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The Search for a solution

How can we solve it? (keep it civilized)

Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:04 am

Annan I1
Annan sent his revised proposals to Clerides and Denktash on 10 Decem-
ber, two days before the meeting of the European Council in


Copenhagen. The major part of lis 11 November proposals, its structure
and most of the content, were left untouched, but a number of modest
changes were put forward in response to points made to de Soto in the
intervening month. As he had promised in his covering letter of 11 No-
vember these changes reflected a careful balance between the interests of
the two sides. The main changes proposed (there were in addition a good
number of minor, drafting amendments) were the following:

(i) Political rights at the common state level, i.e. participation in elections
to the parliament of the common state, would be exercised on the basis of
internal component state citizenship status, i.e. a Greek Cypriot who went
to reside in the north would only get a vote to determine the Turkish
Cypriots elected to the parliament of the common state if he or she had
opted for and received Turkish Cypriot citi7,enship status and renounced
Greek Cypriot citizenship status (since holding both was not allowed).
This change responded to a Turkish Cypriot concern that, when Greek
Cypriots allowed to rcsidc in the north reachcd a critical mass, they would
be able to influence the outcome of parliamentary clcctions and thus to
undermine bi-zonality.
(ii) There could be a four-year moratorium on Greek Cypriots going to
reside in the north (as Turkish Cypriots in the south). 'Thereafter there
could be a cap of 8 per cent on such residents in a village or municipality
between the fifth and ninth years and 18 per cent between the tenth and
15th years, with a 28 per cent cap beyond that and a review after 25 years.
This change gave something to both sides.
(iii) The transitional presidency (when the two signatory presidents
would be co-presidents) was reduced from three years to 30 months: a
co~lcession to the Greek Cypriots who wanted this transitional period to
be further reduced, fearing as they did that Denktash would work to un-
dermine and destabilize the new Cyprus.
(iv) A specific bracket of 2,500-7,500 for the residual Greek and Turkish
troop presence (but agreement on a single figure was left for negotiation
betwccn Greece and Turkey): a narrowing of the bracket helpful to the
Greeks and Greek Cypriots.
(v) 111 addition to Greece and Turkey the component states also had to
give their consent to any international military operations in the new Cy-
prus: a Greek Cypriot request reflecting their dislike of being cut out of
such decisions.


(vi) The management of natural resources was made a common state re-
sponsibility. This change responded to Turkish Cypriot concern that the
Greek Cypriots, once back in control of Morphou, might tamper with the
groundwater resources needed by the Turkish Cypriots' orchards in the
region which would remain in Turkish Cypriot control.
(vii) The basic articles of the constitution could not be amended: an addi-
tional safeguard for the Turkish Cypriots against the hijacking of
constitutional amendments which they believed had happened in 1963.
(viii) The definition of citizens of Cyprus would include those who held
such citizenship in 1960, anyone who had resided in Cyprus for seven
years, anyone who married a Cypriot and had been there two years, mi-
nor children of the above, and, in addition, a list of 33,000 to be handed to
the UN. This set of definitions would have allowed most of the Turks
who had come to the north since 1974 to remain and be citizens of Cyprus
and of the Turkish Cypriot component state.
(ix) Financial assistance of not less than 10,000 Euros was promised for
anyone not being given permanent residence and having to be repatriated:
a change for the particular benefit of Turks in the north.
(x) One-third of Cyprus's European Parliament seats (two out of six)
would go to the Turkish Cypriots. This was helpful to the Turkish Cyp-
riots since a division based on population or a strict proportional
rcprcscntation could have resulted in less.
(xi) One map only was proposed for the territorial adjustment, that giving
the tip of the Icarpas to the Greek Cypriots. This was what the Greek
Cypriots wanted and what the Turks and Turkish Cypriots did not (al-
though they failed to make that clear in the run-up to Annan I1 by flatly
refusing to engage in any discussion of the territorial issue).
(xii)A relocation board was proposed to help those displaced as a result of
the territorial adjustment, with direct involvement of the United Nations
in the process. Grants of not less than 10,000 Euros were also provided: an
addition requested by the Turkish Cypriots.
(xiii) There would be a cap on property restitution of 9 per cent in either
component state and 14 per cent in any given village or municipality (but
figures could be varied if negotiation over the territorial adjustment led to
(xiv) The notick to be given to the UN for troop movements of their re-
sidual contingents was raised to 14 days: a change helpful to the Turks.


(XV) European Union safeguard measures would be available for the
Turkish Cypriot component state for three years, rather than one year: a
change to meet Turkish Cypriot concerns over the weakness of their
Copenhagen: so near, and yet so far
It would be an exaggeration to say that the Danish EU presidency wel-
comed the fact that crucial negotiations about the Cyprus problem were
likely to take place in Copenhagen in parallel with the meeting of the
European Council. Like almost everyone else they had hoped it would be
possible to reach agreement in advance of the European Council and for
that meeting simply to have to cope with a clearcut situation over admis-
sion of a reunited island. They were particularly concerned that the
highly sensitive inter-related issues of Turkey's EU candidature and of
Cyprus would in some way distract or even divert the meeting from its
main task of settling and agreeing terms of accession for the ten first-wave
candidate countries in central, eastern and southern Europe. These con-
cerns were especially strongly felt by the Danish prime minister, Anders
Fogh Rasmussen, and led to some tension between his team and the
foreign minister and his officials. Be that as it may, in the event the Dan-
ish presidency performed the necessary juggling act impeccably. In the
early stages of their presidency, at the Brussels European Council in
October and after the Annan Plan had been tabled on 11 November, they
worked successfully to reinforce the messages contained in the Seville
European Council conclusions and to give the European Union's full
support to Annan's proposals. When it was clear that the cup was going to
pass to Copenhagen they set out with a will to make the necessary ad-
ministrative arrangements. The European Council itself was meeting in a
conference centre out by the airport. A suite of offices for the Cyprus
negotiations was provided in an elegantly refurbished warehouse next to
the foreign ministry and a safe four or five miles and 20 minutes' drive
away from where the European Council was meeting.
I arrived in Copenhagen late on 11 December and joined de Soto and
Weston for dinner. Who would attend for the Turkish Cypriots and what
mandate he would have was still obscure. The only certain thing was that
no one had yet turned up, although the Greek Cypriots, Greeks and
Turks were already in town in force, even though the European Council
was not due to meet until dinner time on 12 December. We agreed on the
priorities for the next day, which focused mainly on the Turks and on the


Greek Cypriots. We were joined after dinner by Pat Cox, the recently
elected president of the European Parliament, who had already made an
important contribution by shifting the parliament's traditional role of
uncritical and unquestioning support for the Greek Cypriots to a more
even-handed stance and was to continue to do so throughout the Copen-
hagen meeting.

The 12th of December began for me with a meeting at the Turkish
delegation's hotel, out near the airport and the European Council confer-
ence centre, with Ziyal (permanent under-secretary equivalent), Ilkin
(deputy under-secretary equivalent) and Apakan (former Turkish ambas-
sador to the TRNC and assistant under-secretary equivalent). They told
me gloomily that Ertugruloglu would be representing the Turkish Cypri-
ots but would not arrive until the next day. I shared their gloom and said
this was an unhappy choice if the objective was to reach an agreement.
We went carefully over the ground of Aman I1 and I pointed out all the
significant improvements in it over Annan I from the Turkish and Turk-
ish Cypriot point of view. They did not dispute that the plan had
improved but were very upset by the map and the UN decision to pro-
pose that the tip of the Karpas Peninsula should go to the Greek Cypriots.
I said I was not surprised, since I had always told the UN (as had the US)
that we believed the Karpas to be the wrong side of a Turkish red line and
suggested that it was not too late to take this up with de Soto. But what
the Turks were most concerned about was what was going to happen
about their EU candidature later in the day. They made no bones about
the fact that that would determine what they could do on Cyprus. I said
that their proclaimed objective (for which they had been pushing for
some time) of getting accession negotiations going in 2003 or even before
enlargement on 1 May 2004 was unattainable, not least given that Presi-
dent Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder had publicly called for the decision
to be put off until 2005 or later. On the other hand those who supported
their EU candidature, as Britain did, were determined to get a decision
taken on opening accession negotiations in 2004 and not to have every-
thing pushed back to 2005 or beyond. It would be a close-run thing as
resistance to ths sort of timetable was strong. Later in the day Ziyal and
Ilkin had a long meeting with de Soto and continued to give the impres-
sion that their main problem with Annan I1 was over the map. De Soto
told them the territorial adjustment remained negotiable, and sent them
away with a number of alternative maps that did not include the Greek
Cypriots getting back any of the Karpas Peninsula.


My own next call was on Clerides and his delegation, including most
of the members of the National Council. The small hotel room was
packed, the Greek Cypriots in a mood of extreme nervousness as they saw
their objective of EU membership almost, but not quite yet, within their
grasp. There was not much talk of Annan 11, which the Greek Cypriots
seemed to be taking very calmly. I had decided in advance that I would
not ask Clerides in front of a lot of witnesses, not all of whom were
friendly, whether or not he would sign Annan 11. Instead I told him that it
was the working hypothesis of de Soto, Weston and myself that if the
Turks and Turkish Cypriots would sign, so would he. Looking at me
with a characteristic twinkle in his eye he said, 'Well, that is your working
hypothesis', and there the conversation ended. On the way out I met
Papandreou who said that he had brought with him to Copenhagen a
military team so that they could settle the numbers of Greek and Turkish
troops to remain on the island if that became possible. I fear they must
have had a frustrating few days.

In the evening I went to the airport to brief the prime minister on his
plane and we all then went straight to see Erdogan and Giil at their hotel
before the prime minister went to join his EU colleagues over dinner to
discuss Turkey's candidature. The meeting with Erdogan and Giil went
well. Tony Blair assured them of our strong support for their candidature
but warned them they would not get everything they wanted. Neverthe-
less he believed that what was achievable would represent a major step
towards membership. On Cyprus he urged the need to strike a deal there
and then on the basis of Annan 11. The Turks stuck to generalities in what
they said. What was already clear was that among the mob of advisers,
diplomats and politicians crammed into their hotel and the meeting room
it was not going to be easy to come to quick and clear conclusions the next

The next few hours were spent with everyone kicking their heels
waiting for the heads of government to emerge from their dinner, which,
as time went on, was clearly not proving plain sailing. Finally, shortly
before midnight, Blair returned to the hotel. A formula had been agreed
under which the European Union would open accession negotiations with
Turkey if, in December 2004, it decided that the Copenhagen political
criteria had been fulfilled. It had been a difficult discussion, with many,
the French president in particular, wanting a slower timetable and a lesser
degree of commitment. It had been the best obtainable. He agreed that I
should telephone Ziyal and give him the formula, some flavour of the


discussion, and the prime minister's judgement that this was an important
breakthrough and the best result obtainable. This I duly did. Ziyal tele-
phoned back at 3.00am to say on behalf of Erdogan and Giil that it would
be very helpful if, when the formula agreed over dinner came for approval
to the European Council in the morning, the prime minister could argue
for a bit more immediacy. I said I would pass the message on, which I
did, and Blair, with support from the German chancellor, managed to add
the words 'without delay' to the commitment to open negotiations. At
that stage, during the night, there was no hint of the dramas to come.

The following morning, however, all was turmoil and chaos in the
Turld~delegation. News reports indicated that Erdogan and Giil were
taking the outcome of the previous night's dinner-table discussion very
badly. There was much talk of rejection and betrayal. The half-full glass
was being described as having no water in it at all. Not for the first time
Turkish diplomacy was falling victim to the excessive expectations it had
built up for itself. Throughout the morning telephone calls and meetings
between members of the European Council and the Turkish leaders were
used to bring home to them that what had been achieved was both posi-
tive and substantial. Further discussion in the European Council showed
that there was no stomach for reopening the hard-fought compromise of
the night before, apart from the minor addition of the words 'without
delay'. By the early afternoon the Turkish leaders had decided to pro-
claim victory and to present the outcome, correctly, as a considerable
success. Rut by then any chance of getting their attention to take difficult
decisions on Cyprus had long since passed, nor was the success so clearcut
that they felt able to afford a showdown with Denktash who was in
Ankara issuing defiant denunciations of the Annan Plan. All through the
morning de Soto tried to get hold of Ziyal and failed; nor was any other
Turkish official prepared to say where Turkey stood over Cyprus. Finally
in mid-afternoon Ertugruloglu turned up for the first and last time at the
foreign ministry conference centre, accompanied by a middle-ranking
Turkish diplomat, to say that the proposals were unacceptable in too
many ways for him to be able to enumerate and that there was nothing to
negotiate about.

At this point any hope of a settlement being reached in Copenhagen
finally evaporated. The European Council was moving towards the final
stages of agreeing the terms of accession for the ten candidates. Among
these was a still divided Republic of Cyprus. It was time to switch to the
alternative approach which, fortunately, had been extensively discussed

2003: Extra Time

he failure to get agreement on a comprehensive settlement either
before or at Copenhagen was clearly a setback. The moment at
which both sides were, for quite different reasons, under the
greatest pressure to show flexibility, with a clear deadline set to concen-
trate minds, and when reaching an agreement would have brought
equivalent benefits, had been allowed to slip away. But no irretrievable
damage had been done to the structure of the package that Annan had
originally put forward in November; some clever legal drafting could take
care of the telescoping of the pre- and post-Copenhagen phases provided
for in the original proposals. The working groups on international obliga-
tions and domestic legislation, to which Denktash had agreed in early
October and then prevented for two months from meeting, had now
finally been staffed and were ready to start work; they could run in par-
allel with further negotiations between Clerides and Denktash, and did in
fact do so from the beginning of January 2003. Moreover Clerides, who
had hitherto given the impression that he would be unable to negotiate
beyond Christmas because of the imminence of the presidential election
in the south, showed no signs of disengaging or of being unable to sustain
his end of the negotiations. And Denktash, who had by now returned to
the island, while continuing to make negative statements about the Annan
proposals, showed no signs of unwillingness to continue either.

Moreover the pressures on Denktash were mounting considerably. A
spontaneous demonstration of Turkish Cypriots took place in north
Nicosia on the day of the Copenhagen Summit, demanding acceptance of
the Annan Plan and membership of the European Union. This was
followed in January by further massive demonstrations. Estimates of their
size varied, but 80,000, a remarkably high proportion of a total population
of north Cyprus of fewer than 200,000, was generally regarded as close to
the mark. Despite many forebodings, the demonstrations passed off
peacefully, but there was no doubting the real anger at Denktash's torpe-


doing of the chances of a settlement at Copenhagen and there were even
unprecedented open signs of criticism and discontent at the role Turkey
was playing. Nor was attendance at the demonstrations confined to
supporters of the opposition parties and business interests; rather it
stretched right across Turkish Cypriot society, including many regarded
as members of the establishment, usually solid supporters of Denktash,
and also Turks from the mainland, often dismissed as a group hostile to a

Opinion polls showed strong support for the Annan Plan and surpris-
ingly this was even true of polls taken in Morphou, a town due to be
handed back to the Greek Cypriots as a result of the territorial adjustment
and whose inhabitants therefore faced displacement yet again. The dem-
onstrations and the rising support in the north for a settlement also had a
positive spin-off in the south. Greek Cypriots who had tended to regard
Turkish Cypriots as giving uncritical and unquestioning support to
Denktash realized that a real shift was under way. The noises coming out
of Ankara, particularly from the new government and its supporters,
while confused and not very clear, were very different from the usual
unquestioning support for Denktash. I-Iigh-level Turkish visitors who
streamed through northern Cyprus in the weeks following Copenhagen
gave mixed signals. The speaker of the Turl<ish National Assembly struck
a note of nationalist defiance, as did some military visitors. But others,
like the prime minister, Giil, and Erdogan, put the accent on finding a
solution and were evidently ill at ease with the aggressive tone of Denk-
tash's press statements. The tension between these visitors and Denktash
was in~possible to conceal.

One new element had begun to emerge right at the end of 2002.
Denktash began to speak publicly and to his visitors of the need for a
referendum in the north before he, as the TRNC negotiator (or someone
else if he could not bring himself to accept the task), signed any commit-
ment at all to a settlement. From the outset it was clear that the
referendum Denktash now had in mind was quite separate and different
from the simultaneous referendums in the north and the south to approve
(or reject) any settlement that the two leaders had signed and submitted
to them. This latter approach had been and remained an integral part of
every UN plan since the 1992 Set of Ideas. 'l'he latest idea fitted into an
easily recognizable pattern of Denktash thinking, which consisted of
always finding a new procedural obstacle just when negotiations were
reaching the home straight -at no point previously had he mentioned this

obstacle, although it was now asserted that it formed part of the TRNC
constitution. The assumption was that he was expecting to be able to
manipulate any such advance referendum so that it produced a negative
result and thus give him a firmly democratic excuse for refusing to sign an
agreement. As opinion swung in the north towards strong support for the
Annan Plan and EU membership, this assumption began to look less and
less viable; and, as it swung, so did Denktash's enthusiasm for the idea
evaporate, as we shall see. But he had planted a seed. And thought began
to be given by the UN as to how, in the necessary task of telescoping the
various stages of the original Annan Plan to take account of the passage of
time, more prominence could be given to the role of the referendums and
less to the up-front legal commitment of the leaders to the outcome of the

A presidential election in the south

The Copenhagen European Council brought to an end the semi-truce in
Greek Cypriot domestic politics, which, to general surprise, had prevailed
through the whole of 2002. With the election only two months away, the
members of the National Council returning from Copenhagen headed for
the hustings. Clerides, after much agonizing and under pressure to do so
from his own party (which had no real desire to support the candidacy of
Omirou, the leader of the small socialist party they had backed earlier in
the year in an attempt to split DIKO leader Tassos Papadopoulos's coali-
tion) decided to run again. Within 24 hours, despite some frantic arm
twisting, his own attorney-general, Markides, who had been heavily
involved in the talks process, also threw his hat into the ring as an inde-
pendent, thus further splitting the centre-right vote and also undermining
Clerides's main appeal, right across the political spectrum, as the indis-
pensable negotiator who could be trusted in the final phase of the
negotiations to secure a settlement. Unfortunately for Clerides, every
word spoken by Denktash belied the picture of a negotiation in its final
phase and thus further undermined this appeal. Whether Denktash in-
tended to have this effect it is hard to say; he was certainly not going to
put himself out to help Clerides, and he could see the tactical benefits he
would be able to draw from the election of someone like Papadopoulos
who could be depicted as a rejectionist.

The campaign did not in fact focus much on the negotiations for a
settlement or on the Annan Plan. Unlike 1992-93, when Clerides had
stood against Vassiliou and had opposed Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas,

Papadopoulos resisted any temptation to launch an open onslaught on
Annan's proposals. He did not really need to. Every Cypriot voter knew
that Papadopoulos was less committed to the success of the negotiations
and thus would tend to be less flexible than Clerides; so those who did
not like the Annan Plan knew whom they should vote for. And the one-
third of the electorate that was in the gift of AKEL was concentrating
much more on returning to office than on the settlement negotiations.
The opinion polls from the outset gave Papadopoulos a strong lead, with
Clerides trailing and Markides well behind that, other candidates being
nowhere. By early February the only real question was whether Papado-
poulos would win on the first round, thus avoiding a run-off a week later
in which Clerides might have hoped to pick up most of Markides's vote.
On 16 February Papadopoulos won on the first round.

The negotiations resume
The resumption of the negotiations in the second week of January, while
taking place in an atmosphere which fell well short of the euphoria briefly
aroused when the face-to-face talks had started exactly a year before, was
business-like and practical. The working groups established to draw up
the international obligations and domestic legislation of the new Cyprus
were at last at work and, while they faced an enormous task in bureau-
cratic terms, it seemed unlikely that they would throw up any insuperable
political problems. Progress was agonizingly painstaking, but progress
there was. At the same time, Clerides and Denktash agreed that Annan
should conduct competitions for the flag and anthem of a reunited Cyprus
and could approach potential candidates for appointment to the transi-
tional Supreme Court which would need to be ready to operate as soon as
a settlement came into effect. A total of 1,506 flag designs and 111 sug-
gested anthems were submitted by entrants from 50 different countries.
But there were plenty of less positive indicators, among which Denktash's
public statements about the Annan Plan were pron~inent. He put out a
series of estimates of the implications of the proposals, designed to scare
the Turkish Cypriots and bearing no relation whatsoever to the careful
estimates the UN itself had made, based on 'l'RNC census figures, before
putting the proposals forward. He alleged that 70,000 Turkish Cypriots
would be displaced by the territorial adjustment, while the UN calcula-
tions gave figures between 42,000 and 45,000. He gave estimates of the
combined effect of the territorial adjustment and the limited and delayed
right of residence for Greek Cypriots in the north which implied more

E: X 'I' I< A 'I' I h.1 E 201
than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots (over half the population) would be dis-
placed. IIe spoke apocalyptically of the Turkish Cypriots being wiped out
within a few years. Faced with this steady drip of disinformation, the UN
and its backers could do little. The UN was bound by its own news
blackout, as were the rest of us. The UN, in any case, as the facilitator of
the negotiations, could not go out and proselytize for a particular set of
proposals that had not yet been accepted by either side, and reducing to
scale Denktash's various eximates was not likely to sound good to a
Greek Cypriot electorate that was in the midst of the presidential cam-
paign. Fortunately the credibility of Denktash's propaganda among
ordinary Turkish Cypriots seemed low.

The position that Clerides took up when the talks resumed was that
there were certainly aspects of the Annan I1 proposals with which he took
issue and would like to see changed. These he and his collaborators dis-
cussed with de Soto, trying as far as possible to proceed on the basis of
'clarifications' rather than putting forward actual changes thenlselves.
Conscious that some further changes were almost certain to be made to
meet points being raised by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots, in particular
the map, they were determined that they too should get changes that
would make any f~u-ther revision of the Annan Plan a balanced one. But
Clerides's position, constantly reiterated, was that, if Uenktash would
accept Annan I1 and sign it, so would he.

From the Turkish side there trickled out a series of non-papers, three
in fact, all called 'Basic requirements for a settlement in Cyprus' and all
different from each other. The first, rather general paper was given to de
Soto by the Turks themselves and was dated 10 January. It contained five

(i)Territory. The present (Aman 11) map was not acceptable. They were
ready to negotiate 'in a substantial manner'.
(ii) Right of return to property. Strong preference for compensation
only. Bi-zonality must be preserved if there were to be returns. A ten-year
moratorium and/or permanent restrictions would be needed.
(iii) Security. The Treaty of Guarantee must stand. The UN peace force
should not have an enforccment role. There must be no hierarchy be-
tween thc troops of the guarantor powers and those of the UN. There
should be no Cypriot participation in multilatcral operations without the
agreement of the guarantor powers.


(iv) Turks in the TRNC. The settlement should not impose provisions
that would result in the repatriation of persons legally resident in Cyprus.
(v) Statuslsovereignty.A strong plug for 'constituent' states and two 'peo-
ples' and for sovereignty to 'emanate' from the two sides.
Several of these points were already dealt with partially or completely in
either Annan I or Annan 11; others were going to be more difficult.

The second version of 'Basic requirements' emerged from the Turks
on 27 January. It had now grown to seven points and contained actual
redrafts of parts of Annan 11. The main changes from the 10 January
paper were:

(i)Territory. As before.
(ii) Property. Moratorium now nine years. Returns by Greek Cypriots to
be capped at 750 per year thereafter, rising to a total of 11,250 in the 15th
(iii) Turks in Cyprus. 50,000, plus those already having permanent resi-
dence for five years to be able to stay. No forccd repatriation of Turks
legally in Cyprus.
(iv)Aliens. Neither Turks nor Greeks should be allowed to make up more
than 5 per cent of the population of the island.
(v) Governance.Drafting changes giving effect to the proposals in the first
version of the 'Basic requircments' paper. One-third of senators from each
constituent state needed for an affirmative vote. Thirteen senators' votes
needed for matters requiring a special majority.
(vi) Status. Drafting changes giving effect to partnership, 'peoples', non-
(vii) Security.Drafting changes to give effect to the ideas in the earlier pa-
per: 14 days' notice of any troop movements.
While some of the precise drafting in this second version was certainly
not going to be negotiable, the substance had not changed much nor got
much more difficult and the increased specificity on some points made
subsequent negotiation more straightforward.

The third version of the 'Basic requirements' paper was handed over
by Denktash to Clerides on 3 February. It was unchanged from the

second version. But it was accompanied by a copy of Denktash's speaking
notes that day, which raised a number of additional issues, namely:

(i) Property. A plug for a global exchange of property and no restitution.
Restitution would be a 'recipe for disaster . . . which will take us back to
pre-1974, even to 1963'.
(ii) An obscure reference requested to the Treaty of Establishment
(which set up the Sovereign Base Areas) to make it clear that that Treaty
was only relevant with respect to the SBAs, i.e. avoiding any reconfirma-
tion of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.
(iii)Debt. All debts prior to entry into force of the agrcement to be thc re-
sponsibility of the constituent states.
(iv) European Union. A plea for simultaneity of entry by Turkey and the
TRNC; but acceptance this would not be so, and some consequential
(v) Economic aspects. Request for concrete measures harmonizing the
economies of the two constituent statcs.
(vi)Signature. Agreement to be signed by the presidents of the two con-
stituent states.
The additional points from Denktash, not all of which were impossible to
accommodate, were added on to nine pages of drafting amendments to
the Foundation Agreement handed over by Denktash to Clerides on 15
January. This would all have been a lot more discouraging to the UN
team if it had not been made clear within days by the Turks that Denk-
tash had acted without authorization. The only points that needed to be
addressed were those in their own 'Basic requirements' paper, i.e. the
document of 27 January.

By this stage neither side was really trying very seriously to negotiate
with the other. Both were concentrating their efforts on what everyone
knew was coming down the road, a further revision by Annan of his
proposals. So most attention was focused on the bilateral meetings each
had with de Soto, and on de Soto's contacts in Ankara and Athens which
were continuing in parallel at a hectic pace.

In late January and early February I visited the regional capitals for
the first time since the Copenhagen meetings. The auguries were hard to
read. In Athens, Foreign Minister Papandreou (since 1January taking his
turn as the EU president) remained as determined as ever to do what he


could to get a settlement before the 28 February deadline, and Karaman-
lis, the leader of the opposition, was supportive too. Papandreou was
frustrated that all his efforts to get a Greek-Turkish dialogue going over
Cyprus, and in particular over the outstanding issue of the number of
Greek and Turkish troops to be stationed on the island after a settlement,
had so far come to nothing and evoked no response from the Turks except
to say that they were not yet ready. He undertook to keep pushing for a
meeting to discuss the troops question. He also agreed that the process of
seeking the consent of the European Parliament to the Treaty of Acces-
sion, which was in full swing, should be handled in such a way as not to
prejudge whether it would in the end be a divided island or a reunited one
whose representatives would be signing the new Treaty in April. This
meant, rather awkwardly, sending forward two options to the European
Parliament, which deeply upset the legal purists in the Commission and
fluttered some dovecotes in Athens and Nicosia, but which passed off
eventually without causing any problems.

In Nicosia Clerides was in the last three weeks of the election cam-
paign with hope of victory ebbing away, the main doubt being whether
he would he beaten in the first round (16 February) or the second (23
February). Up to then, he said he would continue to negotiate, but, once a
clear result was known, he would pass the responsibility to his successor
even though the formal installation of the new president was not due to
take place until 28 February. Papadopoulos and his coalition partner
Christofias were predictably bullish about their chances of victory but
cautious to the point of total obscurity as to their intentions for handling
the Cyprus problem thereafter. They were offering no rejectionist hos-
tages to fortune. The negotiations were still in the hands of Clerides and
they supported the way he was managing them. On the other side of the
city Denktash, whom I was seeing for the first time since his operation
the previous October, seemed cheerful and reasonably fit, having clearly
lost a bit of weight. As usual he showed no interest in engaging in a seri-
ous discussion of the main issues in the negotiations (it was before he had
tabled the 'Basic requirements' paper with his own additions, and it was
never wise to reveal knowledge of Turkish positions to Denktash since he
was only too likely then to try to alter them for the worse). I taxed him
with the disinformation lie was spreading about the Annan Plan, going
carefully through those of his public statements widest of the mark, and
pointed out that the co~lclusion most observers drew was that he was
determined to scupper any chance of a settlement. He showed no sign of


contrition, nor of mending his ways. The one dog that did not bark was
that Denktash never mentioned the idea of a pre-signature referendum,
from which I deduced (correctly, as it turned out) that the state of public
opinion in the north had caused the attractions of this option to pall.
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Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:05 am

In Ankara I was brought face to face with the reality that the looming
war in Iraq and the need for the Turks finally to give a definitive response
to the US and UK requests to allow their troops to transit Turkey was
gradually drowning out all other issues in the consciousness of both
politicians and the bureaucracy. The Turks had been tossing this hot
potato from hand to hand ever since Erdogan's visit to Washington in
early December when Bush had believed that Erdogan had given him a
green light over transit and Erdogan believed he had been completely
non-committal. In the eyes of the Americans, at least, the answer was long
overdue and the pressures to put the matter to the test in the Turkish
parliament were mounting daily. The immediate consequence, so far as
my own visit was concerned, was that Ziyal, who was in the lead on Iraq
too, had to pull out of the talks at the last moment, and I had to deal with
Ilkin and Apakan. Normally this was not a particularly fruitful process
but on this occasion it was less discouraging, although not without its
oddities. The Turks pressed hard the case for a pre-signature referendum,
undeterred by my telling them that Denktash appeared to have lost
interest in one. Apart from pointing out that it might seem a little strange
to most Turkish Cypriots to vote in two referendums on virtually the
same question within a few weeks, I was careful not to rubbish the idea,
making clear that this was a matter for the Turks and Turkish Cypriots.
The rest of the talks consisted of working through their 'Basic require-
ments' paper, pointing out what was likely to fly, what was not and what
could perhaps be achieved by approaching matters somewhat differently.
It was made clear by then that if Turkey secured enough of the points in
their paper (not all of them), they would hope to support a new revision of
the Annan Plan and to persuade Denktash to do so also. Separate meet-
ings with some of Erdogan's advisers and members of parliament from
the governing AK party were even more encouraging. They were quite
open about their desire to see the Cyprus problem resolved, about their
understanding of how failure to settle now would weigh heavily on the
main objective of their foreign policy, getting into the European Union,
and about how Erdogan and Giil would have to give a clear lead if Denk-
tash was to be brought along. They pressed eloquently for a concession
on the sovereignty issue, but seemed to realize that this was unlikely to be


negotiable and that Annan's approach provided the substance of what
they were seeking, if not the label.

The UN prepares the final throw
The window through which the UN had to squeeze if the negotiations
were to be concluded by 28 February was a remarkably narrow one. It
had been accepted from Copenhagen onwards that matters could not be
brought to a head until the Greek Cypriot presidential election was over.
Having refrained from making proposals during the Turkish election
period the previous autumn, the UN could not behave differently to-
wards the Greek Cypriots. While it might be possible to allow a few days'
slippage beyond 28 February, it was crucial not to say so in advance, and,
in any case, very few extra days were available if the whole timetable of
completing the process before the signature of the Treaty of Accession on
16 April and thus making possible the accession of the newly reunited
Cyprus were not to be jeopardized. On 13 February Annan called de Soto
back to New York to take stock, and, rather unusually, he invited Weston
and me to attend as well.
Not surprisingly, since we had all been working together closely for
over three years, there was effectively a consensus over our analysis of the
situation and our prescriptions for action. We believed that the chances of
reaching a settlement hung in the balance. It could go either way. But the
only way to find out was to fire the last shot in the UN locker and put the
matter to the test, what had been known up till then as the 'do or die
scenario'. Delay would not only mean losing many of the positive pres-
sures derived from the EU timetable, but there was also no certainty that
the distracting storm clouds massing over Iraq would be rapidly dissi-
pated or would leave behind a Turkey more capable and willing to take
the necessary decisions. Annan then informed us that he intended to visit
the region in the last week of February, going first to Ankara, then to
Athens and ending up in Nicosia, where he would aim to get the agree-
ment of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to a second revised
version of his plan which he intended to circulate ahead of time. He
agreed himself to press the Greek and Turkish governments to meet
ahead of his visit and try to settle the issue of residual troop numbers.
Weston and I said that our governments at the highest level gave their full
support to this approach and would do all they could during the period
ahead to back up Annan's efforts.


One new element was introduced at this stage. The British govern-
ment had from the outset given its full backing to the UN. In recent
months consideration had been given in London to whether anything
more could be done. Since the size and configuration of the British Sover-
eign Base Areas had been settled in 1960 and set out in the Treaty of
Establishment, which, along with the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance,
laid the foundations for the independence of Cyprus, their role and pur-
pose had evolved constantly. The 99 square miles of territory originally
defined was not all needed for current or prospective military and associ-
ated purposes. Could we contemplate offering to give up some of this
territory in the context of a settlement of the Cyprus problem? Ministers
agreed that we could. About 45 of the 99 square miles could be offered:
those areas from the Western Sovereign Base Area going entirely to the
Greek Cypriot component state, which surrounded it, those areas from
the Eastern Sovereign Base Area going mainly to the Greek Cypriots but
with a small parcel of land going to the Turkish Cypriots, which thus left
their component state still contiguous to the Rase Area, an important
point for the Turkish Cypriots. This offer would change the parameters
within which the single most hotly debated of the core issues would be
settled, providing a little more slack in what had become a very tight
situation. And while it did not affect the linked question of the return of
Greek Cypriots to their properties in the north, it would bring consider-
able economic and commercial benefits to the recipients since it would
result in the lifting of the ban on commercial development, which was an
integral part of the Treaty of Establishment. The offer included a stretch
of valuable coastal land. Annan and his team were grateful for this unex-
pected new trump card added to their hand. In due course we handed
over the maps and the draft amendments to the Treaty of Establishment
required to give effect to the offer. Astonishingly there was no leak until
the secretary-general tabled the second revision of his plan (Annan 111).
And even more astonishingly neither side in Cyprus was able to identify
any perfidious motives behind the British offer.

Annan's latest reminder to the Greek and Turkish governments of the
need for them to discuss residual troop numbers finally bore fruit, and a
meeting duly took place in Ankara on 2 1 February. Unfortunately it made
no progress and reached no agreement. So de Soto, who had gone to
Ankara to be briefed on the outcome and who, at Turkish insistence, had
to be given separate briefings on the same meeting by Greek and Turks,
was left without an agreed figure to put in the revised plan.


Annan I11

De Soto's shuttling between the different capitals had continued up to the
eve of Annan's own arrival in the region. This left precious little time to
incorporate the fruits of his consultations into the new revised proposals
and to get these to all concerned ahead of Annan's arrival. So it was
decided to circulate to them over the weekend of 22-23 February an
informal paper setting out the main changes being made to Annan 11. The
full text of Annan 111, which took the UN team several sleepless nights to
complete, was tabled on 26 February.

There were two important, general points about Annan 111. The first
of these was that the two-page 'Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus
Problem' which had formed the first stage of the rocket designed to put
Annan I and Annan I1 into orbit, had now been changed into a two-page
'Commitment to submit the Fouildation Agreement to approval at sepa-
rate simultaneous referenda in order to achieve a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem'. In other words the leaders were no
longer asked to bind themselves at the outset to anything beyond putting
the package to their electorates. Should the results of the referendums on
30 March both be positive they were then bound, as were the three guar-
antor powers, to implement the package the following day. Rut should the
result of either referendum be negative, then all agreements were null and
void and no binding obligations remained. In a sense therefore the two
referendums idea, with which Lknktash had toyed, would be telescoped
into one; but, before he was required to implement anything that was
legally binding and enforceable, there would have been an affirmative
vote by the Turkish Cypriots, which is what he argued was a legal re-
quirement under the TRNC constitution. The second point was that
Annan 111 introduced an entirely new text of Article 1 of the Constitution
which in one sentence renamed Cyprus, described the form of the central
government and banished the old placebos of 'common7 state and 'com-
ponent' states. It read as follows: 'The United Cyprus Republic is an
independent and sovereign state with a single international legal person-
ality and a federal government and consists of two constituent states,
namely the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State.' 'Ihs
judgement of Solomon balanced extremely important concessions to both
sides: the Greek Cypriots getting the federal label on which they had
always insisted, the Turkish Cypriots getting the concept of constituent
states and a very attractive name for their own state. It could be said that
parthenogenesis had been achieved.

In addition to these two general points, Annan I11 proposed a consid-
erable number of changes that had emerged from the negotiations and,
even more, from the consultations which de Soto had had in the final six
weeks. I have grouped them for ease of understanding into those made in
response to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot representations and those made
in response to Greek and Greek Cypriot representations. The Turkish
and Turkish Cypriot points were as follows:

(i) The Karpas Peninsula was to remain Turkish Cypriot, leaving the
Turkish Cypriots with 29.2 per cent (an increase on Annan 11) of the Re-
public of Cyprus (Denktash having said since 1992 that he would accept
29-plus per cent).
(ii) Constituent states were given discretion to decide on internal citizen-
ship. So Greek Cypriots returning to the north would not vote as part of
the Turkish Cypriot state in federal elections. It also meant the limits
were absolute.
(iii) The moratorium on Greek Cypriot right of residence in the north
went up to six years (not the nine years the Turks had asked for). The
steps fol!owing the moratorium became shallower (down to 7 per cent
from the end of the moratorium until year 10; down to 14 per cent from
18 per cent for years 10-15; final cap at year 15 down from 28 per cent to
2 1 per cent).
(iv) Greece and Turkey's consent for any international military operations
in Cyprus would be needed as well as that of the constituent states (a re-
version to Annan I).
(v)Religious sites were redefined to include only buildings and immediate
surroundings (to banish Turkish Cypriots' fear that a wider definition
would mean substantial repossession of property in the north by the
Greek Cypriot Church which had in many cases possessed land for many
miles around religious sites).
(vi) A simple list of 45,000 former Turkish citizens to have the right to
Cypriot citizenship (probably less in gross terms than the 33,000 plus dif-
ferent categories in Annan I1 but easier to operate).
(vii) Students and academic staff exempted from limitations on residency
and immigration controls (important for the Turkish Cypriots given the
growth of higher-education English-language establishments in the
TRNC catering for the Middle East marliet).

(viii) Most favoured nation status for 'l'urltey.
(ix) Debts taken over by respective constituent states (a Denktash point).
(x) 6,000 Turkish and Greek troops to stay (nearer thc top end of the An-
nan I1 2,500-7,500 bracket).
(xi) Period of notice required for military movements reduced from 14
days to two (for ordinary movements) and three (for exercises) (a con-
stantly reiterated Turkish request).
(xii) Request for the European Union and the Council of Europe to en-
dorse the settlement (a safeguard against court action and Loizidou clone
cases being pursued).
(xiii) Federal economic policy to pay special attention to harmonization of
the economics of the constituent states (a Denktash point).
(xiv) The European Union to be asked to summon a donor conference to
raise funds for costs of displacement resulting from the territorial adjust-
ment and other changes.
The Creek and Greek Cypriot points were as follows:

(i) Increase in the territorial adjustment from 7 1.5 per cent in Annan I1 to
7 1.8 per cent (when Sovereign Base Area offcr of which Greek Cypriots
got over 90 per cent included). Some coastline near Morphou and two
historical sites added. 2,300 more returns to the adjusted territory than
under Annan 11.
(ii) Increase in overall property reinstatement limit from 9 per cent to 10
per cent, and per village from 14 per cent to 20 per cent.
(iii) Returns by Greek Cypriot property owners to four villagcs in the
I<arpas unlimited. Karpas villagers to have responsibility for their own
cultural and educational affairs.
(iv) Immediate voting for European and local elections by Greek Cypriots
resident in the 'l'urkish Cypriots' constituent state.
(v) Greek Cypriots over 65 to have only a two-year moratorium on return
to property in the north and no quantitative restrictions.
(vi) Nine years' permanent residence required to acquire Cypriot citizen-
ship as opposed to scvcn in Annan I1 (a point designed to rcduce the
number of Turks able to claim Turkish Cypriot citizenship).


(vii) Non-Cypriot Supreme Court judges only to have a say if Cypriots
cannot agree (a point to which Clerides attached importance).
(viii)A Court of First Instance to be created (another Clerides point).
(ix) Rules on entry and residence rights for Turks to be compatible with
the Schengen agreement.
(x) Resolution of missing persons (from 1974) issue given constitutional
(xi) The referendum question redrafted to modify the reference to EU ac-
cession (to make it clear that a negative vote in the referendum would not
invalidate EU accession which had already been decided).
The Turks had also pressed hard for some provisions to be linked to
Turkish accession to the European Union, thus giving the Greek Cypriots
and, indeed, other member states an incentive to work for that outcome.
So Annan I11 proposed the removal of the residual Greek and Turkish
troops from the island when Turkey acceded, the removal of the agree-
ment of Greece and Turkey to international military operations, and also
the removal of limits on Greek Cypriot residence in the north.

Three visits and no result
Annan's visit to Ankara, his first port of call, seemed at the time to have
gone well. The paper setting out the changes to Annan I1 having only
been in the hands of the Turks for a few hours, it was not reasonable to
expect a definitive response from them and, in any case, it remained
important for reasons of Turkish domestic politics that it should be
Denktash who gave the answer first. But, at a working dinner with Erdo-
gan, Ziyal gave an entirely fair presentation of the proposed changes and
Erdogan seemed pleased with them. In Athens it was all plain sailing,
with the Greeks making it clear that anything the Greek Cypriots could
accept they could accept too.
On the island Annan had to face up to the fact that, since
Clerides/Papadopoulos and Denktash had only just received the full text
of Annan I11 he could not expect them to sign up to the commitment to a
referendum on it there and then. Moreover Papadopoulos, who was not
yet in office, had had only ten days since his election to catch up with all
the details of the proposals. During that time de Soto had conducted
several long teach-ins with the president-elect, who had kept his cards
close to his chest. He had been equally cagey when I saw him after my


arrival on the island on 22 February. So Annan decided to avoid a failed
effort to get agreement when he saw the leaders on 27 February and
instead went straight for a short extension of the timetable. He therefore
invited Papadopoulos (whose presidential inauguration was to take place
the next day) and Denktash to meet him again in The Hague on 10
March. He told them he would ask each of them formally then whether
they were prepared to sign the text committing them to putting the
proposals to a referendum on 30 March, making it clear that if they said
they were so prepared, he would expect them to campaign for a 'yes' vote.
He reminded them he was also waiting for their reactions to the names he
had given them for appointments to the transitional Supreme Court
which he asked for by 3 March. He pointed out that each side needed to
give him the draft constitutions for their constituent states which had to
be consistent with the Foundation Agreement. He wanted their decisions
on a flag and an anthem. He drew attention to the massive amount of
work remaining to be done by the working groups on international obli-
gations and domestic legislation. Papadopoulos's response was to say that
he would come to The Hague as requested, ready to reply. Denktash
grumbled. He called Papadopoulos a 'bloody nuisance' for agreeing to go,
but then agreed to go too. Later it emerged that he had stopped participa-
tion of his representatives in the working groups on international
obligations and domestic legislation. Meanwhile in north Nicosia another
huge demonstration had taken place, calling for acceptance of the Annan
Plan and accession to the European Union.

That evening Annan invited Weston and me to dinner at the Nicosia
Hilton Hotel, partly to thank us for the help we had given the UN
throughout the negotiations and also to look ahead. We agreed that eve-
rything hinged on Ankara's considered reaction to the proposals in Annan

111. Denktash himself was never spontaneously going to accept any pro-
posals. As to Papadopoulos, it was already clear that his enthusiasm for
pressing on was a good deal less than that of Clerides, but he was showing
every sign of believing that he could not afford to back out. If Denktash,
willingly or not, signed up, he was likely to do so too. We also discussed
the eventuality of Denktash saying no or continuing to filibuster. We
agreed that in either of those circumstances it made no sense to go on
beyond The Hague. Once any realistic prospect had gone of a settlement
being reached before 16 April, when the Treaty of Accession was to be
signed, it would be better to pull the plug on the negotiations and leave
Denktash and the Turks to face the consequences. But even the slenderest

chance of getting a settlement in that time frame should be seized. Annan
asked me to try to find an additional legal drafter to reinforce his hard-
pressed team. We produced a name within a few days but were never
taken up on it for reasons which soon became clear, including the fact that
Denktash had stopped the working groups.

The run-up to The Hague and the last chance
There was only one working week between the Nicosia meeting and that
in The Hague and during it nothing of significance happened in the
negotiations themselves. The UN was anxious to avoid even the slightest
hint that there could be an Annan IV set of proposals; they had used up
all the flexibility and scope for manoeuvre on Annan 111, and the meeting
in The Hague was in any case not designed to negotiate further but to
take a political decision on whether or not to put Annan 111 to referen-
dums in the north and south.
But three major developments did occur during that week, all of them
in Turkey, and, although two of them did not directly involve Cyprus, all
affected the background and climate against which the decisions on
Cyprus had to be taken. The first and least significant was the by-election
in south-eastern Turkey which elected Erdogan to the National Assembly
and thus opened the way to his becoming prime minister and not, as he
had been up to then, merely prime minister in waiting; it also opened the
way to a change at the foreign ministry, with Giil, up to then prime
minister, replacing Yakis as foreign minister. The campaigning for the by-
election and the air of change and upheaval in ministerial ranks reduced
the time and appetite for grappling with difficult, complex issues like
The second development was far more damaging. On 1 March, after
weeks of anguished internal debate and haggling with the US over the
accompanying economic aid package, the Turkish government put to the
parliament a proposal authorizing US troops to move through Turkey
into northern Iraq in the event of hostilities in that country. While the
government's measure was supported by more votes than those against it,
there were sufficient abstentions from the ranks of the government's own
supporters to mean that it did not get the necessary majority and thus
failed. This event and its knock-on consequences were to dominate Tur-
key's international policy making for the months ahead. It did not, to put
it mildly, encourage the government to grasp the Cyprus nettle, which
would also have involved a considerable political effort to sell to its par-

liamentary supporters. Moreover throughout the parliamentary saga over
Iraq, the military had stayed quiet, allowing the impression to be created
that they did not favour the government's proposal to give a green light to
the USA. When they explained in the aftermath that they did actually
favour that policy it was too late and rubbed salt in the wound. So rela-
tions between the new government and the military were tense,
unsatisfactory and not propitious to dealing with another issue that con-
cerned them both, Cyprus.

The third development was directly Cyprus-related. Denktash went to
Ankara and conferred with Erdogan, Giil, President Sezer and many
others. And he emerged from these convultations with full Turkish sup-
port for his policy, which as usual put a lot more emphasis on defiance
than on conciliation. Erdogan himself was by the end of the week singing
a quite different song than before, no longer emphasizing the desirability
of a solution but rather the shortcomings (unspecified) of the Annan Plan.
What happened in Anlara to bring about this shift still remains some-
thing of a mystery. Ziyal at The Hague said it was as much a mystery
and a surprise to him as to those outside the Turkish decision-making
machine and he offered no explanation for it. Whether the shaky parlia-
mentary position, an intervention by the military, perhaps with the
encouragement of President Sezer, or Denktash's undoubted powers of
advocacy were responsible it is difficult to say -probably a combination
of all three. Suffice it to say that Denktash emerged not just with Turkish
support but with a blank cheque for whatever he chose to do in The
Hague. Ziyal was sent off with him, deprived of any leverage or scope for
manoeuvre. There is some indication that Denktash misled the Turks
over his willingness to have a referendum. He seems to have indicated
such willingness in Ankara, but on the day of The Hague meeting the
government parties in the TRNC blocked an attempt to introduce refer-
endum legislation by depriving the Assembly of a quorum.

De Soto, Weston and I foregathered in The Hague on 9 March and
lunched together at the British ambassador's residence. The outlook was
not promising, given the negative sounds coming out of Ankara. Rut we
agreed that the priority remained to push as hard as possible for a positive
decision on calling referendums on Annan I11 and, if that could not be
achieved immediately, to explore any fall-back which preserved the
timetable we were all working to and still offered realistic hope of a
settlement within it. I then called on Papadopoulos, who was somewhat
incongruously ensconced in a seaside resort hotel at Scheveningen. The

sun shone pallidly, but the wind blew coldly off the North Sea. Papado-
poulos was nervous and cagey. He would not confirm flatly that he
intended to agree the next day to putting Annan I11 to a referendum but
he gave the impression that he would, while speaking vaguely of the
plan's shortcomings and the shortage of time to prepare for a referendum.
Denktash declined to see either me or Weston, pleading a bad cold (which
did not stop him later alleging that we had refused to see him and were
ganging up to isolate him). Late that night I saw Ziyal. He was tired and
depressed. We agreed that the biggest risk the next day was that Denktash
and Papadopoulos, like drunken men emerging from a pub, would prop
up each other's negative positions. Ziyal's message was clear: if there was
to be any chance of a positive outcome, Papadopoulos would have to pull
away first. I said I thought that could be achieved. But could he manage
the other half? He grimaced and smiled wanly. I breakfasted early the
next morning with Dimitri Droutsas, Papandreou's adviser, and told him
how things stood, pressing the need for Papadopoulos to respond posi-
tively to Annan's question about a referendum and taking him through
the possible scenario for a last-ditch effort. His response was helpful on all

The secretary-general's meetings on 10 March were to take place in
the Peace Palace, the home at The Hague of the International Court of
Justice, which had been made available to the UN and the other delega-
tions. Dating architecturally from a period at the beginning of the
twentieth century not renowned for its style, an uneasy compromise
between neo-classical grandeur and Dutch homeliness, it was far from
being an ideal conference centre. Delegations were either shut away in
their own rooms for most of the 19 hours of talks, or they roamed the
corridors. Fraternization there was none. Papadopoulos said his answer to
Annan's basic question was yes, although he argued for more time before
the referendum was held, clearly wanting to push it beyond the 16 April
signature of the Treaty of Accession and thus strengthen the Greek
Cypriots' tactical position and reduce their vulnerability. He was willing
not to reopen negotiations on Annan I11 if Denktash reciprocated. It was
clear at the time, and later when Annan reported in writing to the Secu-
rity Council, that Annan believed he could, if necessary, have overcome
Papadopoulos's reservations about the timing of the referendums.
Whether Papadopoulos (and Christofias) would then have campaigned for
a 'no' vote, as they were to do a year later, cannot be stated with any
certainty. But I doubt it. The imminence of the date for signing the


Accession Treaty would have weighed heavily in the balance. But, given
Denktash's response, that was never put to the test. Denktash gave Annan
a flat no to the request that he put Annan I11 to a referendum. He pro-
posed that the negotiations begin again from scratch with an open-ended
discussion of principles.

In the light of this unpromising opening the rest of the talks were
devoted to exploring a basis for continuing the process on a realistic and
time-limited basis. Overnight I had put certain suggestions to the UN for
a crash work programme to complete the negotiations and all the ancillary
work by the end of March, and to slip the referendum a further week,
until 6 April. This chimed very much with their own thinking. A consoli-
dated draft of this programme was then put to Papadopoulos, Denktash
and the representatives of the three guarantor powers. It read as follows:

1. The two leadcrs have agreed to an intensified work program for the
technical committees to finish their work by 28 March 2003.
2. They are committed to negotiations on the basis of the 26 February
2003 revision of my plan with a view to agreeing on any changes by 28
March and to putting the finalized Foundation Agreement to simultane-
ous referenda on 6 April.
3. They will nominate the members of the committees on the flag and
anthem competitions, which have been launched with the agreement of
the two sides, by March 14. They will also strive to reach agreement on
the nomination of the members of a future transitional Supreme Court,
the Registrar and Deputy Registrars and the members of the transitional
Board of the Central Bank, failing which they have asked me to contact
persons who would fill those posts in case of approval of the Foundation
4. They committed to table draft constituent state constitutions no later
than 25 March 2003.
5. They will immediately put in hand preparations necessary and to be
completed by 28 March so that the holding of referenda on 6 April will
depcnd only on a political decision to that effect.
6. They will notify the UN SG by 28 March whether they are ready to
hold separate simultaneous referenda on 6 April.
7. The guarantor powers endorse this procedure and undertake to com-
plete whatever internal procedures are necessary in order for them to send

an irrevocable written commitment not ldtcr than 31 March that they
agree with the holding of separate referenda and would sign thc suggested
'Treaty on matters related to the ncw state of affairs' upon entry into force
of the Foundation Agreement.

8. If agreed by 28 March, separate simultaneous referenda would be held
on 6 April 2003.
9. If referenda producc a positive result, the Foundation Agreement would
cntcr into force at 00:00 hours on the day after certification by the United
The Turks immediately asked for time to submit it to Ankara and also
obtained a clarification to the effect that if either referendum returned a
negative outcome, the whole plan would be rendered null and void.

When negotiations resumed later in the day it rapidly became clear
that Denktash would accept none of this. He was not prepared to let the
working groups resume their labours; he was not ready to make any
preparations for a referendum until the negotiations were over and a
decision to hold one was reached; everything to do with the Supreme
Court nominations, the flag and the anthem was premature; he was not
ready to table his constituent state constitution. By the time he had fin-
ished with it the UN work programme consisted of one single sentence as

The two leaders haw agreed to continue negotiations with a view to
agreeing on any changes to my 26 February revised plan on 28 March.

In parallel with these problems, the Turks then~selves suddenly found
that they had insuperable difficulties about committing themselves in
advance of the referendums to signing the amendments to the Treaties of
Guarantee, Alliance and Establishment immediately after a successful
outcome. These amendments would require changes to Turkey's own
international obligations and thus could not be promised until the Turk-
ish parliament had approved them, but equally the Turkish parliament
would not even look at such changes until there had been a referendum
showing that the Turkish Cypriots approved them. It was a perfect Catch
22 situation. Since the tight timetable requiring the guarantor powers to
bind themselves to sign the treaty amendments the day after two suc-
cessful referendums had taken place had been an unchanged feature of
Annan I, I1 and 111, it was odd, to say the least, that the Turks only for-
mally raised the problem for the first time on 10 March. The assumption

had to be that the failed vote over Iraq in the 'I'urkish parliament had
changed everything.
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Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:06 am

Throughout the late afternoon, the evening and the night Anna11 and
his team wrestled with these two parallel sets of problems. They tried
various amended forms of the work programme that made thc details less
prominent but preserved the essence of it. Each one was rejected by
Denktash. They tried to find ways round the Turkish parliamentary
problem at two successive meetings with the guarantor powers, but these
tended to come up against a Greek (and by implication a Greek Cypriot)
objection that they could not be expected to go into the referendums
uncertain whether or not Turkey would endorse the outcome and bring
the new state of affairs into effect. There was too much of a risk of ending
up stuck in a limbo, with the existing Cyprus effectively wiped out, but
the new reunited one not brought into being. They pointed out that their
parliament too would need to ratify the outcome in slower time, but that
need not prevent Greece and Turkey committing themselves to imple-
ment their part of the bargain the day after the referendums had voted in

In the late afternoon I went for a walk in the grounds of the Peace
Palace and ran into Annan. It was sunny, but bitingly cold as only an
early March day can be. We agreed that things looked bad. Annan said he
was about to telephone Erdogan and ask for help. I said we were hoping
that the prime minister would do the same, and the Americans were
working on a presidential call. In the event all these calls went through
but they brought about no change in Turkey's or Denktash's positions.
Nor did a call to Denktash by Yakis later that night. The talks adjourned
for a dinner hosted by the Dutch foreign minister. He had Papadopoulos
on his right and Denktash on his left and the two never exchanged a
word. Annan had slipped away to see his newly born granddaughter in
Haarlem and returned later. The talks went on into the night at the Peace
Palace in an air of increasing frustration and exhaustion. Finally, at a
meeting in the early hours, Annan said to the representatives of the guar-
antor powers that he could see no way forward and no sense in continuing
the negotiations. Only Turkey disagreed and said the negotiations should
go on, but Ziyal was unable to offer anything beyond that.

Nothing remained to be done except to hold the funerary press con-
ferences: de Soto (on behalf of the secretary-general) sad, Papadopoulos
smug and Denktash defiant. De Soto described the situation as the end of
the road. Negotiations would have continued if there had been a strict

work programme, but that had been rejected. Annan would now report to
the Security Council. De Soto's own office in Cyprus would be closed. It
was by no means clear that another opportunity like the present one
would recur any time soon. It was regrettable that Cypriots had been
denied the chance to decide their own future. The plan remained on the
table. If there were a clear and realistic prospect of carrying it forward to
a solution, with the full backing of the motherlands, he would be ready to

I drove directly from the Peace Palace up the road from The Hague to
Schipol Airport to catch the first flight to London. It was a cold, grey,
dank morning, which matched my mood as 1 contemplated the ruins of
seven years of hard labour. I wrote my report and my assessment of the
future prospects on the plane to London. Both report and assessment
were bleak.

Epilogue: The Curtain Falls

he view of the secretary-general of the United Nations that the
negotiations had reached the end of the road and that there was
no purpose to be served in trying to conceal that they had broken
down at The Hague was contested by no one. Nor was it contested that
the responsibility for the breakdown lay at Denktash's door. Even the
Turkish government, which would have much preferred it if some proc-
ess of negotiation had continued, had had the ground cut from under its
feet by the pleasure displayed by Denktash at the breakdown and by the
intemperance of his constantly reiterated public onslaughts on the Annan
Plan, which he delighted in describing as dead and off the table. That was
not the view taken by anyone else: the widespread opinion in the interna-
tional community was that the Annan Plan was the most sophisticated
and the most complete attempt ever made to solve the Cyprus problem
and that a key objective must now be to rescue it from the shipwreck of
the negotiations. And, while comment on the breakdown was overshad-
owed by the hostilities in Iraq which broke out within a few days of the
meeting at The Hague, there was a general feeling of regret that the effort
and skill that de Soto and Annan had put into the negotiations had not
been crowned with success. It was another piece of bad news in a world
where good news was in short supply.

The European Union moves on
The first steps taken after the meeting in The Hague were by the Euro-
pean Union. There was now no longer even the slenderest chance that a
reunited Cyprus could be brought into being in time for it to sign the
Treaty of Accession on 16 April. So the documentation sent to the Euro-
pean Parliament to deal with that eventuality was withdrawn and the
alternative approach of preparing for the admission of a divided island
was pursued. A 'Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus' to be incorporated in the
terms of accession was approved by the European Parliament and agreed


by the member states. The protocol's main provision was to suspend the
acquis communaotaire in the north of the island, thus avoiding a possible
confrontation with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and also avoiding
the Greek Cypriots being held responsible for events in an area over
which they had no control, but making it clear that the European Union
was in no way recognizing the division of the island. Another provision
enabled the EU Council, acting unanimously, to lift that suspension, thus
avoiding the need for treaty amendment and ratification in the event of a
settlement being reached. At the same time, the protocol committed the
European Union to continue its support for Annan's efforts to get a
settlement and reiterated its willingness to accommodate the terms of
such a settlement. This latter commitment was important in that it was
binding on the Greek Cypriots and thus provided some protection against
attempts to unpick the derogations provided for Turkish Cypriots in the
Annan Plan.

On 16 April, amidst much fanfare and pomp, the heads of state and
government of the European Union and of the candidate countries, in-
cluding those of the three countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey)
which were not yet ready for accession, met in Athens and the Treaty of
Accession was signed. Erdogan decided not to attend but Giil, now in-
stalled as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, did, although he
slipped away from the actual signature ceremony, no doubt finding that
just too much for Turkish domestic opinion to bear. For all the sound and
fury generated by the previous Turkish government about the possible
consequences of a divided Cyprus being admitted into the European
Union, with speculation that Turkey might annex the north of Cyprus or
resort to other (usually unnamed) measures of retaliation, not a bat's
squeak was heard. A diplomatic note repeating Turkey's view that Cy-
prus's accession was illegal passed unnoticed. While it was cold comfort
for the UN, which had laboured so hard for a positive outcome, this quiet
acceptance of a fait accompli was an unsung triumph of conflict preven-

A month later the Commission launched proposals to fulfil the remit it
had been given at Copenhagen to find ways of bringing the north of
Cyprus closer to the European Union. These proposals focused on possi-
ble aid projects in the north to be financed with European Union funds
and also on ideas for resuming direct preferential trade between the north
and the European Union, which had been largely cut off as a result of a
ruling by the European Court of Justice. The aid projects proved easier to


move forward than those for trade, partly because it was possible for the
Commission to enlist the enthusiastic cooperation of the mayors of those
Turkish Cypriot n~unicipalities that had fallen to the opposition in the
2002 elections. The ideas for resuming trade were soon entangled in
bureaucratic and legalistic difficulties, many of them enthusiastically
contributed by the Greek Cypriots. The Papadopoulos administration
retained more than a trace of old-style thinking, that squeezing the Turk-
ish Cypriots was a clever policy, and was slow to recognize that, in the
new circumstances, this was largely counter-productive.

The United Nations takes stock

Immediately after the meeting in The IIague de Soto and Annan re-
turned to New York and put in hand the drafting of a substantial written
report to the Security Council. This was urgently required, since up till
then the whole set of negotiations, which had lasted for nearly three and a
half years, had been conducted without Annan making any written re-
ports to the Security Council. The justification for this was clear. Written
reports from the secretary-general are public documents, every word of
which are pored over and often subsequently contested by the interested
parties. To have provided such material while the negotiations were
under way would have risked a controversy that would have damaged the
already fragile structure of the negotiations and would have also risked
embroiling the UN with one or other, or perhaps both, of the protago-
nists, thus reducing its effectiveness as the facilitator of a settlement.
Moreover a written report would have required a formal response from
the Security Council, at the very least a presidential statement or, more
likely, a resolution. The process of negotiating such a formal response
would have been fraught with difficulty, given the superior lobbying
capability of the Greek Cypriots and the pressure in the Council of a
permanent member, Russia, which simply took the Greek Cypriots' brief
unquestioningly. The chances were that any text agreed would not only
have upset the Turks and Turkish Cypriots, whose ability to keep their
end up in the Security Council was invariably less than that of the Greek
Cypriots, but would have destabilized the whole negotiation by moving
away from the 'no preconditions' text of Resolution 1250 on which the
negotiation was based. So Annan and de Soto had briefed the Security
Council orally from time to time throughout the negotiations on their
progress or the lack of it, but had sent forward nothing in writing; nor had
they officially published either the Annan Plan or its two revisions, al-


though those texts were available for studying by members of the Council
in de Soto's office and were, of course, effectively in the public domain as
a result of press leaks on the island. The Security Council, for its part, had
responded on each occasion with a press statement of its current presi-
dent, which stuck largely to generalities and to supporting the secretary-
general's continuing efforts.

The secretary-general's report was tabled on 1 April (S/2003/398) and
the full text of Annan 111 was posted on the UN website. The report was
worth waiting for. It gave a coherent and often eloquent account of the
negotiations, of the proposals Annan had made and of the process that had
led to Annan's conclusion at The Hague that he had reached the end of
the road. He justified the decision to launch a new effort to settle the
Cyprus problem: there had been 'a unique set of circumstances . . . and the
potential existed to make a true impact on the attitudes of the protagonists
and bring about the required qualitative changes of position'. He re-
minded the Council of the scale of the negotiating effort -54 meetings in
the proximity phase, 72 meetings in the face-to-face format, more than
150 separate bilateral meetings between de Soto and the two leaders, 30
trips to Greece and Turkey. The cost had been $1,148,500. The proposals
ran to 192 core pages plus 250 pages of finalized laws for the reunited
Cyprus. Draft laws running to 6,000 pages and 1,954 international treaties
and instruments were awaiting approval when Denktash pulled out of the
working group exercise. Annan then ran through the issues, the narrative
of the negotiations and the content of his successive proposals in terms
similar to those set out in earlier chapters of this book and which I will
therefore not weary the reader by repeating.

He concluded by describing the breakdown as the last in a long line of
missed opportunities. In measured but trenchant terms he set out the
responsibility of Denktash for the breakdown: 'in the case of the failure of
this latest effort I believe Mr Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, bears
prime responsibility', and 'except for a very few instances, Mr Denktash
by and large declined to engage in negotiations on the basis of give and
take'. He said little that was critical of the Turkish government, express-
ing the hope that '[it] will soon be in a position to throw its support
unequivocally behind the search for a settlement, for without that support
it is difficult to foresee one being reached'. For Clerides he had little but
praise: 'He did not feel wedded to tried and true formulas; he was quite
prepared to explore approaches different from his own ... [he] showed a
capacity to accept that his side bore its share of the responsibilities for the


bitter experiences of the past.' 1le warmly thanked Greece for its support,
and the United States and the United Kingdom for their backing and
advice. As to the future Annan said a window of opportunity had now
closed; he did not believe such an opportunity would occur 'any time
soon'. But his plan remained on the table. He did not propose to take any
new initiative

unlcss and until, such time as I am given solid reason to bclieve that the
political will exists necessary for a successful outcome ... a solution on the
basis of the plan could be achieved only if there is an unequivocally stated
preparedness on the part of the leaders of both sides, fully and deter-
minedly backed at the highest political level in both motherlands, to
commit themselves (a) to finalize the plan (without reopening its t~asic
principles or essential trade-offs) by a specific date with UN assistance
and (b) to put it to separate, simultaneous referenda as provided for in the
plan on a date certain soon thereafter.

Faced with such a f~dl and clear report, the Security Council had no great
difficulty reaching similar conclusions. As might have been expected,
there was plenty of lobbying. The Greek Cypriots in particular put in a
frenzied performance which at some moments gave rise to the suspicion
that they too wanted to marginalize the Annan Plan and reopen its main
proposals. But none of that affected the outcome very much. Security
Council Resolution 1475 was adopted by unanimity on 14 April. It com-
mended the secretary-general and his team for their conduct of the
negotiations and for the proposals he had made. It gave its full support to
Annan 111, which it described as 'a unique basis for further negotiations'.
It regretted 'the negative approach of the Turkish Cypriot leader', which
had deprived both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots of an opportu-
nity to decide for themselves on a plan that would have permitted the
reunification of Cyprus before the signature of the Treaty of Accession. It
asked the secretary-general to continue to make available his Good Of-
fices for Cypnls.

Soon after adoption of this resolution de Soto closed his office in the
island, and he and his able team were posted to new assignments, he
himself to become the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for
the Western Sahara in the autumn of 2003, Pfirter to go to the Swiss
embassy in Lisbon and Dann to the secretary-general's own office in New
York. But it was made clear that, should circumstances change and should
the prospects for a settlement revive, then the team could be reassembled
at short notice. I, too, after consultation with ministers in London decided


that there was no useful purpose to be served in the short term by con-
tinuing my mission. No new appointment was made but Jack Straw told
parliament that if the circumstances justified it he would not hesitate to
make a further appointment. The message from all this was clear. The
international community had given Cyprus its best effort. If negotiations
were to be resumed, there would have to be some fundamental shifts in
the region.

A barrier aumbles

A few days after the signature of the Treaty of Accession, on 2 1 April, the
Turkish Cypriots, without any advance notice or the usual leaks, an-
nounced the lifting of all restrictions on the Green Line, which had for
nearly 30 years prevented Greek Cypriots going to the north and Turkish
Cypriots to the south. The response was instant and massive. Huge
queues formed at the crossing points. A mass two-way exodus began.
Pressure mounted for the opening of new crossing points. Tiresome
restrictions that prevented Greek and Turkish Cypriots driving their cars
on the other side of the line were lifted. The Greek Cypriots, who had at
first been caught on the hop by this sudden move, were driven to recipro-
cate and to desist from the temptation to make a fuss about such issues as
those crossing from the south having to show their passports to authori-
ties in the north, although they continued to try to prevent Greek
Cypriots spending a night in the north and would not admit to the south
anyone whom they considered to be a Turkish 'settler'. Within a few
months it was estimated that three-quarters of all Turkish Cypriots had
visited the south, many more than once, and that half of all Greek Cypri-
ots had visited the north.

Perhaps more interesting even than the scale of the crossings was the
atmosphere in which they took place. It had been part of Denktash's stock
in trade over many years to predict that dire consequences would ensue if
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots ever again mingled in an uncon-
trolled way. I-Ie was not averse to dramatic bloodcurdling analogies with
the problems between Israelis and Palestinians. And there were extrem-
ists in the Greek Cypriot community with similar views. The reality bore
no relation to this picture. The mood was festive. There were many
touching accounts of reunions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots who
had been neighbours before the events of 1974 had driven them apart.
There were practically no ugly incidents of any sort, and the few that
there were were handled with a light touch by the police on both sides.


For once ordinary people were able to get ahead of the politicians, and
they enjoyed it. It gradually dawned, however, that the Green Ihe was
not the Berlin Wall. The mass crossings were not a prelude to the crum-
bling of the regime in the north. The political obstacles to a settlement,
although they were in the broadest sense undermined and weakened by
developments on the Green Line, were not removed by them.

A remaining enigma was why Denktash and the authorities in the
north took the action they did to open up the Green Line crossings. No
doubt part of the explanation was that both Denktash and the Turks felt
under great international pressure following the collapse of the talks at
The Hague and the blame they were apportioned in bringing that about,
and wanted to take some eye-catching initiative that would place them in
a more positive light. If so, it somewhat backfired in the sense that the
main international reaction was that this validated the thinking behind the
Annan Plan and demonstrated that a bi-zonal, federal Cyprus should have
a good chance of working. Other baser motives were possibly at work.
Denktash may have expected a violent incident or two to strengthen his
case. He may have intended to boost the electoral prospects of his son's
party in the parliamentary elections due in December. The huge flood of
Greek Cypriots coming to the north (which, of course, had not been
anticipated) certainly gave a boost to the Turkish Cypriots' ailing econ-
omy. And there were some recognition and status crumbs to be lovingly
gathered up as Greek Cypriots showed their passports to Turkish Cypriot
policemen. But all in all the story is more one of the law of unintended
consequences in full operation than of careful planning and foresight.

Negotiating stasis
With the temporary withdrawal of the United Nations from an active role
in promoting a Cyprus settlement and with the removal of short-term
external pressure in support of their efforts, the scene rapidly reverted to
one in which tactical manoeuvre and the playing of the blame game
dominated. Papadopoulos, while insisting that he was ready to accept a
settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan, developed an eloquent attach-
ment to a mantra called 'a viable and workable settlement'. What this
might mean in terms of changes to the Annan Plan was never explained,
perhaps fortunately, but it seemed to signal a desire to unpick some of the
EU derogations which had formed such a crucial part of the Annan Plan.
Denktash, as so often before when he was in a tight corner, tried to
change the subject. IIe launched proposals for bilateral face-to-face

meetings with Papadopoulos without the presence of the UN and quite
explicitly designed not to negotiate on the basis of the Annan Plan. He
also went back to some of the old Confidence-Building Measures of the
1993-94 period, proposing that the ghost town of Varosha could be
opened up to the Greek Cypriots. None of the ideas had any attraction to
Papadopoulos. In Ankara denunciation of the Annan Plan was eschewed
and repetition of the 'no solution is no solution' slogan continued. But
there were few signs yet that Turkey was ready to come to terms with the
reality of the Annan Plan or was willing and able to rein in Denktash.
Indeed the dislocation in Turkey's Cyprus policy was again underlined
by the decision on 8 August to form a customs union between Turkey
and the TKNC. This move, of little practical significance or benefit to the
Turkish Cypriots, was part of the preexisting agenda of the Ecevit gov-
ernment to match any move to integrate the south into the European
Union with similar moves between the north and Turkey. Its main effect
was to put Turkey in the wrong in its own dealings with the European
Union (since Turkey's Association and Customs Union Agreements with
the EU required prior consultation before Turkey entered into any such
new commitments), and to undermine the view which the AK govern-
ment was anxious to propagate that it was still seriously working for a
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Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:08 am

What Went Wrong, and
Will It Ever Go Right?

'o one who has participated in a failed negotiation can duck the

q~mtion of what went wrong. Indeed they should not do so,

because the answers to that question will be needed by the next
person or organization to pick up the baton. Nor is it enough to point the
finger at one person or country to the exclusion of all others as being
responsible for the failure, because things are seldom as simple as that.
The Cyprus settlement negotiations may have been many things, but
simple they were not. Some readers may think that I have indeed pointed
my finger at Rauf Denktash as that one person whose actions explain
what went wrong in Cyprus. It is true that I believe he bore the lion's
share of the responsibility for frustrating what was the most far-reaching
and the most hopeful of the attempts so far made to resolve the Cyprus
problem, as he had done earlier ones. But I do not believe it makes sense
to demonize him or to overlook the many other factors that contributed to
the setback.

Some of the problems the negotiators faced in Cyprus were generic
ones, which could have arisen almost anywhere in the world. To get
agreement to a territorial adjustment at the negotiating table and not on
the battlefield is one of the most difficult challenges for any negotiator
and it has not often been successfully achieved. In this case it was made
even more problematic by the fact that 'l'urkey, which ultimately had to
agree to the adjustment, remained the militarily dominant force in the
immediate region and on the island, not seriously challenged even by the
frantic and costly armament programmes initiated by successive Greek
Cypriot administrations. To get agreement to making the painful com-
promises necessary for a solution when the status quo was not urgently
unsustainablc and when the two parties had not been worn down by
conflict, was also a challenge. The Greek Cypriots had made a remarkable

recovery from the dog days of 1974 and had built a strong economy on
the foundations of their tourist and service industries. They were making
their way into the European Union in the happy position of being the
most prosperous of the ten candidates and the one that needed the least
adjustments to meet the requirements of EU membership. The Turkish
Cypriots were less comfortably placed, with a weak and dysfunctional
economy, but the annual subsidy from Turkey in the region of $200
million -approxinlately $1,000 for every man, woman and child in the
TRNC -and the Turkish troop presence guaranteeing their security,
took the edge off their predicament.

And then there was the ineluctable fact that the Cyprus problem was
not right at the top of anyone's agenda. So, however many international
meetings issued statements calling for a settlement in Cyprus, the harsh
reality remained that the leaders making those statements invariably had
more urgent things on their minds and more immediate calls on their
time. In the event it proved possible on this occasion to enlist a more
sustained effort by those principally concerned -the US, the UK and the
other main European countries, the UN and the European Commission -
than had ever been the case before. But this concentration of effort was
fragile and vulnerable to external distractions. The crisis over Iraq gradu-
ally overshadowed the final stages of the negotiations and distracted the
attention of some of the main players, especially those in Ankara. I am not
suggesting that without a crisis in Iraq a settlement would have necessar-
ily been reached in Cyprus in the spring of 2003. This factor was not that
important or fundamental. But it certainly was not helpful.

Two other generic problems plagued the Cyprus negotiations: the
blame game and the zero-sum game. The blame game was a speciality of
the Greek Cypriots and, to a lesser extent in the early years of this nego-
tiation, of the Greeks. They played it day in day out, and they played it
well. If there had been an Olympic medal for playing the blame game,
they would have won it. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots played it very
badly, except in the eyes of their own public opinion which did not
signify much in this contest. Their mistake was not to realize how much
tactical damage to their position arose from their i~~ability

or unwilling-
ness to raise their presentational game. But the really pernicious aspect of
the blame game was its incompatibility with a commitment to negotiate
effectively and seriously. If you are playing the blame game you pick the
most extreme and unreasonable of your opponent's public statements and
make the most use of it you can; if you are negotiating seriously you pick


the most useable and reasonable of your opponent's statements and try to
make something of them. Points scored in the blame game are points lost
at the negotiating table. Neither side understood this or, if they did, drew
the right conclusions. The Greek Cypriots believed they could play both
games at the same time and were unwilling to recognize the damage they
caused to the fabric of the negotiation by continuing with the blame

Treating the Cyprus settlement negotiations as a zero-sum game was
even more endemic and more pernicious. At its simplest this meant that
any of one side's problems that the UN successfully addressed was in-
stantly regarded as a loss to the other side and one which had to be
compensated for somewhere else. In the final stages of the negotiations,
once the UN plan of 11 November 2002 was on the table, there was no
escape from zero-sum calculations; there had to be a balance in any revi-
sions proposed, and the UN achieved that balance with considerable skill.
But the failure of many, although not all of those concerned, to realize
that getting a Cyprus settlement and getting a reunited Cyprus into the
European Union was not a zero-sum game at all was a serious handicap.
In the security field, it was essential to understand that achieving a feeling
of security only at the expense of creating a feeling of insecurity on the
other side (as was the effect of the large 'Turkish troop presence in the
north and of the south's sequence of arms purchases) was not a contribu-
tion to achieving lasting and sustainable security, which was much more
likely to be obtained by lower troop presences and the demilitarization of
indigenous forces. In the economic field, all experience with previous
enlargements of the European Union had shown that far from being a
zero-sun1 game, bringing less prosperous countries and regions within the
scope of the single market and of the European Union's structural funds
tended to result in a substantial increase in overall prosperity and the
narrowing of gaps between disadvantaged regions and their better-off
neighbours. The importance of appreciating these aspects and of getting
away from a zero-sum mentality was all the more crucial in Cyprus
because the smallness of the island and the duration of the attempts to get
a settlement had meant that the negotiating pitch had long since been
trampled into a quagmire; only if the pitch could be enlarged and the
mentality changed was the will going to be found to make the necessary

But, when all was said and done, the generic problems were not the
most difficult ones the negotiators had to face: the Cyprus-specific prob-

lcms were even more daunting. I well remember the fate of Holbroolte's
efforts to use historical analogies to impress on the Cypriots of both
persuasions the need for and the possibility of overcoming their antago-
nisms and hatreds. To preach this sermon he produced Dick Spring,
former foreign minister of Ireland and a man who had played a distin-
guished role in overcoming the differences between Britain and Ireland
over Northern Ireland. Spring spoke eloquently and well. For a brief time
his Cypriot audience looked dazed and impressed. And then with one
accord they chorused 'Ah, yes. But Cyprus is different.' The truth of that
could not be gainsaid by careful academic analysis because it was in the
bloodstream of all concerned.

Most fundamental of the Cyprus-specific problems were what I
named the two nightmares. The Turl<ish Cypriot nightmare was that,
however many precautions you took, however many counter-provisions
you made in the paperwork of a comprehensive settlemcnt, and even with
Turkish troops on the island guaranteeing its constitutional provisions,
those wily Greek Cypriots would end up dominating a reunited Cyprus
and repressing the Turkish Cypriots as they had done in the Cyprus of
the 1960 agreements. The Greek Cypriot nightmare was that, however
many times you said that secession was banned and that the new Cyprus
was an indissoluble union, Denktash would in fact be able to use to his
advantage all the concessions made to him, would cause stalemate in the
institutional arrangements (as the Greek Cypriot version of the history of
the 1960s had it), and, after a brief time, would walk off into the sunset
with the independent, sovereign state he had al\vays been determined to
achieve. What could be done to banish these nightmares was done by the
UN in the successive iterations of the Annan Plan. But it had to be recog-
nized that only the experience of succesfully operating the new, reunited
Cyprus was going to banish them for ever. So this was one of several
Catch 22 elements.

Another Cyprus-specific problem arose from the complexes the vari-
ous players had about each other. The Turkish Cypriots had an
inferiority complex about the Greek Cypriots, who ol~tnumbered them
and were thought to be richer and more astute than they were. The Greek
Cypriots had an inferiority complex about Turkey because Turkey domi-
nated their island militarily. I once said to Clerides that it looked as if we
were going to have bad weather coming from the Taurus Mountains (in
Turkey). 'Yes', he said, 'That's where it always comes from.' IIe was not
talking about the weather. Both lots of Cypriots, as I have observed


earlier, had complexes about their motherlands. And Greece also had a
complex about Turkey. All these interlocking co~nplexes had somehow to
be unlocked if there was to be a settlement and if it was to work. But, as
with the interlocking complexes in Northern Ireland, between Protestants
and Catholics and between them and their motherlands and between
Ireland and Britain, that was easier said than done.

In Cyprus these complexes were exacerbated, particularly in the
south, by the weird politically correct vocabulary in which all matters
relating to Cyprus had to be discussed. The TRNC was the 'pseudo
state', its land 'the occupied territories', its people 'the Turkish Cypriot
community', its politicians 'so-called ministers' and so on. In the north
there were some equally egregious examples, the Turkish military inter-
vention of 1974 being invariably referred to as 'the peace operation' and
Greek Cypriot harassment referred to as 'genocide'. Turkish Cypriots
were slightly less devoted to the textual exegesis of their visitors' state-
ments than were the Greek Cypriots. For any British minister going to
Cyprus for the first time, the first document in the briefing folder was not
a list of objectives for his or hcr visit but a glossary of the various words
and terms to be used or avoided. All this was translated by the politicians
on both sides into highly vitriolic political discourse about the others. I
used to ask Cypriot audiences (both in London and on the island) whether
it might not make more sense to show some respect for the institutions of
the other side. After all, the politicians, judges, civil servants and others
whom they so freely denounced and denigrated were the self-same peo-
ple, and, largely, with name changes, the self-same institutions, that
would be running the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent
states of a reunited Cyprus. This thought seemed quite strange and rather
heretical to most of them. However, probably the worst and most dam-
aging manifestation of these complexes was in the educational curricula
on either side of the Green Line. Children are brought up to regard the
other side as the 'enemy', taught bigoted songs at nursery and given time
off to demonstrate on significant anniversaries. I remember sitting next to
a Greek Cypriot businessman flying to Larnaca who said that, as someone
who had lived in a mixed community pre-1974, he could never and would
never regard Turkish Cypriots as his enemies; but his children all did so
automatically. The history syllabus taught to each side is a travesty.

As if all this was not bad enough, there were some astonishing gaps in
human contact, let alone political dialogue, between some of the key
players. 'I'his was partly, but not exclusively, due to the peculiarities of

travel arrangements and diplomatic protocol arising from the fact that no
one but Turkey recognized the TRNC and that Turkey did not recognize
the Republic of Cyprus. But the Turkish Cypriot authorities did their
level best to supplement such obstacles and to harass and obstruct bi-
communal gatherings. They seemed to feel that, if they could not be fully
recognized, they would prefer to be a hermit state, a view not shared by
most of their citizens. The worst gap was that between the Turks, the
ultimate arbiters of any settlement, and the Greek Cypriots. There was
something surreal about sitting in an office in the foreign ministry in
Ankara listening to a row of senior Turkish diplomats telling me in great
detail about the objectives, intentions and motivation of Clerides, whom
none of them had ever met or talked to. I, of course, would have seen him
a few hours before, but that did not seem to register. The only Turks who
ever did talk to Clerides were journalists like Mehmet Ali Birand of
CNN-Turk, to whom he would from time to time give a conciliatory
interview, but that did not register either. And indeed what was needed
was some discreet dialogue, not necessarily conducted by diplomats or
politicians. But then there was the problem of Denktash, who would have
regarded any such dialogue as a personal betrayal. So nothing was ever

No consideration of what went wrong would be complete without
some consideration of the European Union dimension, if only because
Denktash invariably tried to cast the European Union as the villain of the
piece, without whose involvement all would have been fine. Elsewhere in
Europe, even in some quarters of Ankara, the contrary view was taken
and the European Union was seen as a catalyst for reaching a settlement
and as likely to provide the cement that would hold one together. I am in
no doubt myself that the second thesis is closer to the truth than the first.
But it was all a bit more complex than this simple black and white choice
can make it appear. Cyprus's EU application and the implementation of
the acquis communautaire in the island were seen by many Greek Cypri-
ots as a tactical stroke of genius enabling them to gain points painlessly
without the concessions that would be required of them at the UN's
negotiating table. Moreover there was much loose talk on the Greek
Cypriot side of how the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee would be invalidated
by membership of the European Union and of how the emerging Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy would miraculously turn into a mutual
defence commitment between its members. Much persistence and skill
was required, mainly from the European Commission, to dissipate these


illusions and to establish the sort of adjustments when applying the acquis
communautaire which would ensure it was compatible with the UN
proposals for a settlement. Once this process had been completed, as it
was by late 2002, it became clear to most Cypriots, including most Turk-
ish Cypriots, that European Union membership by a reunited island was
the keystone of any settlement.

Turkey's own relationship with the European Union was a less un-
mitigated success story. The ambivalent attitude of many member states
towards the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union was an
endlessly complicating factor, as were the problems Turkey itself had in
meeting the Copenhagen political criteria for membership. Above all the
sequencing of Turkey's slow and halting progress towards membership
and the Cyprus negotiations presented a virtually insoluble problem. No
one much doubted that if Turkey's candidature had been proceeding to a
positive conclusion in parallel with Cyprus's and with the negotiations for
a settlement, all three would have passed the finishing post together. But
that was not on offer. The 1995 commitment to the Greek Cypriots was
clear. And Turkey's accession date could not be predicted. Were the
Turkish Cypriots' EU aspirations and a Cyprus settlement to be left in
limbo until then, as Denktash and many in Ankara wanted? Not only was
that bad news in the meantime for the Turkish Cypriots but it was far
from clear that they would avoid ending up with the short straw in any
such grand deal. The implications for both Turkey and for the Turkish
Cypriots of the Greek Cypriots by then being entrenched as a member
inside the European Union were seriously negative. To anyone except
Denktash, who wanted neither Turkey nor the TRNC to be in the Euro-
pean Union, and who regarded the European Union as some kind of
plague sent to trouble him, these concerns would have provided pause for

There was one further European Union complication. A Greek Cyp-
riot business, egged on by their government, had, in the early 1990s
brought a case to the European Court of Justice arguing that Turkish
Cypriot exports to the European Union should not be admitted or given
preferential treatment because they did not have origin and phyto-
sanitary certificates issued in accordance with the EU/Cyprus Customs
Union Agreement. Although the case was contested by the British gov-
ernment (most of the exports went to the UK) and by the Commission,
the Court found for the plaintiff and so, from 1994, virtually all direct
trade between north Cyprus and its natural market in the EU ceased.

This was known to Turl<ish Cypriots as 'the embargo' and was treated as
if the European Union had imposed sanctions on the TKNC. In fact it
was partly their own fmlt since the problem over certificates was com-
pounded by Denktash's declaration of independence. The effect,
however, was to damage further the economy of the north and to lend
credibility to Denktash's own view that the European Union was hostile
to Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately, although most members of the EU
and the Commission believed the 'embargo' was counter-productive,
finding a way around the Court's edict was not straightforward. On
numerous occasions I tried to persuade Clerides that it made more sense
politically to help the Turkish Cypriots resume exports and thus to dem-
onstrate, contrary to what Denktash was saying, the benefits the EU
would bring them. Furthermore I pointed out that, contrary to public
belief in the south, the 'embargo' did not give them leverage over the
north, but simply made Turkish Cypriots feel angry and sorry for them-
selves. But to him the political cost of a move always outweighed the
benefits and nothing was done. Even in 2003, when the Green Line was
open and the Commission was trying to find ways in which trade with
the north could be resumed, the Greek Cypriots were dragging their feet
and making difficulties. It was the epitome of zero-sum calculation.

So far in this chapter I have concentrated on the underlying indirect
factors that militated against a successful settlement negotiation and thus
contributed to its failure. The more obvious direct factors have been fully
described in the narrative chapters on the negotiations themselves and in
the account of Annan's analysis of what went wrong. Ought one to be
more self-critical? Were there mistakes made by the UN and those who
supported its efforts? Of course there were, and I hope they have been
identified in those same narrative chapters, the mistake in pushing the
negotiations a bit too far, too fast in November 2000 being the most
obvious one.

Another major weakness was that it was never possible to synchronize
the moments at which both sides were under pressure to settle. When the
Greek Cypriots were under the greatest pressure (up to March 2003) the
Turks were not ready to handle Denktash. And when they finally were
ready (outside the time-scale of this book, in 2004) the pressure on the
Greek Cypriots had eased off.

There remains one big question: should the negotiations have been
started at all, knowing, as everyone concerned did, that Denktash was
fundamentally opposed to any outcome that was even remotely negotia-



ble? The person who would have been happiest if that question had been
answered in the negative would have been Denktash. Negotiations put his
position in north Cyprus and as the controller of 'l'urkey's Cyprus policy
at risk; the absence of negotiations consolidated it. The hard fact was that
the UN was never going to find out whether the Denktash roadblock
could be circumnavigated without putting it to the test. I am sure they
were right to do so.

So much for what went wrong. What about the more difficult and
speculative question of will it ever go right? Many of those who have
struggled with the Cyprus problem over the years and broken their teeth
on it have concluded that it is insoluble. I do not share that view. The
problem is soluble, although only with the greatest difficulty given the
inherent negative factors discussed earlier in this chapter. Moreover it is
in the general interest of those who live in the island, of those who live in
neighbouring countries in the region and of the wider international com-
munity, that it should be solved. That is not, however, a confident
prediction that it will be solved, and certainly not a prediction that it will
be solved, in Ihfi Annan's phrase, 'any time soon'. Another reason for
believing the problem is soluble is that the material for a comprehensive
solution is now on the table. The Annan Plan is not the result of a few
months or even years of negotiation; it was built up slowly and painstak-
ingly over a period of 20 years which began with Pe'rez de Cue'llar's work
on the island and afterwards when he became UN secretary-general, and
which continued through Routros-Ghali's Set of Ideas and which only
reached its final and complete form in the negotiations described in this
book. It is not, as Denktash and, later, Papadopoulos have attempted to
depict it, yet another externally devised and imposed settlement like that
of 1960, into which Cypriots have made no input. On the contrary it has
been pieced together in a process that has involved Cypriots at every
stage. Clearly it is not perfect, and some balanced changes can still be
negotiated. Rut it is an illusion to suppose that there is some alternative
approach out there waiting to be found, which will prove to be both
negotiable and viable. As Aman frequently said, the choice is not be-
tween this approach and another one, it is between this approach and no
solution at all.

However, the negotiations between 1999 and 2007 did, in my view,
demonstrate that external pressures and assistance do have their limita-
tions and cannot, unaided, deliver a settlement. On no previous occasion
were external pressures applied so consistently and in such a sustained


manner; on no previous occasion was the raw material that emerged from
the views of the two sides so skilfully blended and merged. And yet all
that was not enough to achieve an agreement. The conclusion to be
drawn, surely, is that it is not to an increase in external pressure and
assistance that one must look in the future, important though those ele-
ments will remain, to produce a positive outcome; it is rather to an
increased positive input from Cypriots themselves and from the two
motherlands. This switch in emphasis would be no bad thing in its own
right. One of the most corrosive characteristics of Cypriot politics on both
sides is the belief that Cypriots are mere pawns on the international chess
board, that 'they' (sometimes defined as Greece and Turkey, sometimes
as the 'great powers') will settle matters and impose their preferred solu-
tion on the Cypriots. This attitude has encouraged the growth among
politicians on both sides of irresponsible politics, of an unwillingness to
accept responsibility for the consequences of the policies being promoted.
In any case a solution imposed from outside will risk being as unstable
and as fragile as the 1960 settlement, which lasted only three years and
had few supporters on either side in Cyprus. If, next time, there is to be a
durable solution it will surely have to be one for which the majority of
Cypriots claim ownership and one which they are prepared to support
and to make work.
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Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:08 am

One further important regional element will be the development of
relations between Greece and Turkey. Will the present fragile and in-
complete rapprochement between the two countries be consolidated to
the extent of resolving all the disputes between them, including the key
ones over the continental shelf in the Aegean and the sea and air bounda-
ries there? Or will the rapprochement stall or even fall apart? Whether or
not the two governments go further than that will be a key factor for the
chances of solving the Cyprus problem. There cannot be a complete
resolution of all the disputes between Greece and Turkey without a
settlement of the Cyprus problem. So if the two governments put their
hands to settling their bilateral disputes, they will need also to put more
effort into helping bring about a settlement of the Cyprus problem. But if
they leave the Cyprus problem to fester, then the chances of their being
able to settle their bilateral disputes will lessen and the risks of regression
in their relationship will increase.

Do these regional elements have to fall into place simultaneously?
That would indeed be a triumph of hope over experience. A less clearcut
outcome is more likely. But each one will affect the prospects for settling


the Cyprus problem. Outside the region the most important elements
relate to the European Union and the evolution of its policies. The Euro-
pean Union is debarred from becoming itself a facilitator or mediator by
the fact that Greece and Cyprus will now be members and Turkey is not
yet one. That role remains for the UN. But, as has been said before, the
European Union's handling of the Turkish candidature will be vitally
important, as will be its continued willingness to 'accommodate' a UN
settlement within the terms of accession that will apply to the north of the
island. Any weakening of that commitment, and there are plenty on the
Greek Cypriots' side who would be happy to see, and even to work for, a
weakening of it, would be damaging, perhaps fatally damaging, to the
prospects for a settlement. On the contrary the European Union should
be working systematically to demonstrate to Turkish Cypriots that they
should have no fear about joining ahead of Turkey and that the institu-
tions of the European Union will be there to protect a settlement once
reached, not to undermine it.


stepped down from my job as the British government's Special
Representative for Cyprus at the end of May 2003 with some relief
and some regret. I had done the job for seven years. What had started
as a part-time retirement post had gradually come perilously close to
being a full-time commitment. When, in April 2001, I was appointed to
the House of Lords and almost simultaneously became Pro-Chancellor of
the University of Birmingham, I had tried to escape, but the Foreign
Office would have none of it: John Kerr (the permanent under-secretary)
and Emyr Jones Parry (the political director) persuaded me to carry on.
Now, with the breakdown of the negotiations, the indicators all pointed
the other way. Moreover I had the feeling that I had done what could be
done from the outside to help the process forward. The pieces needed to
complete the jigsaw were on the table.

It was a relief to be spared the continuing carping criticism of the
Cypriot press, in particular in the south. I had grown my extra skin or
two and had evolved a technique of never responding even to their wild-
est fantasies about the plots I was said to be hatching. It was a relief too to
be spared the burden of suspicion about British intentions, which was
pervasive almost everywhere on the Cyprus circuit. I had started my
diplomatic career in Iran and Afghanistan, two countries whose history
had left them convinced that the long, hidden hand of British diplomacy
could be held responsible for almost anything that happened; but that was
a mere aperitif for Cyprus. As I learned more about our role there in the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, I came to understand better some of the hostility
and suspicions towards Britain. We had indeed not covered ourselves
with glory during that period. But the prevalence of that same suspicion,
so long after the justification for it had disappeared, was saddening and a
trifle wearing.

There was also regret. I did not like leaving a job unfinished. If I had
believed that continuing would have made a real difference I would have


been ready to do so. I felt in a way that I had let down those many Cypri-
ots, Creek and Turkish, who thanked me quietly (no one ever thanked me
publicly) for what I and others were doing to get a settlement. Most of all
I regretted severing my last official link with my colleagues in Britain's
Diplomatic Service with whom I had worked for 44 years and whose
professionalism, capacity for hard work and cheerfulness were as notable
when I left as the day I joined their ranks in 1959.


rom the breakdown of the negotiations in May 2003 until the
Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections in December of that year,
there was a complete absence of activity, let alone of movement, in
attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem. The United Nations camped
firmly on the position, endorsed by the Security Council in April, that
there would need to be a firm commitment of all concerned to work on
the basis of the Annan Plan before it could contemplate re-engagement.
The Turkish Cypriot scene remained dominated by a weakened Denk-
rash in full rejectionist mode, regularly denouncing the Annan Plan; the
Turks retired to lick their wounds and wait for a shift in the political
situation in the north of the island; the Greek Cypriots reclined comforta-
bly on their laurels, occasionally repeating a vague mantra expressing
willingness to negotiate on the basis of the Annan Plan (while demanding
greater 'viability', whatever that might mean) and coasting towards EU
accession on 1 May 2004.

All that changed with the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections in
December. Although the outcome was a dead-heat (25 seats each for
parties supporting a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the Annan
Plan and for the rejectionists), the result in fact reflected a substantial
shift away from the rejectionists and a repudiation of Denktash's domi-
nance of the Turkish Cypriot handling of the settlement negotiations.
Difficult negotiations then ensued over the formation of the new govern-
ment, it being clear from the outset that to achieve any sort of stability or
sense of direction, there would need to be a coalition that in some way
straddled the differences over the Annan Plan. Eventually a coalition was
formed with Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of the firmly pro-Annan Plan
CTP, as prime minister and Serdar Denktash, leader of the less funda-
mentally rejectionist of the two centre-right parties, as deputy prime
minister and foreign minister. More significantly the coalition agreement
committed the new government to work for a resumption of the settle-


nxnt negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan. This government was
accepted and installed with ill grace by Kauf Denktash towards the end of
January 2004.

It was clearly the signal for which the Turkish government had been
waiting with some impatience, having in the interim, since the breakdown
of negotiations in March 2003, resolved its own internal contradictions
and concluded that an early settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan
offered a potentially acceptable outcome and the only sure way of fur-
thering its major policy objective of getting a green light for the opening
of its own accession negotiations with the EU at the end of 2004. The
Turkish prime minister moved rapidly, through a series of high-level
meetings with the EU, the UN secretary-general and the president of the
United States, to indicate that he was anxious for a resumption of the
negotiations on the conditions laid down by Annan and that he and the
Turkish Cypriots intended this time to negotiate in good faith for a posi-
tive result. How the Denktash obstacle was to be removed or
circumnavigated remained, however, at this stage unclear.

With both Greek Cypriots and the Greeks continuing to repeat their
commitmc:lt to a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan, and with the
whole international community, with the US, the UK and the EU in the
lead, keen to have one final try to see whether a settlement could be
reached in time to enable a reunited Cyprus to join the EU on 1 May, the
UN secretary-general called the parties to New York in early February
2004. Three days of difficult and tense negotiations led to agreement on
the following:

1. Negotiations between the two Cypriot sides under the aegis of the UN
and on the basis of the Annan Plan would resume on the island without
2. If, after a month (by 21 March), these negotiations had not reached a
comprehensive agreement, thc Greek and Turkish governments would
join the negotiations and try to hclp the Cypriots to rcach an agreement
within a further week.
3. Should this second phase not succeed, Annan would, on his own re-
sponsibility, complete a definitive new version of his plan, which would
be submitted to refercndums in both parts of Cyprus at the cnd of April
(at first envisaged for 2 1 April but subsequently shifted to 24 April).


4. Meanwhile the technical work needed to draft legislation for a rcunitcd
Cyprus, including its international commitments (begun in the run-up to
The Hague meeting in March 2003), would be completed.
The negotiations in New York revealed rifts on both sides. Those
between the Turkish government and Talat on the one hand and Denk-
tash on the other were more evident than ever before. Papadopoulos for
his part showed increasing signs of unease about the game plan to which
he was committing himself, while for the Greek government the shadow
of its own general election on 7 March loomed ever closer and limited its
scope for manoeuvre and forceful intervention.

The first phase of the resumed negotiations was a pure charade. Nei-
ther side negotiated seriously. Papadopoulos and Denktash pressed for
long lists of unnegotiable changes to the Annan Plan and showed no
interest in negotiating trade-offs. The unholy alliance between them was
already taking shape. The second phase, which the UN moved to Biirgen-
stock in Switzerland, was more serious. For one thing, Denktash declined
to participate, thus (not for the first time) reneging on an agreement into
which he had himself freely entered. His absence proved, however, to be
a positive development, since his potential for spoiling manoeuvres was
removed and the Turkish government was relieved of the necessity of
taking the initiative to override him. For another, the Turks themselves
came to Biirgenstock with a limited number of proposed changes to the
Annan Plan and a determination to settle.

On the other side the situation was neither so clear nor so positive.
Not only did Papadopoulos reject any of the symbolic gestures that might
have demonstrated his belief that he was on the verge of a historic agree-
ment and was working for a positive outcome in good faith (refusing to
shalte Talat's hand and declining any direct contact with the Turkish
government), but, by refusing to prioritize his own list of demands for
changes to the Annan Plan, he effectively frustrated any serious negotia-
tion in this phase too. The new Greek government (in office for little
more than a week, following the 7 March election, which the opposition
New Democracy party won), while making positive noises, clearly felt in
no position to bring effective pressure to bear on the Greek Cypriots. So
the second phase ended in deadlock too, despite an attempt by Annan to
get agreement on a package of amendments (Annan IV) to the earlier
versions of the plan.

Annan was therefore compelled to table his own definitive version of
the plan (Annan V), which he duly did on the last day of the Burgenstock


talks, and it was this version that was submitted to the 24 April referen-
dums. For all the allegations of both sides (naturally, in a contradictory
sense), Annan V did not differ in any fundamental respect from the
earlier versions of the plan. The territorial adjustments proposed in An-
nan 111were not changed at all, nor were the basic structures of a bi-zonal,
federated state. Some changes strengthened bi-zonality; provisions ena-
bling property to be partially repossessed were included; token Turkish
and Greek troop presences, even beyond accession to the EU (the num-
bers of troops being those in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance), were to be
permitted. But if the plan itself was not greatly changed, the reactions
were. The Turkish government and Talat embraced and supported
Annan V as warmly and vociferously as Denktash, from afar, rejected it.
Papadopoulos, while taking a few days before fully declaring his hand,
soon moved to outright and emotional rejection. And the new Greek
government wrung its hands on the sidelines, concentrating on limiting
the damage to Greek-Turkish relations of any eventual rejection by the
Greek Cypriots.

Everything now turned on the referendums. The UN, by definition,
could not campaign itself, so its plan and the explanations of it were left to
the tender mercies of Cypriot politicians. Nor could the international
community afford to play too prominent a role; to have done so would
only have confirmed the conviction of many Cypriots that this was yet
another settlement being imposed on them from the outside. What could
reasonably be done was done. But both UN and EU attempts to explain
neutrally what the plan meant were countered by Greek Cypriot gov-
ernment obstruction and by the predominantly rejectionist Greek
Cypriot press.

The EU made it clear that, whatever rejectionist Greek Cypriot politi-
cians might say, there was nothing in Annan V that could not be
accommodated with the acquis. A donor conference was held in Brussels
at which substantial sums of international aid were pledged to help re-
settle those Turkish Cypriots who would be displaced by the settlement
and to underpin the objective of reducing the economic discrepancies
between Greek and Turlush Cypriots. The Security Council would have
endorsed the whole package and committed itself to its prescribed role in
its implementation had there not been a disgraceful last-minute veto by
the Russian Federation, acting at the behest of Papadopoulos who then
argued in the closing days of the campaign that it was impossible to have


confidence in the settlement because it had not been endorsed by the
Security Council.

The two campaigns on either side of the island were sharply con-
trasted. In the north the outcome was never in much doubt, with the
Turkish government's clear support for the Annan Plan a crucial factor.
Denktash fought to the bitter end, with support from right-wing allies,
but he no longer cast a spell over his compatriots, either on the mainland
or the island. The outcome was a 64.9 per cent vote in favour of the
Annan Plan. In the south the rejectionists had a field day. When Papado-
poulos did declare his hand, in a lengthy, rambling and emotional
television presentation, he did not confine himself to the details of the
changes in Annan V but rather launched a root-and-branch onslaught on
the fundamentals of the UN's approach (which had not in fact changed
much over the last 20 years). He thus disposed of any illusion that he
might in fact have been negotiating in good faith up to the last moment.
Most Greek Cypriot parties, with the exception of Clerides's Democratic
Rally and Vassiliou's small liberal party, followed this lead; and the Greek
Orthodox Church campaigned vigorously for rejection. The key thus lay
with AKEL, the communist party, whose rock-solid one-third of the
popular vote could have swayed the outcome either way. With the pusil-
lanimity that had characterized its position under its leader Christofias
throughout the last five years, they finally opted for a procedural device,
calling for a delay in the vote, which they knew would not be conceded,
and, when it was not forthcoming, recommended a 'no' vote. With that
decision the outcome was not in doubt. The Greek Cypriots voted 'no' by

75.83 per cent.
So ended a negotiation that had seemed, against all the odds, to offer a
real opportunity for an equitable outcome of substantial benefit to all
concerned. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots had made a number of
serious tactical errors which meant that they missed the best moment to
settle when the Cypriot application for EU membership was still in the
balance. l'hey could have negotiated something like the outcome pro-
posed in Annan V a year or more earlier if they had got their act together
in time. And there would have been a reasonable chance of its being
endorsed by both sides. They paid dearly for not doing so. Rut the Greek
Cypriots made a strategic error. Yet again, as in 1961 and 1974, they
opted for a narrow, crabbed vision of their future, dictated more by
emotional memories of the past than by a rational view of the future. Let
down by their leadership, they chose, just when they were on the point of

entering the European Union, to demonstrate that they had not under-
stood the first thing about the fundamental objectives of that Union.
They will now have to live with the consequences of that decision. The
Greeks, who eventually spoke out in favour of the plan, had learned yet
again that the Cypriot tail had a tendency to wag the Greek dog. As to the
international community in general, and the UN in particular, it had
nothing to be ashamed of but much to regret. After years of neglect, and
then of inadequately supported efforts to get a solution, it had shown
commendable ingenuity and determination. But in the last resort it de-
pended on rational self-interest overcoming the demons of history and
prejudice, and in this instance that was not achievable.

What will happen now? Much will depend on the prospects for Turk-
ish accession to the EU. If Turkey's candidature prospers, and as the
reality of Turkish accession comes closer, a solution to the Cyprus prob-
lem will become a necessity; and it is difficult to see any solution straying
far away from the Aman Plan which has been so widely endorsed. But if
Turkey's candidature stalls or is blocked, it is not easy to be so sanguine.
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Postby boomerang » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:09 am


Accession Partnership
(EUITurkey), 135, 146
acquis cornmunautaire, 28,45,46,
108, 134, 154, 170, 171-2, 179,
221, 233-4, 244
Agenda 2000,76,78
AKEI, (Greek Cypriot con~n~unist
party), 6, 15, 16, 34, 84, 122, 200,
Akinci, Mustafa, 20, 124
AKP (Turkish Islamist party), 24,
26, 174, 181,205
Akrotiri, 4, 7
Al-Qa'eda, 154
Albright, Madeleine, 75
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), viii
ANAP (Turkish centre-right party),
109, 111, 181
Anastasiades, Nikos, 15
Annan, Kofi
attitude to the Cyprus problem,
becomes UN secretary-general,

Clerides, meeting with
(September 2002), 176
Clerides, meeting with (3-4
October 2002), 177-8
Denktash, meeting with (August
2001), 154
Denktash, meeting with
(September 2002), 175-6

Denktash, meeting with (3-4
October 2002), 177-8
011equality of the parties issue,
129, 131
and face-to-face talks (2002), 163-
at Glion (August 1997), 79
at The Hague (March 2003), 2 18
new initiative (Febnlary 2004),
news blackouts, attempts at, IS,
79, 119
and proxinlity talks, 110, 119, 129
report on negotiations
(S/2003/398), 223-4
statement to Clerides and
Denktash (8 November 2000),
136-42, 145
at Troutbeck (July 1997), 78
visits to regional capitals (2003),
Annan I,178, 181, 182-5
Annan 11, 188-91, 192
AnnanIII, 207-11, 213, 215, 223,
Annan IV, 243
Annan V, 243-5
Apostolos Andreas, monastery of,
(newspaper), 2 1


Bakoyanni, Dora, 23
Batu, Inal, 60-1, 79
Beattie, Richard, 49, 75
'Berlin-plus' arrangements, 116
Bir, General Cevik, 62
Birand, Mehmet Ali, 167, 223
Blair, Tony, 82, 84, 86, 89, 193-4
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros
Denktash, relationship with, 55,
64, 164
Set of Ideas (1992), 8-9, 29, 35,
38,44,48, 52-3, 54, 64, 74, 128,
198, 199
Biirgenstock talks (2004), 243-4
Bush, George W., 145, 205

Camilion, Oscar, 52
Cem, Ismail
attitude to the Cyprus problem,
24,25, 100, 127-8, 146-7
and EUITurkey Association
Council, 87
Papandreou, relationship with,
23, 25, 98
resignation (2002), 17 3
and 'vision first' approach, 167
Ceyhan, 3 3
Chirac, Jacques, 192, 193
Chizov, Vladimir, 72
CHP (Turkish centre-left party),
26, 174, 181
Christofias, Dimitris, 16, 204, 2 15,
Ciller, Tansu, 24,49, 60, 67,73
Clark, Joe, 49
Clerides, Glafcos
as acting president (1974), 6
Annan, meeting with (September
2002), 176
Annan, meeting with (3-4
October 2002), 177-8
on Anna11 I, 185-6
on Annan 11, 193,201


Annan's praise for, 2 2 3-4
background and character, 13-14
becomes president (1993), 9
Blair and Cook, meeting with, 89
on demilitarization of Cyrpus, 32,
Denktash, relationship with, 12
on deployment of S300 missiles,
election (1998), 84-5
on equality of the parties issue,
and face-to-face talks (2002), 159-
60, 162, 165
at Glion (August 1997), 79-80
and National Council, 15-16, 121
negotiating team, 14-1 5
on proximity talks (2000), 12 1-2
Rifkind, meeting with, 67
on Set of Ideas (1992), 48,52, 54
at Troutbeck Uuly 1997), 78
Clinton, Bill, 106, 109
CNN Turk, 167, 175, 176,233
Confidence-Building Measures
(1993-94), 9, 48,49, 52, 54, 64,
Cook, Robin, 87, 89, 136
Copenhagen European Council
(December 2002), 117, 191-6
Cordovez, Diego, 74-5,77,79,80,
Cox, Pat, 192
CTP (Turkish Cypriot centre-left
party), 16, 20, 124, 241
Cypriot National Guard, 4-5, 32, 33
British rule, 2-3
constitution of 1960, 3-4, 13, 28
early history, 1-2
EU accession, 9,28, 3 1,44-7,48-
9, 59, 61, 78, 81-3, 88-91, 92-3,
112-13, 123, 124, 147, 169-72,
185, 195,204,220-1


international treaties on, 3-4, 3 1-
partition (1974), 6-7
referendums (April 2004), 208,
Republic of, 5,40
Turkish invasion of (1974), 6
see also Cyprus problem; Greek
Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots
Cyprus problem
Annan I Plan, 178, 181, 182-5
Annan I1 Plan, 188-9 1,192
Annan I11 Plan, 207-11, 213, 215,
Annan IV Plan, 243
Annan V Plan, 243-5
and Confidence-Building
Measures (1993-94), 9,48,49, 52,
and Copenhagen European
Council (December 2002), 117,
face-to-face talks on (2002), 157-
65, 172, 178
face-to-face talks on (2003), 200-3
and G8 Summit (June 1999), 100,
101, 102
and Glion meeting (August 1997),
Greek attitudes to, 2 1-3,60
Greek Cypriot 'nightmare', 28,
and The Hague meeting (March
2003), 214-19
and Helsinki European Council
(December 1999), 112-14, 116
and High-Level Agreements
(1977 and 1979), 8,28
proximity talks on (1999-2000),
110, 115-16, 119-23, 135, 142-3
and SC Kesolution 1250 (1999),
40,102-4, 108,110, 128

and SC Resolution 1475 (2003),
and Set of Ideas (1992), 8-9, 29,
35, 38,44,48, 52-3, 54, 64, 74,
128, 198, 199
and Seville European Council
(June 2002), 169-70, 17 1
terminology of, 232
and Troutbeck meeting uuly
1997), 77-9
Turkish attitudes to, 23-6,60-3,
Turkish Cypriot 'nightmare', 28,
'virgin birth' approach, 157, 160,
anthem of new state, 200, 2 12
continuity, 42-3, IS 1
equality of the parties, 129-32,
EU accession, 28, 3 1,44-7,48-9,
112-13, 123, 124, 147, 169-72,
185, 195,204,220-1
federal v. confederal system, 29-
30, 125, 127-8
flag of new state, 200, 2 12
governance, 27,28-31, 122, 150,
176, 183-4
international recognition of
TKNC, 5,27, 39-41,93, 123,175
'linkage', 99-100
name of the new state, 161-2
property, 27, 37-9, 123, 125, 150,
security, 27, 3 1-4, 121-2, 150,
164-5, 184
sovereignty, 41-2, 15 1-2, 177,
179, 183
Supreme Court, 30, 3 1, 150, 200,
2 12


territory, 27, 35-7, 121, 122, 125,
149-50, 176, 184,200-1,207,244
troop presence on the island, 32-
3, 334,62, 121-2, 150, 164-5,
179, 184,204,211,244
Turkish 'settlers' in the north, 27,
43-4, 160, 185

Dann, Robert, 105,224
de Soto, Alvaro
and Annan I, 186, 187
and Annan 11, 192
and the Aman statement of 8
November 2000, 145
consultations with UK, US, EU
and Turkey (October 2002), 178-
draft document (July 2001), 152-
and face-to-face talks (2002), 157,
162, 168
at The Hague (March 2003), 218
new posting (April 2003), 224
news blackouts, attempts at, I5
'Preliminary Thoughts' (July
2000), 125-8, 134
and proximity talks, 119-20
'Three Noes' statement
(September 2000), 13 1, 144
as UN Special Kepresentative for
Cyprus, 105, 134
Democratic Kally (Greek Cypriot
centre-right party), 13, 245
Denktash, Rauf
Annan, meeting with (August
2001), 154
Annan, meeting with (September
2002), 175-6
Annan, meeting with (3-4
October 2002), 177-8
on Annan 1, 186, 188
on Annan 11,200
authority, 12, 17-18, 108


background and character, 18-19
Boutros-Ghali, relationship with,
55,64, 164
Clerides, relationship with, 12
election (2000), 12 3-4
Eroglu, relationship with, 181
on equality of the parties issue,
130, 131, 132-3
and establishment of TRNC
(1983), 8
on EU accession, 45,46-7, 83, 89,
90, 123, 124
and face-to-face talks (2002), 155-
6, 160, 162, 165
'final effort' (August 1998), 93-4
at Glion (August 1997), 79
heart surgery, 177, 178, 180
and High-Level Agreements
(1977 and 1979), 8, 127
'history lesson', 58-9
on international recognition of
TRNC, 5, 39-40,59,93, 123, 128
and lifting of restrictions on the
Green Line, 225-6
negotiating team, 19-20
new initiative (2003), 227
Pe'rez de Cue'llar, relationship
with, 55
pressures on, 197-8
on property issue, 125
on proximity talks (2000), 122-3
proximity talks, walks out of,
142-3, 144
on referendum idea, 198-9, 2 15-
and referendums (April 2004),
responsibility for breakdown of
negotiations, 220, 223, 228, 235-6
Rifkind, meeting with, 67
on Set of Ideas (1992), 52
on territorial issue, 200-1
at Troutbeck Uuly 1997), 78

on Turkish immigrants to the
north, 44
Turkish support for (2003), 214
vetoes Egeland's appointment,
Denktash, Serdar, 20, 241
Dhekelia, 4
Diamantopoulou, Anna, 13 5
DIKO (Greek Cypriot centre-right
party), 15, 16, 199
DP (Turkish Cypriot centre-right
party), 20
Droutsas, Dimitri, 2 15
DSP (Turkish centre-left party), 63,
109, 111, 173, 181
DYP (Turkish centre-right party),

173. 181

Ecevit, Bulent, 1 1, 24, 63, 108-9,
143, 173
Egeland, Jan, 104
erlosis (union with Greece), 2, 3
Erbakan, Necmettin, 24,60
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 24, 174,
181-2, 186-7, 193, 194, 198,205,
211,213, 214
Erel, Ali, 20
Eroglu, Dervish, 20, 123-4, 18 1
Ertugruloglu, Tahsin, 170-1, 188,
192, 194
ESDP see European Union
European Court of Human Rights,
property claims brought before,

European Court of Justice, and
'embargo', 2 34-5
European Union
accession of Cyprus to, 9, 28, 3 1,
91,92-3, 112-13, 123, 124, 147,
169-72, 185, 195,204, 220-1

accession of Turkey to, 78-9, 8 1-
3,84, 85-7, 11 1-15, 134-5, 146-7,
186-7, 192, 193-6,234,238,246

sccpis cornn~u~ia~itaire,

28, 45, 46,
108, 134, 154, 170, 171-2, 179,
221,233-4, 244
Common Foreign and Security
Policy, 107
EUITurkey Association Council,
EUITurkey Custonls Union
Agreement (1995), 50, 61, 83, 85,
European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), 116-18, 171, 185,
relations with Turkey, 234
role in Cyprus negotiations, 65,
80-3, 107-8,233-4
Evren, General Kenan, 37

Famagusta, 35
Feissel, Gustave, 52, 54
Filon, Alecos, 60
'fishing net', 38, 123

G8 S~mnlitUune 1999), 100, 101,
Glion meeting (August 1997), 77,
Gonensay, Imre, 6 1
on A~man 111, 2 10-1 1
attitude to the Cyprus problem,
on deployment of S300 missiles,
earthquake (September 1999), 98
emergency aid to Turkey (August
1999), 98
relations with Turkey, 49-50, 98-
100, 237


support for Turkish EU
membership, 99
Greek Cypriots
on Annan 111,210-1 1
complexes, 2 3 1-2
coup d'e'tat (July 1974), 6
elections (1998), 84-5
elections (2003), 199-200
and government of Cyprus, 5
guerrilla war against the British, 2
media, 17
National Assembly, 6, 13, 13 1
National Council, 15-1 6, 12 1
'nightmare', 28, 2 3 1
property claims, 6-7, 27, 37-9
purchase of S300 missiles, 70-2,
relations with Greek government,
Greek Orthodox Church, campaign
for 'no' vote in referendum (April
2004), 245
Green Line, 6, 27, 34, 225-6
Greenstock, Jeremy, 50
Grivas, General George, 2
Grossman, Marc, 187
guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey,
UK), 4, 3 1-2
Giil, Abdullah, 24, 73-4, 181, 186,
193, 194, 198,205, 213,214
Giirel, Siikrii Sina, 24, 25, 173, 174

The Hague meeting (March 2003),
Hain, Peter, 166
Haktanir, Korkmaz, 25, 120, 128
Han Sung Joo, 64-5,74,77,80
Hannay, David
at Copenhagen European Council
(December 2002), 191-4
deplores absence of face-to-face
meetings, 57-8, 120, 232-3


early experiences of the Cyprus
problem, vii
as EU Presidency Special
Representative for Cypms, 84
first visit to Cypn~s, 55-9
at The Hague (March 2003), 214-
interview on CNN Turk (June
2002), 167-8, 175, 176
on the key players, 10-1 1
on the making of Cyprus policy,
mission, 50-5
mission, end of, 224-5, 239
on prospects for the future, 236,
reasons for becoming involved in
the Cyprus problem, vii-viii
reasons for failure of negotiations,
reasons for writing book, viii-ix
and Rifkind's visit to Cyprus, 66-
speech to Turkish Cypriot
Chamber of Commerce, 92-3
at Troutbeck (July 1997), 79
visit to Cyprus (January 1999),
visit to regional capitals (January-
Febnmy 2003), 203-5
Annan, 105
Batu, 60-1
Bir, 62
Cem, 127-8, 146-7
Chizov, 72
Ciller, 73
Clerides, 57, 135-6, 155, 175, 180,
Cordovez, 74-5
Denktash, 58-9, 175, 204-5
Ecevit, 63
Gonensay, 61

Giil, 7 3-4
Han Sung Joo, 64-5
Hercus, 97
Holbrooke, 76-7
Kranidiotis, 60, 96
Miller, 97
Oymen, 72-3
Pangalos, 59, 60
Papadopoulos, 2 14-1 5
Papandreou, 203-4
Verheugen, 134
Yilmaz, 86
Ziyal, 192, 194, 215
Heads of Mission conference
(January 1999), 96
Helsinki European Council
(December 1999), 112-14, 116,
134-5, 146
Hercus, Dame Ann, 97, 104
High-Level Agreements (1977 and
1979), 8, 28
IHolbrooke, Kichard
and Imia crisis (1996), 49
as Presidential Special
Kepresentative for Cyprus, 75-7
on Turkey's EU accession
application, 82
as US ambassador to the UN, 106
visit to Cyprus (May 1998), 91-2
Hurd, Douglas, 66

lacovou, George, 84
Imia crisis (1996), 22, 49
Iraq war (2003), 205, 213-14, 229

Johnson, Lyndon B., 5
Jones Parry, Emyr, 239
Juncker, Jean-Claude, 82

Karamanlis, Costas, 23, 203
Karpas Peninsula, 6, 36, 184, 192
Kasoulides, Ioannis, 14, 166
Kerr, John, 239

KlBRIS (newspaper), 2 1
KISOS (Greek Cypriot centre-left
party), 16
Kissinger, Henry, 100
Kokkina, 35
Kouros, Pantelis, 14
Kranidiotis, Ioannis, 22, 60, 96
Kyprianou, Spyros, 8, 15, 16

Lipponen, Paavo, 1 14-1 5
Logoglu, Faruk, 25
Loizidou, Titina, 39
Lyssarides, Vasos, 16,94

Major, John, 66
Makarios, Archbishop, 2, 3, 6, 8, 13,
Markides, Alecos, 14, 160, 163, 176-
7, 186, 199,200
Maurer, Leopold, 120
Greek Cypriot, 17
Turkish Cypriot, 2 1
MHP (Turkish right-wing
nationalist party), 109, 1 1 1, 18 1
Miguel, Kamon de, 169
Miller, Tom, 91, 97, 106
Morphou, 35,198
Moses, Alfred, 106, 128, 129, 134,

and ESDP, 1 16
proposal for troop presence in
Cyprus, 34, 122
New Democracy (Greek centre-
right party), 23, 243
Nicosia Airport
face-to-face talks at (2002), 157-8
reopening of, 9,48

Ocalan, Abdullah, 97-8, 109
Olgun, Ergun, 20, 17 1, 180, 186


Omirou, Yannakis, 16
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 102
Oymen, Onur, 25,72-3
0za1, Turgut, 12

Pangalos, Theodoros, 22,59,60,65,
Papadopoulos, Tassos, 15,16, 199-

Papandreou, Andreas, 98
Papandreou, George, 22-3,25,98,
100, l3O-l,203-4
Papapetrou, Michalis, 14
Paphos military airbase, 70
PASOK (Greek centre-left party),

PPrez de Cudlar, Javier, 55
'Petersberg' tasks, 116,11 7
Petersen, Friis Arne, 169
Pfirter, Didier, 105, 177, 186, 224
PKK (Kurdish terrorist movement),

Powell, Colin, 146
Prodi, Romano, 106, 169

Quin, Joyce, 58

Kasmussen, Anders Fogh, 191
Kifkind, Malcolm, 50,66-9
arms sales to Greek Cypriots, 70,

attitude to the Cyprus problem,


S300missiles, deployment on
Cyprus, 70-2,94-5,96
Sampson, Nikos, 6
Sandhis, Alecos, 120
Schroeder, Gerhard, 1 1 1, 192, 194
Schiissel, Wolfgang, 94

Set of Ideas (1992), 8-9, 29, 35, 38,
44,48, 52-3, 54, 64, 74, 128, 198,

Seville European Council Uune

2002), 169-70, 171
Sezer, President, 214
Sirnitis, Constantinos, 22,49
Solana, Javier, 106, 134, 196
Sovereign Base Areas, 2,4,6, 37,
Soysal, Mumtaz, 19-20, 147, 162,
176-7, 180
Spring, Dick, 23 1
Steel, Henry, 75
Straw, Jack, 167,225

taksin~(partition), 3
Talat, Mehmet Ali, 20, 124, 241,

TKP (Turkish Cypriot centre-left
party), 20, 124
TMT (Turkish Cypriot guerrilla
Treaty of Alliance (1960), 3,4, 3 1-
2,33, 142, 150, 164,207, 217, 244
Treaty of Establishment (1960),3,
Treaty of Guarantee (1960), 3,4,6,
31-2,33, 41,52,57, 61, 62, 93,
122,142, 150, 164, 179, 184, 207,

TRNC see Turkish Kepublic of
Northern Cyprus

Troutbeck meeting (July 1997), 77-

on Annan I, 186
on Annan 111,209-10,227
attitude to the Cyprus problem,
attitude to the deployment of
S300missiles on Cyprus, 70-1
attitude to ESDP, 116-18


'Basic requirements' papers
(2003), 201-3, 205
earthquake (August 1999), 98-9
election (November 2002), 181-2
EU accession, 78-9, 8 1-3, 84, 85-
7, 111-15, 134-5, 146-7, 186-7,
192, 193-6,234,238,246
and face-to-face talks (2002), 165
government collapse (2002), 17 3-
and Iraq war (2003), 205, 2 13-14,
military presence in Cyprus, 7,
relations with Greece, 49-50,98-
relations with EU, 234
USITurkey scenario (2001), 148-
9, 154

Turkish Cypriot Assembly, 20
Turkish Cypriot Chamber of
Commerce, 20, 88, 92, 171, 181

Turkish Cypriots
on Annan 111,209-10
complexes, 23 1-2
customs union with TRNC
(2003), 227
demonstrations in support of
Annan Plan and EU accession,
elections (December 2003), 241-2
EU aid projects, 22 1-2
exports to EU (the 'embargo'),
2 34-5
Green Line, lifting of restrictions
on, 225-6
international recognition, demand
for, 5, 27, 39-41, 93, 123, 175
media, 2 1
'nightmare', 28, 23 1
pro-settlement parties, 20-1,47,
181, 198

relations with Turkish
government, 12
reliance on Turkey, 2, 7
support for EU accession, 124
withdrawal from 1960
constitution, 4

Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TKNC)
customs union with Turkey
(2003), 227
declaration of (November 1983),
international recognition of, 5, 27,
39-41,93, 123, 175

UBP (Turkish Cypriot centre-right
party), 20, 123, 124
UK, role in negotiating process,

UNFICYP, 74,97, 102, 104
UNFICYP 11, 179
United Nations

Confidence-Building Measures
(1993-94), 9,48,49, 52, 54, 64
on equality of the parties issue,
Good Offices Mission, 64, 102,
initiative post-proximity talks,
involvement in Cyprus (1964), 5
involvement after partition, 7-9,
2 7
SC Resolution 1250 (1999), 40,
102-4, 108,110,128
SC Resolution 1475 (2003), 224
Set of Ideas (1992), 8-9,29, 35,
38,44, 48, 52-3, 54, 64, 74, 128,
198, 199
troop presence in Cyprus, 34

Bush administration, 146
interest in Cyprus, 3,65


US/Turkey scenario (2001), 148-
9, 154
interest in Cyprus, 3
see also Russia

van den Broek, Hans, 64, 85,88,89,
Varosha, 9, 35,48, 227
Vassiliou, George, 8, 12, 14, 245
Verheugen, Gunther, 106-7, 134,
154, 172

Western European Union, 1 16-1 7
Westmacott, Peter, 167
Weston, Thomas, 106, 145-6, 148,
158, 180
World Trade Center, attack on (1 1
September 2001), 154

Yakis, Yasar, 24, 186, 2 13
Yilmaz, Mesut, 24, 60, 79, 82, 83,
86, 109, 173, 174, 186

Ziyal, Ugur, 25, 165, 179, 192, 193-

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Postby denizaksulu » Sat Jan 22, 2011 12:44 pm

Is that all? :lol: :lol:

Thanks for that Boomers.

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Postby Gasman » Sat Jan 22, 2011 4:51 pm

It's an EBOOK!
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Postby Jerry » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:43 pm

Gasman wrote:It's an EBOOK!

Is that why there are so many seplling errors? :lol:
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Postby denizaksulu » Sat Jan 22, 2011 5:51 pm

Gasman wrote:It's an EBOOK!

:oops: :oops:

Sorry Gasman. Did not know. :oops:
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