problem. The latter, and especially the Orthodox church, identified themselves with the whole island, and thought of the dispute with Britain as a classic anti-colonial one in which complications about the Turks were only a British excuse. Greek Cypriots simply did not take seriously warnings about the likely reaction of the Turkish Cypriots to any change of sovereignty, and felt--and retrospectively still feel--that it was unnecessary for Britain in the circumstances of the 1950s to do so. The Turks themselves did not take seriously the possibility of Britain yielding to such a demand. It is correct that Britain alerted them not to count on this too complacently. Anthony Eden states in his memoirs that he minuted a telegram in July 1955 that it was as well that Turks should speak out 'because it was the truth that the Turks would never let the Greeks have Cyprus'. This could be interpreted as inciting the Turks, but it could also be considered a prudent precaution against Greek overconfidence.

The Move Toward Violence, 1953-55The failure of the British to offer any hope of a change in Cyprus=s colonial status was met by Greek Cypriots with a growing surge toward militancy, particularly (and perhaps exclusively) by those insisting in enosis. Greek scholar Ioannis Stefanidis explains this in Isle of Discord.

1955 Armed violence against British begun by Grivas & EOKA. Küçük renames National Union Party as Cyprus is Turkish Party. London Conference: Britain invited Greece & Turkey to discuss problems, including Cyprus. Conference ended without agreement. Riots orchestrated in Istanbul. Gov. Harding cracks down on EOKA.

1956 Negotiations for self-government. Makarios deported. Violence & repression intensifies. EOKA targets police, GCs as well as British murdered. GCs in police replaced by TCs; some TCs are casualties of EOKA terrorism. Radcliffe Plan for self-governance rejected; first official reference to partition.

1957 Bombing kills one TC, wounding three; TCs retaliated. TC riots in Nicosia against British forces; seven TCs killed. Trade unions joint appeal for calm. EOKA cease fire, release of Makarios to Athens. TC demand for "taksim"; rise of TMT. Demand for Turkish army base. Governor Foot pursues new policy of conciliation.

1958 Plan for self-government postponed sovereignty issue; rejected by Turkey. TCs riot for partition. EOKA boycott of British, end of year-long ceasefire. Turkish Cypriot PIO office bombed, EOKA blamed (later established that TC extremists responsible). TC violence against GCs in Nicosia, 8 GCs killed near Guenyeli. MacMillan plan involving Greece & Turkey; some implementation begun. EOKA targets TCs; villages burned. Intercommunal ceasefire. Makarios announced he would agree to guaranteed independence

The harsh measures adopted by the British on Cyprus seemed particularly incongruous in view of the relaxation of strictures in Egypt and India at the same time. But the harsh measures continued; the teaching of Greek and Turkish history was curtailed, and the flying of Greek or Turkish flags or the public display of portraits of Greek or Turkish heroes was forbidden. The rules applied to both ethnic groups, although Turkish Cypriots had not contributed to the disorders of 1931.

Perhaps most objectionable to the Greek Cypriots were British actions that Cypriots perceived as being against the church. After the bishops of Kition and Kyrenia had been exiled, only two of the church's four major offices were occupied, i.e., the archbishopric in Nicosia and the bishopric of Paphos. When Archbishop Cyril III died in 1933 leaving Bishop Leontios of Paphos as locum tenens, church officials wanted the exiled bishops returned for the election of a new archbishop. The colonial administration refused, stating that the votes could be sent from abroad; the church authorities objected, and the resulting stalemate kept the office vacant from 1933 until 1947. Meanwhile, in 1937, in an effort to counteract the leading role played by the clergy in the nationalist movement, the British enacted laws governing the internal affairs of the church. Probably most onerous was the provision subjecting the election of an archbishop to the governor's approval. The laws were repealed in 1946. In June 1947, Leontios was elected archbishop, ending the fourteen-year British embarrassment at being blamed for the vacant archbishopric.

Under the strict rules enforced on the island, Cypriots were not allowed to form nationalist groups; therefore, during the late 1930s, the center of enosis activism shifted to London. In 1937 the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy was formed with the avowed purpose of lobbying Parliament for some degree of home rule. But most members of Parliament and of the Colonial Office, as well as many colonial officials on the island, misread the situation just as they had sixty years earlier, when they assumed administration from the Ottoman Turks and were greeted with expressions of the Greek Cypriot desire for enosis. The British were still not able to understand the importance of that desire to the majority community.

Although there was growing opposition to British rule, colonial administration had brought some benefits to the island. Money had gone into modernization projects. The economy, stagnant under the Ottomans, had improved, and trade increased. Financial reforms eventually broke the hold money lenders had over many small farmers. An honest and efficient civil service was put in place. New schools were built for the education of Cypriot children. Where only one hospital had existed during the Ottoman era, several were built by the British. Locusts were eradicated, and after World War II malaria was eliminated. A new system of roads brought formerly isolated villages into easy reach of the island's main cities and towns. A reforestation program to cover the colony's denuded hills and mountains was begun. Still, there was much poverty, industry was almost nonexistent, most manufactures were imported from Britain, and Cypriots did not govern themselves.

British Rule
1878 - 1960
The Cypriots hope that the British will do the same with Cyprus as they did with the Ionian islands - hand them over to Greece, in other words - but instead the British formally annexe Cyprus in 1914, and alongside a reasonable governmental system, they impose crippling taxes on the population, partly due to the wording of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which precludes Britain from spending too much on Cypriot development. In the 1930s, calls for enosis (union with Greece) reach fever pitch, resulting in the first of many civil disturbances. After World War II an offer from the British for limited self-rule is rejected by the enosists, and by 1950 Archbishop Makarios III calls a referendum that shows 96 per cent of Greek Cypriots support enosis; however the Turkish minority (18 per cent of the population) are strongly opposed to union with Greece, and combined with a little 'divide and conquer' politics by the British, this sets the scene for arguments between Britain, Greece and Turkey on the issue. In 1954 EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) is formed by Makarios and General George Grivas, and starts a campaign to oust the British and bring about enosis. The British arrest and deport Makarios, but the British finally accept the concept of independence 'in principle' and he returns in 1957. In 1958 the TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation) is founded to counter EOKA activity, and a bomb in June 1958 outside the Turkish press office in Nicosia (later shown to have been planted by the TMT) sparks off Cyprus' first intercommunal riots. After the riots are quelled and EOKA and TMT sign a truce, the British finally hand over control of the island on 16 August, 1960, apart from three sovereign bases, which remain British. Archbishop Makarios is installed as the first President, and as part of the constitution Britain, Turkey and Greece are appointed as guarantors of peace in independent Cyprus, and Grivas leaves for Greece in disgust at Makarios' sell-out of the enosis cause. ... yprus.html

In end 19th century the British took over Cyprus from now a weakened Ottoman empire. The Cyprus Convention of 1878 between Britain and Turkey allowed the former a base under Ottoman sovereignty to protect the latter from Russian designs. But in 1914 when they were at war with each other, Britain annexed the island. The annexation was ratified under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Cyprus became a crown colony in 1925. But since the occupation of the island by the British, the Greek population had always hoped to join (Greek enosis ) Greece, while the Turkish population was always opposed to it. Greece refused the British offer of transfer of Cyprus to it in 1915 as the attached conditions were not acceptable to Greece. After the 2nd World War, during which Cyprus received only a few air raids, the new Labor party government in Britain published in 1947 proposals for greater self-government. But the Greek Cypriots were only for "enosis and only enosis". In 1955 Lieut. Col. Georgios Grivas (also known as Dighenis), an ex Greek Army officer, began a concerted campaign for enosis, under the National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakoú Agónos- EOKA), bombing public buildings and killing opponents of enosis, Greek Cypriots as well as British. Many proposals for self-government were discussed at different times and were rejected. But the EOKA attacks continued. In March 1956 archbishop Makarios III, took over the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. He was deported to the Seychelles and when not allowed to return on release in 1957, he moved over to Athens. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot minority, led by Fazil Küçük, alarmed at the clamour for enosis, demanded partition and or accession to Turkey. Public opinion in Greece and Turkey was much aroused in support of the two communities, resulting in riots and expulsions of Greek residents in Turkey. United Nations tried but could produce no agreed solution.

In the municipal elections of 1943, the first since the British crackdown of 1931, AKEL gained control of the important cities of Famagusta and Limassol. After its success at the polls, AKEL supported strikes, protested the absence of a popularly elected legislature, and continually stressed Cypriot grievances incurred under the rigid regime of the post-1931 period. Both communists and conservative groups advocated enosis, but for AKEL such advocacy was an expediency aimed at broadening its appeal. On other matters, communists and conservatives often clashed, sometimes violently. In January 1946, eighteen members of the communist-oriented Pan- Cyprian Federation of Labor (Pankypria Ergatiki Omospondia--PEO) were convicted of sedition by a colonial court and sentenced to varying prison terms. Later that year, a coalition of AKEL and PEO was victorious in the municipal elections, adding Nicosia to the list of cities having communist mayors.

In late 1946, the British government announced plans to liberalize the colonial administration of Cyprus and to invite Cypriots to form a Consultative Assembly for the purpose of discussing a new constitution. Demonstrating their good will and conciliatory attitude, the British also allowed the return of the 1931 exiles, repealed the 1937 religious laws, and pardoned the leftists who had been convicted of sedition in 1946. Instead of rejoicing, as expected by the British, the Greek Cypriot hierarchy reacted angrily, because there had been no mention of enosis.

Response to the governor's invitations to the Consultative Assembly was mixed. The Church of Cyprus had expressed its disapproval, and twenty-two Greek Cypriots declined to appear, stating that enosis was their sole political aim. In October 1947, the fiery bishop of Kyrenia was elected archbishop to replace Leontios, who had died suddenly of natural causes.

As Makarios II, the new archbishop continued to oppose British policy in general, and any policy in particular that did not actively promote enosis. Nevertheless, the assembly opened in November with eighteen members present. Of these, seven were Turkish Cypriots; two were Greek Cypriots without party affiliations; one was a Maronite from the small minority of non- Orthodox Christians on the island; and eight were AKEL-oriented Greek Cypriots--usually referred to as the "left wing." The eight left-wing members proposed discussion of full self-government, but the presiding officer, Chief Justice Edward Jackson, ruled that full self-government was outside the competence of the assembly. This ruling caused the left wing to join the other members in opposition to the British. The deadlocked assembly adjourned until May 1948, when the governor attempted to break the deadlock by advancing new constitutional proposals.

The new proposals included provisions for a Legislative Council with eighteen elected Greek Cypriot members and four elected Turkish Cypriot members in addition to the colonial secretary, the attorney general, the treasurer, and the senior commissioner as appointed members. Elections were to be based on universal adult male suffrage, with Greek Cypriots elected from a general list and Turkish Cypriots from a separate communal register. Women's suffrage was an option to be extended if the assembly so decided. The presiding officer was to be a governor's appointee, who could not be a member of the council and would have no vote. Powers were reserved to the governor to pass or reject any bill regardless of the decision of the council, although in the event of a veto he was obliged to report his reasons to the British government. The governor's consent was also required before any bill having to do with defense, finance, external affairs, minorities, or amendments to the constitution could be introduced in the Legislative Council.

In the political climate of the immediate post-World War II era, the proposals of the British did not come near fulfilling the expectations and aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. The idea of "enosis and only enosis" became even more attractive to the general population. Having observed this upsurge in popularity, AKEL felt obliged to shift from backing full self-government to supporting enosis, although the right-wing government in Greece was bitterly hostile to communism.

Meanwhile, the Church of Cyprus solidified its control over the Greek Cypriot community, intensified its activities for enosis and, after the rise of AKEL, opposed communism. Prominent among its leaders was Bishop Makarios, spiritual and secular leader of the Greek Cypriots. Born Michael Christodoulou Mouskos in 1913 to peasant parents in the village of Pano Panayia, about thirty kilometers northeast of Paphos in the foothills of the Troodos Mountains, the future archbishop and president entered Kykko Monastery as a novice at age thirteen. His pursuit of education over the next several years took him from the monastery to the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia, where he finished secondary school. From there he moved to Athens University as a deacon to study theology. After earning his degree in theology, he remained at the university during the World War II occupation, studying law. He was ordained as a priest in 1946, adopting the name Makarios. A few months after ordination, he received a scholarship from the World Council of Churches that took him to Boston University for advanced studies at the Theological College. Before he had completed his studies at Boston, he was elected in absentia bishop of Kition. He returned to Cyprus in the summer of 1948 to take up his new office.

Makarios was consecrated as bishop on June 13, 1948, in the Cathedral of Larnaca. He also became secretary of the Ethnarchy Council, a position that made him chief political adviser to the archbishop and swept him into the mainstream of the enosis struggle. His major accomplishment as bishop was planning the plebiscite that brought forth a 96 percent favorable vote for enosis in January 1950. In June Archbishop Makarios II died, and in October the bishop of Kition was elected to succeed him. He took office as Makarios III and, at age thirty-seven, was the youngest archbishop in the history of the Church of Cyprus. At his inauguration, he pledged not to rest until union with "Mother Greece" had been achieved.

The plebiscite results and a petition for enosis were taken to the Greek Chamber of Deputies, where Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos urged the deputies to accept the petition and incorporate the plea for enosis into national policy. The plebiscite data were also presented to the United Nations (UN) Secretariat in New York, with a request that the principle of self-determination be applied to Cyprus. Makarios himself appeared before the UN in February 1951 to denounce British policy, but Britain held that the Cyprus problem was an internal issue not subject to UN consideration.

In Athens, enosis was a common topic of coffeehouse conversation, and a Cypriot native, Colonel George Grivas, was becoming known for his strong views on the subject. Grivas, born in 1898 in the village of Trikomo about fifty kilometers northeast of Nicosia, was the son of a grain merchant. After elementary education in the village school, he was sent to the Pancyprian Gymnasium. Reportedly a good student, Grivas went to Athens at age seventeen to enter the Greek Military Academy. As a young officer in the Greek army, he saw action in Anatolia during the Greco- Turkish War of 1920-22, in which he was wounded and cited for bravery. Grivas's unit almost reached Ankara during the Anatolian campaign, and he was sorely disappointed as the Greek campaign turned into disaster. However, he learned much about war, particularly guerrilla war. When Italy invaded Greece in 1940, he was a lieutenant colonel serving as chief of staff of an infantry division.

During the Nazi occupation of Greece, Grivas led a right-wing extremist organization known by the Greek letter X (Chi), which some authors describe as a band of terrorists and others call a resistance group. In his memoirs, Grivas said that it was later British propaganda that blackened the good name of X. At any rate, Grivas earned a reputation as a courageous military leader, even though his group was eventually banned. Later, after an unsuccessful try in Greek politics, he turned his attention to his original home, Cyprus, and to enosis. For the rest of his life, Grivas was devoted to that cause.

In anticipation of an armed struggle to achieve enosis, Grivas toured Cyprus in July 1951 to study the people and terrain (his first visit in twenty years). He discussed his ideas with Makarios but was disappointed by the archbishop's reservations about the effectiveness of a guerrilla uprising. From the beginning, and throughout their relationship, Grivas resented having to share leadership with the archbishop. Makarios, concerned about Grivas's extremism from their very first meeting, preferred to continue diplomatic efforts, particularly efforts to get the UN involved. Entry of both Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made settlement of the Cyprus issue more important to the Western powers, but no new ideas were forthcoming. One year after the reconnaissance trip by Grivas, a secret meeting was arranged in Athens to bring together like-minded people in a Cyprus liberation committee. Makarios chaired the meeting. Grivas, who saw himself as the sole leader of the movement, once again was disappointed by the more moderate views of the archbishop. The feelings of uneasiness that arose between the soldier and the cleric never dissipated. In the end, the two became bitter enemies.

In July 1954, Henry L. Hopkinson, minister of state for the colonies, speaking in the British House of Commons, announced the withdrawal of the 1948 constitutional proposals for Cyprus in favor of an alternative plan. He went on to state, "There are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their peculiar circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent." Hopkinson's "never" and the absence of any mention of enosis doomed the alternative from the beginning.

In August 1954, Greece's UN representative formally requested that self-determination for the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly's next session. That request was seconded by a petition to the secretary general from Archbishop Makarios. The British position continued to be that the subject was an internal issue. Turkey rejected the idea of the union of Cyprus and Greece; its UN representative maintained that "the people of Cyprus were no more Greek than the territory itself." The Turkish Cypriot community had consistently opposed the Greek Cypriot enosis movement, but had generally abstained from direct action because under British rule the Turkish minority status and identity were protected. The expressed attitude of the Cyprus Turkish Minority Association was that, in the event of British withdrawal, control of Cyprus should simply revert to Turkey. (This position ignored the fact that Turkey gave up all rights and claims in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.) Turkish Cypriot identification with Turkey had grown stronger, and after 1954 the Turkish government had become increasingly involved as the Cyprus problem became an international issue. On the island, an underground political organization known as Volkan (volcano) was formed. Volkan eventually established in 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teskilâti--TMT), a guerrilla group that fought for Turkish Cypriot interests. In Greece, enosis was a dominant issue in politics, and pro-enosis demonstrations became commonplace in Athens. Cyprus was also bombarded with radio broadcasts from Greece pressing for enosis.

In the late summer and fall of 1954, the Cyprus problem intensified. On Cyprus the colonial government threatened advocates of enosis with up to five years' imprisonment and warned that antisedition laws would be strictly enforced. The archbishop defied the law, but no action was taken against him.

Anti-British sentiments were exacerbated when Britain concluded an agreement with Egypt for the evacuation of forces from the Suez Canal zone and began moving the headquarters of the British Middle East Land and Air Forces to Cyprus. Meanwhile, Grivas had returned to the island surreptitiously and made contact with Makarios. In December the UN General Assembly, after consideration of the Cyprus item placed on the agenda by Greece, adopted a New Zealand proposal that, using diplomatic jargon, announced the decision "not to consider the problem further for the time being, because it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus." Reaction to the setback at the UN was immediate and violent. Greek Cypriot leaders called a general strike, and schoolchildren left their classrooms to demonstrate in the streets. These events were followed by the worst rioting since 1931. Makarios, who was at the UN in New York during the trouble, returned to Nicosia on January 10, 1955. At a meeting with Makarios, Grivas stated that their group needed a name and suggested that it be called the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston--EOKA). Makarios agreed, and, within a few months, EOKA was widely known. ... alism.html

Now please make corrections on your conclusions....

Postby Humanoid » Fri Mar 05, 2004 12:32 am

With the 1931 rebellion, the British erased the "democratic" involvement of the people in the governing of Cyprus by abolishing the Legislative Council. The Governor had absolute power from then on. (loose translation from the Greek "History of Cyprus" by Katia Hadgidimitriou

- NO ( Details above)

After 1931, the British began a campaign to cultivate the division between the "Christian majority and the Moslem minority" on the island. The terms "Greeks" and "Turks" were adopted after 1946.

- NO ... The seperation had been already started by Enosisist in 1929... The years 1900 till 1940 is the liberation and nationalism years of the world ... there's nothing related with British policies but Enosis movement of a group of Greek and GCs strenghten the TCs seperatist and nationalist feelings...

Turkey's rejection of the 13 points aimed to divide the Cypriot people and bring disaster and taksim, all in the interest of Ankara.

- Yes... But in addition; Enosis idea divided most of the GCs and TCs so many years ago...The neverending Enosis demand of a group of Greeks and GCs had given them a great opportunity to step into division policy. In 1963, 13 points wasn't the only problem of the Republic of Cyprus. It's the year of sneaky Akritas Plan had been put in action by Ensosisists. Guess when it was formed!

Today, history repeats itself. Ankara, through their puppet Denktash, introduces another divisive plan for the people of Cyprus. 1963 will repeat all over again.

- Yes ...But in addition; Greece, through their puppet Papadopulos introduces another Akritas plan for the people of Cyprus. But this time 1963 won't repeat all over again...

Are the Cypriot men going to wake up, one of these years? Are they that stupid?

- As far as noone tells them the unbiased true history and the ongoing facts; waking up is impossible for them cause they think they have been already awaken up... It's not a matter of stupidity of Cypriots but their so-called frontmen...

I propose a common democratic goverment system with only one condition. 50-50% representation between men and women. The president and vice-president should be females.

- Hehehehe... I understand you very well... you too are one of them...

Nothing else.

- Else is above very detailed....

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