My view on this - founded mostly on empirical data - is that leaders in the GC community have a great sway over voters, and voters are far more loyal to their parties than they should be, but when it comes to the Cyprus Problem most people tend to have a mind of their own. For instance, I know from my first survey that there was very little correlation between attitudes to Annan Plan and party allegiance (at least as far as the four large parties are concerned). Furthermore, the correlation between party allegiance and vote at the referendum was also quite weak - a majority of DISY voters still voted No, about a quarter of AKEL voters still voted Yes, about 15% of DIKO and EDEK voters still voted Yes. Political influence in this respect is limited.
I think your reference to the Cyprus problem should be specific, that is, it is not merely the Cyprus problem that mattered, but a specific plan that could have lead to solution. Had you conducted your survey prior to the submission of the Plan, you would have probably found different results with good correlation between party allegiance and personal stance on the Cyprob. Of course, the situation became very messy and confused during the period prior to the referendum and in the emotionally charged atmosphere strange things happened, not only at a personal level but also at a party level. Take the example of AKEL where the party behaved in a peculiar way to say the least. Your next paragraph addresses the above.
On the contrary, I would say that, on the issue of the Cyprus Problem, it is the politicians that tend to fear and obey the public, not the other way round. When AKEL sensed that the public mood was against the plan, it no longer dared to support it fearing an "electoral punishment" by its voters. As an example, many politicians would like to accept compromises on the issue of property / residence rights, based on the "pragmatic thinking" that very few people would choose to return anyway, but they don't dare to proceed along this path because they fear a public backlash.
I am not sure that your analysis is correct. AKEL did nothing for a year and a half to prepare its faithful and indeed the Cypriot people in general for the eventuality of the referendum. AKEL watched the "OXI" bigots organise meetings and rallies and take over the tv stations that became the flagships of the "OXI" campaign. AKEL did nothing to answer the lies spread by the President and his close associates that daily daemonised the plan. Of course, this was not a mistake by AKEL. Its leadership had already agreed to go along with Papadopoulos and Christofias was sporadically showing the carrot to the "YES" Akelites. He knew all along that he could control them quite nicely after the referendum. Two months ago they duly agreed to punish themselves during a CC plenary session! In stalinist parties this is called self criticism. Thus, public mood (members and sympathisers of AKEL) did not turn against the proposed solution overnight but it did so after a carefully orchestrated campaign which was more than obvious in the party mouthpiece "Haravgi". Thus, such an unprecedented deviation from the party line of AKEL may be expected given the fact that AKEL did its utmost to confuse its members, supporters and friends. Regarding the other parties, I feel the referendum acted in a cathartic manner. Hopefully now the party legacy is more genuine and eventually all will find their way into the party they really belong.
The effect of politicians, over public perceptions regarding the Cyprus Problem, only works in the long term - over a period of decades. This is why TCs don't care about the right of return whereas GCs do. It has to do with the rhetoric that each side has been hearing. These attitudes, however, cannot be changed over a period of months by "very convincing politicians" - they are too deeply ingrained now.
Isn't it true that from the late 70's the GC community has been hearing about the only solution that could be achieved to be a bicommunal, bizonal federation? In fact only one marginal party that came to existence a few years ago questioned the kind of solution we were pursuing. One would expect that 30 years of talk for this particular type of solution would have been enough to even create a kind of conditioned reflex for this solution. Yet, everything turned round when a single but very important parameter changed. Accession to the EU just a week after decision day proved the catalyst that easily reversed conventional wisdom. Coupled with the promise that a better solution, a European one, was up for grabs, if we could be patient for just another 7 days, this saw the overturning of years of patient policy building.
Concerning the most recent survey, I would say that on the GC side the results were quite definitive: The GC public knows exactly how they would like to see the Annan Plan changed. A politician may choose to ignore the public's views at his peril. On the TC side, in contrast, perhaps because there has been little talk of "changing the Annan Plan", opinions are far less well defined, and I suspect that much would change once these issues enter the sphere of public debate. For instance, on the provision which "killed" my proposal: No limits to residence but separate voting. Once the proposal starts being discussed on the TC side, many will begin to argue that such a provision would threaten bizonality, and therefore, since the argument would tap into deeply ingrained fears and insecurities, we can expect many people to swing from being in favour to being opposed.
I should like to persist with my original point. Public opinion is very much shaped by the parties. In this case public opinion was shaped by DIKO, AKEL, EDEK, NEO and the splinter group of DISI. Anastasiades took a huge risk and put his political career on line by his brave decision to go against the grain. Yet, this is what makes a real leader. Those that are led by the people are puppets. Real leaders lead and are never lead.
