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How can we solve it? (keep it civilized)

Postby insan » Fri Jan 23, 2009 6:28 pm

SECRET
Copy No 1
TO: CC BCP FIRST SECRETARY AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL, COMRADE TODOR ZHIVKOV


INFORMATION No 15

We received information that in the last days of February this year, the Turkish Land Forces Headquarters has issued an order to the 1st Turkish Army (Istanbul) to prepare within twenty days an operations plan for an offensive operation against Greece under the code name Kaluch (Sword).

In previous years (1967 and 1968) when relations between the two countries had been strained on the Cyprus question, the Turkish Military Headquarters had prepared another operations plan, under the code-name Kalkan (Shield), intended for possible military operations against Greece and Cyprus.

The preparation of the Kaluch plan is possibly either a constituent part of the Kalkan plan or a thoroughly new plan. It is intended for the preparation and action of Turkish Land Forces in the event of new complications on the Cyprus question as well as in the event of further strains of the existing contradictions between the two countries over the exploration of oil-fields in the Eastern part of the Aegean Sea.
As it is known, lately both Greece and Turkey have each started oil fields exploration separately in the Aegean sea close to the Asia Minor coast. Since the islands in close proximity to the coast are dominated by Greece, the two countries renewed the dispute exactly on their maritime borders.


DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND
CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

LT. GEN. ZIKULOV



No 0483/1.3.1974
Printed in 1 copy.
Copied in 24 copies.


[SOURCE: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 378-B, File 866/15; Translated by Vanja Petkova, Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]


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Postby insan » Fri Jan 23, 2009 6:35 pm

As a result of the increased nationalist feelings, the US efforts for a compromise between Greece and Turkey in the interest of NATO met a stern opposition. These feelings are typical for both the Greek bourgeoisie and the Armed Forces. Karamanlis government hopes that the US will exert considerable pressure so that Turkey changes its position on the Cyprus problem and the other disputes in the Aegean Sea. They see Carter’s election campaign declarations in support of Greece, as well as Turkey’s economic difficulties and Ecevit’s unstable political position, as prerequisites for reaching a favorable solution. Karamanlis understands Greece’s importance to the US after closing of the American bases in Iran, and the American need to control the implementation of the SALT-2 treaty from the territory of Greece and Turkey. Both government and opposition openly declare that the US pursues protection of Turkey, and this is the main reason for the setback in the Greco-American relations. After the failure of Waldheim’s initiatives on Cyprus and General Haig’s mission on the “special” statute of Greece in NATO, Karamanlis took up a tougher stance towards the US.

Even though the bilateral relations have deteriorated, the US still keeps its military presence in Greece. They have started silently, although in limited quantities, to transfer electronic and telecommunication devices from Iran to their bases on the island of Crete. Since the beginning of 1979 a reorganization of the American Intelligence Services in Greece has started. During his visit in Athens the US Assistant Secretary of State, Warren Christopher put the question for the extension of the American bases. Meanwhile Nelson Rockefeller, Carter’s personal envoy, insisted on the Greek government’s official agreement for transfer of the American military equipmenet from Iran to Greece. The Greek government continues to hold aloof because of the progressive and democratic internal opposition it is facing, and also because it is seeking to obtain economic benefits and political advantages with respect to Turkey by exploiting the increased American interest. Greece has also been looking into the legal consequences of the decision not to extend the use of the military bases.


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Postby insan » Fri Jan 23, 2009 7:07 pm

Comrade Zhivkov,

Tonight, at his request, I received comrade E. Papaioanu [Ezekias Papaioannou]. Regarding the issue, he raised (laid out in the memo), I suggest:

1. That we summon the Czechoslovak ambassador and inform him about Papaioannou’s opinion regarding the question of receiving weapons.
2. That we contact the CPSU CC [Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union] on Wednesday, in order to find out their opinion on the matter.
3. After that, instructions should be given to the press to carefully unmask the attempts at a coup d’état in Cyprus. If the Soviet comrades propose other measures (military, diplomatic), we will inform you in a timely manner.

19.III.1974
[19 March 1974]
Signature:
[K. Tellalov]


Makarios has promised to travel to Romania, but is asking for weapons from Czechoslovakia. Katsuridis has tried to explain to the Czechoslovak comrade that, most likely, Makarios will visit not only Romania, but also Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and other socialist countries, and that it should not be required of him that he adhere to an entirely communist line. But the Czechoslovak comrades asked for a written request from Makarios, and [demanded] that the weaponry be formally sent.


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Postby insan » Sun Jan 25, 2009 3:43 am

More detailed documentation on the population and agricultural production of specific regions is given in the various administrative and taxation registers. A complete census was taken in 1572 for the purposes of organising the taxation of the new province (İnalcık 1973, 122-3, 134-5). This document, which lists the land holdings and annual income of every household on the island, is preserved in the Directorate-General of Cadastral and Land Survey in Ankara (Gazioğlu 1990, 186). Various documents held
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Ottoman Cyprus4 by the Cyprus Research Centre have been published in summary form (Hidiroglou 1971-72), and provide useful information on topics such as land and property sales. Tax and population figures for the 1820s and 1830s have been published and analysed in very useful detail (Papadopoullos 1965, 97-214; Theocharides and Andreev 1996). Another class of documents consists of monastery records and correspondence, usually with the Ottoman authorities, and often concerning land purchases, grazing rights, and water rights. The correspondence of the rich and powerful Kykko Monastery is particularly well-published, if mostly in summary form (Hidiroglou 1973; Theocharides 1993), but information is also available for other monasteries such as that of Ayios Iraklidhios in Politiko (Tsiknopoullou 1967) and Makheras Monastery (Tsiknopoullou 1968). Hopefully this trend towards publishing documents will continue; work in Greece, for example, has shown how valuable such information is to archaeological as well as historical research (see, for example, Kiel 1997). Historical and Social BackgroundWith the final capture of Famagusta by the Ottomans in August 1571, the Venetian rulers and most of the European landholding classes were killed or expelled, and Cyprus was incorporated into the Ottoman empire. The organisation of the new province followed lines similar to other Ottoman conquests (see Hill 1952, 10-34; Papadopoullos 1965, 16-36; İnalcık 1973; Sant Cassia 1986, 5-17; Hunt 1990, 226-33; Kyrris 1996, 253-62). The demographic profile of the island was altered by a Turkish garrison and a substantial but much disputed number of settlers from Anatolia, perhaps about 20,000 (Hunt 1990, 227; cf. Kyrris 1996, 260-2), and in many cases new Turkish estate owners took over from the old Frankish and Venetian feudal overlords. In keeping with the Ottoman millet system, the Orthodox church was given fiscal and administrative as well as spiritual control over its flock, with the Archbishop and the Dragoman (‘interpreter’) being allowed considerable personal power. The harsh Venetian taxes were rationalised and reduced, with the main sources of state income consisting of cereal tithes, generallyset at about one fifth, the poll-tax, and dues for such things as animals, mills, beehives, and orchards (İnalcık 1973, 125-33). The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were most notable for their considerable decrease in population. Many of the European travellers commented with varying degrees of reliability on the changing population, and these figures have been carefully analysed by Papadopoullos (1965, 37-77). Most useful are probably the surviving Ottoman records. According to the 1572 census, some 85,000 Christian adult males were liable to pay the poll tax (Papadopoullos 1965, 17). A hundred years later in 1673, according to official papers captured in the siege of Vienna, only 12,029 households were liable to the poll-tax. This may in fact represent only the lowest of three taxable categories, which would put the total figure at about 30,000; this would be consistent with the 30,000 family heads reported by a traveller in 1670. Another traveller in 1668, however, gave a figure of 12,000 households (Papadopoullos 1965, 40-2). Whatever the actual figure, the dramatic decrease is clear. At an anecdotal rather than statistical level, travellers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are eloquent in their descriptions of abandoned villages (see, for example, Cobham 1908, 236, 258, 261, 303-4; Mariti 1909, 73, 79; Barsky 1996, 33). The abandoned villages mentioned in the survey reports discussed above are clearly a
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Ottoman Cyprus5 result of this same phenomenon. The various causes of this depopulation include a series of devastating plagues, locust attacks, droughts, and earthquakes (Hill 1952, 67), as well as emigration partly due to these factors and partly because of increasing andsometimes arbitrary taxation. Another feature of the Ottoman period was a series of rebellions, which until the nineteenth century were not so much nationalist uprisings as ‘tax rebellions’ (Kitromilides 1982, 92). Greek and Turkish Cypriots often protested together against the excessive depredations of the tax farmers and governors, who were generally collecting as much for themselves as for the Ottoman state. These social problems were expressed in uprisings, such as that against the governor Chil Osman Pasha in 1764, who among other extortions had doubled the poll tax to recoup what he had spent on bribes to gain his appointment. A deputation of Greek clerics and Turkish officials were appealing to have the tax reduced, when suddenly the floor of the Governor’s palace collapsed underneath them, in what was apparently a deliberate attempt to remove them. Three months later, Chil Osman Pasha was killed by a mob of protesting Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Hill 1952, 80-82; Kitromilides 1982). Such affairs are dealt with by the historians of political events; regional archaeology and an examination of local documentation gives a fuller picture of the underlying social trends which manifest themselves briefly in these isolated instances (cf. Ziadeh 1995, 1001).


http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/3011/01/Given2 ... Levant.pdf
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Postby insan » Tue Jan 27, 2009 12:26 am

http://www.google.com/books?hl=tr&uid=1 ... 4177973064

My shared virtual library full of books related Cyprus Problem. :)
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Postby Get Real! » Tue Jan 27, 2009 1:54 am

insan wrote:http://www.google.com/books?hl=tr&uid=13997818274177973064

My shared virtual library full of books related Cyprus Problem. :)

So, have you finally gotten hold of that power? :lol:
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Postby insan » Tue Jan 27, 2009 2:14 am

Get Real! wrote:
insan wrote:http://www.google.com/books?hl=tr&uid=13997818274177973064

My shared virtual library full of books related Cyprus Problem. :)

So, have you finally gotten hold of that power? :lol:


There's no end to improve knowledge, thus ur power. :wink:
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Postby insan » Tue Jan 27, 2009 8:31 pm

Traditional national feeling in a civil society does not need reinforcement by national identity policies. Only the construction of sub-nations in multinational states have to rely on identity politics. The sub-nations in devolutionary federalist states have to fight the prejudice that “symmetrical federalism” or equal treatment of all the regions is “rational,” whereas special protection of sub-nations is “irrational”. In Spain the privileges of the three “sub-nations” (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) meet with counter-slogans such as “cafépara todos”. When the other regions get additional rights, the sub-nations make further claimsand consequently are a blamed for getting “coffee plus brandy”. A problem of modern democratic federalism is that symmetrical schemes of early “coming-together-federalisms” donot work in a social situation of centrifugal tendencies, limited by “keeping-together-federalism.” At least in the European Union John C. Calhoun’s (1853, 1953: 23) idea of“concurrent or constitutional majorities” - close to a liberum veto - is no longer viable as a model of a loose confederation of “sovereign” states. But Calhoun’s basic idea for a “properorganism”, to “regard interests as well as numbers” had a kind of revival. In a more integrated way the sub-nations in post-modern federalism ask for “concurrent majorities” on the level of regional autonomy. Federalism again became a normative concept.



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Postby insan » Wed Jan 28, 2009 1:41 am

NATIONALISM AMONGST
THE TURKS OF CYPRUS:
THE FIRST WAVE

Altay Nevzat

The rise of competing nationalisms in Cyprus first drew world attention in the 1950's, yet the origins of nationalism in Cyprus can clearly be traced to the closing stages of Ottoman rule on the island during the nineteenth century. While the earlier development of nationalism in the Greek Orthodox community of Cyprus is commonly acknowledged, the pre-World War II evolution of nationalism amongst Cyprus' Moslem Turks is consistently overlooked or misrepresented.


http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9514277511/ ... 277511.pdf[/quote]
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Postby insan » Wed Jan 28, 2009 1:56 am

Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation
in Cyprus
NEOPHYTOS G. LOIZIDES
Queen’s University Belfast

Both ethnic communities in Cyprus have maintained strong political
and cultural ties with Greece and Turkey, respectively, and at some point
of their twentieth century history, each has aspired to become part of
either the former or the latter. Yet the way this relationship has been
imagined has differed across time, space, and class. Both communities
have adapted their identities to prevailing ideological waves as well as
political opportunities, domestic alliances, and interests. The article
evaluates different responses to ethnic nationalism, highlighting important
intra-ethnic differentiations within each Cypriot community usually
expressed in the positions of political parties, intellectuals, and the press.
While the current literature identifies two major poles of identity in the
island, ‘‘motherland nationalism’’ and ‘‘Cypriotism,’’ the article suggests
that the major focus of identity of Cypriots is identification with their
respective ethnic communities in the form of Greek Cypriotism or
Turkish Cypriotism. In fact, contentious politics in Cyprus from the
ENOSIS/TAKSIM struggle to the April 2004 referendums demonstrate
the interplay of external constraints and collective self-identification
processes leading to the formation of these identities. The article
concludes by identifying the implications of identity shifts for deeply
divided societies and conflict resolution in general.


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