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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Tue Sep 06, 2011 1:43 pm

nearly a tc sell out and just to get a date with the EU...some motherland huh?...not just returning back to your roots but nearly got rooted instead... :lol:

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005827



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2009


Classified By: (U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch
for reasons 1.4 b, d.

¶1. (U) On October 2, several days before issuance of the
European Commission's report on Turkish progress toward
accession, the Turkish MFA announced that all new EU
members, including the Republic of Cyprus, would be included
within the
scope of the Turkey-EU Customs Union. The announcement
followed GOT Cabinet approval of an amendment to the customs
union agreement to include all new EU member states. This
amendment supersedes a May 7, 2004 Cabinet decision which
extended the customs union to the other nine new members and
which excluded the Republic of Cyprus. The MFA announcement
(reftel) underscores that this step does not imply
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus or a change in its
relationship with
the Turkish Cypriot administration in northern Cyprus.

¶2. (C) In subsequent conversations with us, European
diplomats, including the EU President Dutch DCM, averred that
the EU will not require Turkey to take any further steps with
respect to Cyprus prior to the EU Summit in December. MFA
Cyprus Department Head Bilman told us that Turkey does
not contemplate further measures, such as maritime and
aviation links, arguing that these areas are outside
the scope of the Customs Union. He also noted the lack of
concrete progress in easing the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots. Nor, he added, will Turkey sign a protocol on the
matter with the ROC: making the extension operational is an
internal Turkish matter, he argued, and Turkey had signed no
such protocol with any other new EU member.

¶3. (C) When we spoke to him on October 4, Bilman worried
that extending the Customs Union would draw criticism from
the nationalistic elements in Turkey, including the
opposition Republican Peoples, Party (CHP) and the military.
CHP Member of Parliament and Vice Chair for International
Relations Oymen claimed to us on October 8 that the CHP
understood Customs Union extension was "unavoidable" if
Turkey wanted to get a date in December, and that the CHP
would not criticize it. On October 13, Bilman said the MFA
had not yet received the criticism he feared.

¶4. (C) Cemalettin Damlaci, Director General for EU Affairs at
the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, told Econoff and Econ
Specialist on October
8 that the GOT's October 2 announcement has not actually
been implemented. Implementing regulations must be issued
for the Customs and Foreign Trade Undersecretariats. Asked
about the timing of these regulations, Damlaci implied that
the Greek Cypriots
would need to show a "positive approach" before Turkey
finalized these measures. Conversely, Customs Director
General for EU Affairs Sabahattin Kocas told Econ Specialist
on October 13 that he expected the Prime Ministry to approve
the implementating regulation for the Customs
Undersecretariat soon.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Tue Sep 06, 2011 1:48 pm

the damn roc making the turks look bad once again scene... :lol:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006003



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2014


¶B. NICOSIA 1974

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey will base its decision on how to break
the impasse over Cyprus and Malta's participation in NATO-EU
security cooperation on several factors: EU action to reach
out to the Turkish Cypriots, EU leaders' Dec. 17 decision on
beginning accession talks with Turkey, and Turkey's
evaluation of other concrete elements of NATO-EU cooperation,
such as Operation Althea and Turkish participation in the
Battlegroups concept. In any case, we doubt Turkey will move
until after, perhaps even well after, Dec. 17. When they are
ready, we expect the Turks will insist on breaking the
impasse on their own, very legalistic, terms. End summary.

¶2. (C) Embassy Ankara appreciates USEU-USNATO's thoughtful
and coherent ref a suggestions--as well as Embassy Nicosia's
equally helpful ref b analysis--for untying the knot of the
impasse over the participation of Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU
strategic cooperation. From a Turkish perspective, this
issue is wrapped up in the broad net of Cyprus and Turkey's
status with the EU. Thus, we believe that there can be no
Turkish movement on this problem until after, perhaps well
after, the EU's leaders decide Dec. 17 on the core question
of how they will proceed on accession negotiations with

The Cyprus Problem

¶3. (C) The Turks believe that the international
community--and particularly the EU--has done little to reward
the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) for their vote in the April
referendum on the island, and that the Greek Cypriots (GCs)
have avoided any negative consequences. Specifically, Turkey
is angry that the GCs have apparently used their EU
membership to block EU aid and direct trade regulations for
the TCs. The GOT believes it has given enough concessions on
Cyprus, especially given its recent decision to extend its
Customs Union agreement with the EU to include Cyprus.
Ankara showed the depth of its displeasure with the GCs and
the EU in its willingness to cancel the EU-OIC Forum
scheduled for earlier this month in Istanbul over the GOT's
insistence on according the TC delegation a higher form of
recognized representation than the GCs--and thus the
EU--could live with. The GOT sees NATO-EU strategic
cooperation as one of the few cards it holds in this game,
and it could agree to move only after it is reassured by
developments on the Cyprus issue.

EU Accession Decision

¶4. (C) It goes without saying that what decision EU leaders
take on Dec. 17 will have an impact on the Turks' attitude
toward the EU. The Turks will reserve NATO-EU strategic
cooperation for its menu of policy options to reward--or
punish--the EU for whatever decision it takes in December.
The GOT will also monitor very closely in particular the
GOC's attitude toward Turkey's membership bid as Dec. 17

Other NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation Issues

¶5. (C) Parallel to the accession negotiation decision, Turkey
is also tracking its satisfaction with other areas in NATO-EU
strategic cooperation, specifically Operation Althea and the
EU Battlegroup concept. So far, this appears to be the only
unalloyed good news to announce. The Turks report that they
are generally pleased with how the EU has worked with them on
planning for the transition from SFOR to Althea.
Additionally, we understand that the EU has opened its call
for Battlegroup contributions to the Turks, and the Turks
have responded enthusiastically. Indeed, Turkey is one of
the few European countries that can offer real capabilities
to Battlegroups or even make one on its own. By January the
Turks will have more data points on both these key areas of
strategic cooperation, and will enter these into their

The U.S. Influence

¶6. (C) Unfortunately, we have less influence with the Turks
on these EU-NATO issues than we had when we negotiated the
Istanbul Documents on ESDP. The Turks believed that if the
Cyprus referendum failed we would persuade the Europeans to
move smartly to reward both the Turks and the TCs in tangible
ways. Instead, the Turks feel they have almost nothing to
show for their forward-leaning position on the Annan Plan.
At the same time, the Turks feel we have failed to deliver on
a series of other issues related to Iraq, especially the PKK.
As a result, our credibility with the Turks is not high at
the moment.

What Would a Solution Look Like?

¶7. (C) The Turks are legalistic and would likely be unwilling
to agree to amend the December 2002 NAC decision which
requires both PfP membership and signing the NATO security
agreement for non-NATO EU countries who wish to engage in
NATO-EU strategic cooperation discussions. For the Turks,
this ensures they control the timing (blocking consensus
until Ankara is ready to move). For Cyprus and Malta, they
would have to apply for PfP. We note Embassy Nicosia's point
(ref b) that Cypriot PfP membership might not be desirable
given our efforts to eventually demilitarize the island, but
we also do not see another alternative acceptable to the
Turks. What we and the EU could do is to work on all three
to ensure the necessary steps are nearly simultaneous, but,
in our estimation, there is no point in trying with the Turks
until there is movement on EU measures to reward the TCs for
their April vote and/and Turkey has a date to begin EU
accession negotiations.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Tue Sep 06, 2011 1:52 pm

the puppet master is having problems getting a puppet huh?... :lol:

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006099


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014


¶B. ANKARA 5820

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1,4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In an October 25 meeting, Turkish MFA
Cyprus Department Head Bilman again insisted the GOT does not
need to sign a protocol to extend the Customs Union to
Cyprus. According to Bilman, EU embassies in Ankara have
raised the idea of additional Turkish concessions on Cyprus
but none has yet pressed concessions as a requirement for a
positive answer on December 17. Bilman's initiative to have
the Turks/TCs ease UNFICYP restrictions failed to get
approved up the line, and lack of a "TRNC government" is
hindering GOT movement on Cyprus. End Summary.

Turks Claim No Need to Sign Customs Union Protocol
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶2. (C) Bilman again insisted (ref A) that Turkey does not
need to sign a protocol in order to extend the Customs Union
to the ROC; he claimed it had already taken effect through
changes in Turkish internal regulations. Bilman said that
Turkey did not sign one when Austria, Finland and Sweden
joined the EU. He added that although Turkey did sign one
when Greece, Portugal and Spain joined, those countries did
not ratify it in time and the protocol was later withdrawn.

No EU Demands for Additional Turkish Moves on Cyprus -- Yet
--------------------------------------------- --------------

¶3. (C) Bilman said that from his viewpoint, there is
confusion in Ankara over whether EU members will insist on
additional Turkish concessions on Cyprus before December 17.
EU embassies here have raised recognition of the ROC, troop
withdrawals, and opening ports and air corridors with the
Turks. However, no EU embassy here has yet pressed the Turks
for Cyprus concessions as a condition for a positive response
in December. On the EU's aid proposal for the north, Bilman
said that the MFA and Talat thought current proposed
conditions on aid are too restrictive. Bilman predicted FM
Gul will favor rejecting the aid altogether if the proposed
conditions remained intact.

Lifting UNFICYP Restrictions Gets Axed in Ankara
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶4. (C) Bilman said that he and others (NFI) were
unsuccessful when they raised the idea of easing UNFICYP
restrictions (ref B) in Ankara. Those who favored lifting
the restrictions argued this would not be a concession to
Greek Cypriots, since GCs already are allowed to pass through
the gates. Those opposed argued, illogically but
successfully, that Turks and Turkish Cypriots have still seen
no benefits from their pro-settlement stance and they should
make no other concessions.

Turks Without A "TRNC" Interlocutor

¶5. (C) Bilman said the Talat "government's" resignation means
"we do not have an interlocutor" in the north. Bilman asked
rhetorically whom the GOT can call if it wants to make a
decision affecting the north. He predicted the lack of a
"TRNC government" will seriously impede Turkish/TC
cooperation, particularly any "forward movement."
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Tue Sep 06, 2011 1:55 pm

here we see the spitefull little monkeys hard at work...

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006402



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2014


¶B. ANKARA 6003

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) MFA DDG for Multilateral Security Affairs Fatih Ceylan
told PolMilCouns October 28 that a number of weeks earlier
Ankara had delivered a demarche to Malta on the NATO-EU
blockage issue. Turkey's message was that it would not stand
in the way if Malta wanted to take the necessary steps to
meet the legal requirements to participate in EU-NATO
security discussions. Turkey was not encouraging Malta to do
so, that was for Valletta to decide. However, Ankara wanted
to reassure the Maltese that their actions blocking Cyprus
and Malta from participating in NATO-EU fora was in no way
aimed at Malta. When asked, Ceylan affirmed that Turkey was
not prepared to do the same for Cyprus at this time. First,
he insisted, the international community needed to end the
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Until then, Ankara would
most likely block any application for PfP membership from

¶2. (C) Comment: Ceylan's comments suggest Ankara would be
flexible in interpreting a declaration by Valletta that its
pre-existing agreements remain in force, if one were made
(ref A). However, we do not believe Turkey's acceptance of
Malta in NATO-EU meetings portends any weakening in Ankara's
resolve to keep Cyprus out (ref B). End comment.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:05 pm

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000373


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2030

REF: 04 ANKARA 6402

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Our recent conversations with MFA and TGS
officials reveal that some thought is being given to how to
resolve the impasse created by Turkey's strict interpretation
of NAC decisions that excludes from Berlin Plus-related
discussions those EU members who are not parties to a NATO
security agreement nor members in PfP. While officials
working on alliance matters understand the negative impact
Turkey's position is having on NATO-EU relations, their
seniors are still putting more weight on the Cyprus issue.
Ankara's disappointment that the EU has not lived up to its
expectations to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
and the GOT's displeasure at Nicosia's attempt to use the EU
to force Turkey's recognition of Cyprus will need to
dissipate further before the GOT will be ready to consider
compromises. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The DCM raised the NATO-EU impasse over the
participation of Cyprus and Malta when he called on the new
MFA Director General for International Security Affairs Tomur
Bayer on Jan. 18. Bayer, who has long experience working on
NATO affairs, asserted that the wording of the North Atlantic
Council decisions setting out the conditions for non-alliance
members to participate in discussions of Berlin-Plus issues
were carefully considered and came the day after the EU
issued its own decisions on the subject. Thus, allies
understood and intended the differences between the NATO and
EU decisions. That said, Bayer conceded that NATO-EU
relations were suffering, weakening the transatlantic
relationship and risking duplication of EU and NATO efforts.
Therefore, "we want to find a way to deepen NATO-EU
relations," he said. The problem was being considered "at a
technical level" Bayer continued. MFA was consulting with
"other authorities" (read: the military) and would likely
have to consult with ministers. At this stage, it was not
possible to give an indication of what Turkey might be
willing to do or when it might do it.

¶3. (C) The DCM acknowledged that relevant NATO and EU
documents were not totally in agreement. That said, the
continued impasse only served those who wanted greater
divisions between NATO and the EU. The Berlin Plus
arrangements were designed for a specific set of activities.
For issues unrelated to Berlin-Plus, Turkey should find a way
to permit cooperation between the two institutions. Bayer
took the point, but recalled that on issues like Dafur and
the Ukraine, certain statements (not further defined) from
European Commission officials made compromise difficult. The
DCM concluded by noting that as Turkey thinks about ways to
resolve this issue the USG stood ready to assist in the

¶4. (C) Earlier conversations with other MFA officials suggest
that brainstorming is occurring among NATO policy officials.
Judging by his comments to visiting EUR DAS Kennedy on
January 12, Deputy Undersecretary Ahmet Uzumcu, formerly
Turkey's permrep to NATO, is also contributing to the process
despite neither NATO nor Cyprus being in his new portfolio.
Uzumcu said the MFA would probably come up with some
progress, but it would be less than expectations. In fact,
NATO Department Head Alper Coskun told PolMilCouns on January
10 that his department was gaining little traction in moving
this issue with senior officials who are still smarting about
Nicosia's efforts against a Cyprus settlement. He and his
staff were trying to come up with some creative ideas to get
around the opposition, lamenting that suggestions from
Europeans to date had been no more than "just let the
Cypriots participate." He thought some more time would be
needed to dissipate the anger felt toward Cyprus over its
refusal to approve the settlement on the island last Spring.
The same is evidently true in the military -- on January 13
TGS/J5 LtGen Aydogan Babaoglu told the DCM, "the NAC decided
the matter; we are happy with that."

¶5. (C) Comment: Unfortunately, progress on Cyprus is
unlikely to contribute towards resolving the NATO/EU problem.
Turkish MFA thinking on Cyprus is unable to get around the
political obstacles posed by the perceived lack of positive
international response to Turkish Cypriot approval of the
April referendum. MFA Deputy U/S Apakan, whose portfolio
includes Cyprus, told DAS Kennedy January 12 that the GOT is
exchanging internal views on next steps to try to get the
settlement process re-started, but cannot see how it could
accept less than the Annan Plan as voted on April 24. MFA
Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs acting DDG Bilman
consistently tells us that perceived lack of measures to
ameliorate Turkish Cypriots' isolation undermines
pro-settlement sentiment in the GOT and the bureaucracy and
prevents Turkey from offering further concessions.

¶6. (C) Comment cont.: The way the EU and Turkey are
interacting adds to the problem. The EU members feel
aggrieved at Turkey's stonewalling on Cyprus at its December
summit. Similarly, the EU's handling of the Cyprus issue at
the summit rekindled Ankara's resentment of Nicosia's
blocking of a Cyprus settlement and of the EU for not doing
enough to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. For now,
many in Ankara see barring Cyprus from NATO/EU activities as
one of the few sticks it has to use against the ROC. With
time, this may pass. However, the extremely legalistic GOT
would be more likely to concede Cypriot participation in an
activity that clearly was not covered by Berlin Plus and that
would not require the discussion of classified information.
Anything more, we fear, would require changing the NAC
decisions, something Turkey is unlikely to consider in the
current environment. End comment.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:10 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000427



E.O.12958: DECL: 01/26/2015

REFS: A. 2004 ANKARA 6845

¶B. 2004 ANKARA 6887
¶C. MOSCOW 0642

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA Northeastern Mediterranean
Affairs acting DDG Bilman is confident Turkey will sign the
Ankara Agreement extension protocol this summer, but in the
face of domestic criticism about the lack of measures to help
Turkish Cypriots, the MFA is not inclined to propose
unilateral Turkish concessions. The MFA is considering
proposing a package of mutual confidence-building measures,
but the Turkish bureaucracy has yet to agree on its contents.
Despite Putin's promises of Russian support on Cyprus to PM
Erdogan, the Turks have seen no change in Russian behavior.
End Summary.

MFA Not Inclined to Propose Unilateral Turkish Moves
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶2. (C) Bilman said he had been "bashed" at a January 25
interagency meeting on Cyprus attended by the MFA and "other
institutions" (meaning the military). Bilman did not
enumerate the specific criticisms, but in the recent past has
told us the consistent sore point is lack of measures for
Turkish Cypriots. Given this situation, the MFA feels it is
in no position to propose unilateral Turkish concessions to
the AK government and the rest of the bureaucracy. Bilman
predicted Papadopoulos would simply pocket any such
concessions, give nothing, and demand more.

¶3. (C) Bilman remains confident Turkey will sign the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol, probably this summer.

¶4. (C) Bilman professed to have no information about the
proposed February visit to Turkey by the Greek Cypriot DISY
party. He did not know whether DISY President Anastassiades
would come or whom he would see. Bilman confessed the MFA
had no visibility inside PM Erdogan's office, saying the MFA
is not in a position to ask about the PM's appointments.

Mutual CBMs Proposal Possible, But No Agreement on Content
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶5. (C) Bilman argued that the Greek Cypriots should be the
ones to make concessions, since the Turks and Turkish
Cypriots did everything the UN asked. However, he conceded
the reality that the impact of this will fade over time, and
that international (especially EU) perceptions of continued
Turkish political will to reach a settlement are important,
but said many in the Turkish establishment do not understand

¶6. (C) Asked about the possibility of Turkey proposing a
package of confidence-building measures (CBMs) involving
concessions by both sides, Bilman agrees this is feasible and
claimed the MFA is considering it. The problem is there is
no agreement about what measures Turkey should propose for
either side. With a laugh, Bilman said that after Land
Forces Commander Buyukanit's January 25 statement that there
will be no troop pullouts absent an overall settlement, troop
reduction is probably off the table as a CBM.

Turks See No Change in Russian Behavior On Cyprus
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶7. (C) According to Bilman, neither the Turkish Embassy in
Moscow nor the Turkish UN Mission has yet seen any change in
Russian behavior on Cyprus, despite Putin's promises to
Erdogan during Putin's December visit to Ankara (refs A and
B) and Erdogan's January visit to Moscow (ref C). Bilman
claimed the MFA had information that Putin indeed called
UNSYG Annan twice after his December Ankara visit, but only
discussed generalities. When UNSYG Annan raised the Good
Offices Mission Report, Putin reportedly dodged by saying
Russia would have to see the proposed text of any related
UNSCR before taking a position.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:17 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000777


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015

REF: A. STATE 19853

¶B. ANKARA 373

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey will not change its position on
NATO-EU cooperation absent ROC concessions on the Cyprus
issue, including measures to help the Turkish Cypriots. End

¶2. (C) Ambassador delivered ref a demarche Feb. 9 to MFA
Deputy Under Secretary for Multilateral Political Affairs
Nabi Sensoy. Ambassador urged the GOT to think creatively
about possible solutions in order to ensure that certain
European countries are not able to use this issue to drive
NATO and the EU further apart. President Bush's
participation in the Feb. 22 NATO Summit would be an
especially good setting to deliver the news that this issue
is at least partly behind us.

¶3. (C) Sensoy responded that with the Feb. 22 summit
approaching the GOT had expedited its interagency discussion
on this issue. While Turkey places great importance on the
transatlantic link and on its relationship with the EU,
Sensoy said, "I can't give you good news." While as of Dec.
17 Turkey may have gained official status as entering formal
accession negotiations with the EU, the experience of the EU
summit itself and the lack of any significant action to
ameliorate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) since
May of last year make it impossible for Turkey to contemplate
making an opening on this issue. Given the current
situation, Sensoy added, it would be premature even to
discuss the possible areas for NATO-EU discussion outlined in
ref a non-paper.

¶4. (C) Ambassador responded that we don't want to see a
situation where the Cyprus problem creates "collateral
damage," such as NATO-EU cooperation. With several issues
related to Cyprus piling up at once--NATO-EU cooperation,
Cyprus' application for bodies such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement, the Ankara Agreement extension protocol--Turkey
runs the risk that many in the international community will
again view Turkey as it did before 2004: as THE obstacle on
all issues related to Cyprus. If we were to see a positive
step on Cyprus--for example if the ROC were to remove its
block to EU aid and trade for the Turkish Cypriots--would
Ankara be ready to move on this issue?

¶5. (C) Sensoy said he was "not in a position" to say that
this would make a difference. The key, he pointed out, was
that Turkish politicians would need to see real progress for
themselves, progress they could also display to the Turkish
people. Absent such movement, why should Turkey feel
obligated to move first?

¶6. (C) Ambassador also discussed the issue Feb. 8 with
Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul as Gonul prepared to depart for
the Nice Defense Ministerial. Gonul responded that the GOT
must first see movement from the EU on Cyprus before it can
make any concession on NATO-EU cooperation. Feelings about
Cyprus in Turkey are running so high now, he said, that to
make any concession absent any action from the EU could
derail Turkey's EU candidacy.

¶7. (C) In addition to the Ambassador's efforts, PoMilCouns
called on Deputy DG for Security Policy Fatih Ceylan Feb. 8
to discuss ref a demarche. Ceylan confirmed (as reported ref
b) that the Turkish MFA has presented some ideas for
compromise to the GOT, but the decision on NATO-EU
cooperation is now both politicized and political. Turkey's
political leadership is grappling with two competing policy
priorities: increasing NATO-EU cooperation and dealing with
the EU's lack of progress on aid and trade for northern
Cyprus. Ceylan (please protect) candidly stated that the
battle within the GOT is between the Cyprus hard-liners and
the Atlanticists. PolMilCouns noted that we continue to seek
creative thinking on this issue. Ceylan responded that even
if Turkey were to decide to allow Cyprus and Malta to
participate in NATO-EU security cooperation discussions, the
topics could not cover any Berlin Plus issue, i.e., any topic
which would include NATO operational planning.

¶8. (C) Comment: The MFA has firmly linked NATO-EU cooperation
to ROC concessions on Cyprus and measures to help the TCs.
Ceylan's comments suggest the GOT understands the stakes and
is therefore wrestling with this issue; Sensoy's indicate
that the hard-liners are still on top. Unfortunately, we
cannot share ref a's view that Turkey's post-Dec. 17 status
has changed the Turks' perspective on this issue. Indeed, it
may even have hardened. As we noted ref b and Sensoy told
the Ambassador, the Turks still have a bitter taste in their
mouths regarding how the EU handled Cyprus at the Dec. 16-17
EU summit and the lack of measures to help the TCs. Sensoy
made clear that Turkey feels betrayed by the international
community--and especially the EU--for this lack of progress.
We predict no movement on this issue from Ankara at least
until and unless the EU can convince the ROC to stop blocking
measures to assist the north.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:20 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000799


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In the first visit by a Greek Cypriot
politician to Turkey since 1963, Democratic Rally (DISY)
Party leader Nicos Anastassiades met with Turkish FM and
Deputy Prime Minister Gul in Ankara on February 10. We
understand that (1) Anastassiades raised changes to the Annan
Plan that could help DISY gain more support for it among
Greek Cypriots, but he and Gul discussed few details; (2)
Anastassiades brought no message from President Papadopoulos.
Anastassiades meets PM Erdogan in Istanbul February 12. End

¶2. (C) According to ruling AK Party International Relations
head Saban Disli, who was present at the meeting, Gul and
Anastassiades talked about Cyprus for about 30 minutes of a
two-hour meeting. DISY's trip to Turkey is being billed as
party-to-party contact, and the rest of the meeting was taken
up in discussion of political party matters.

¶3. (C) Some Turkish press accounts claimed the meeting had a
detailed Cyprus agenda. Disli said Anastassiades told Gul
that if there were "certain changes" to the Annan Plan, DISY
would again push the Plan with the Greek Cypriot public.
Anastassiades raised the Turkish military presence, changes
in the Karpass and, according to Anastassiades, missing
persons issues. However, Disli said the two discussed few
details; Anastassiades did not present any written document
and "tried to stay away from delicate issues." He brought no
messages on behalf of President Papadopoulos.

¶4. (C) Anastassiades quietly requested a meeting with Gul
through the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in
September 2004, and the MFA's answer was a resounding no.
This time, Anastassiades bypassed the MFA and quietly
requested Gul and Erdogan meetings through AK party channels.
The meeting took place at AK party headquarters, no MFA
officials were present, and the MFA Cyprus Department had no
role in or details about the AK/DISY contact (reftel).

¶5. (C) Disli said Gul expressed appreciation for
Anastassiades' courage in accepting AK's invitation to visit
Turkey. Disli's assessment to us is that Anastassiades is
someone with whom AK could maintain dialogue. Anastassiades
meets PM Erdogan in Istanbul on February 12.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:23 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000866


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Two days after meeting with Turkish FM Gul
(reftel) Greek Cypriot Democratic Rally Party (DISY) leader
Nicos Anastassiades met for about an hour with PM Erdogan in
Istanbul February 12. Anastassiades again raised possible
changes to the Annan Plan, although with more specificity
than during the Gul meeting. On the Turkish side, the
meetings appear to have yielded no concrete progress toward
settlement, but are remarkable for the fact they happened at
all. End Summary.

¶2. (C) AK Party International Relations head Saban Disli,
who was present at the Erdogan meeting, said Erdogan and
Anastassiades spoke for about an hour. As he had with Gul,
Anastassiades raised changes in the Annan Plan, but this time
with more specificity: complete withdrawal of Turkish troops
upon Turkey becoming a full EU member; modifications to the
Plan's property settlement provisions; the possible exchange
of Turkish Cypriot territory in the Karpass for Greek Cypriot
territory. Anastassiades also raised missing persons issues.

¶3. (C) Erdogan reiterated Turkey's commitment to a solution,
adding that failure to resolve Cyprus soon will lead to
bigger problems in the long run. He told Anastassiades
Turkey will support any Greek Cypriot initiative with Talat.
Anastassiades said he is committed to a bizonal, bicommunal
solution. Erdogan promised to keep the door open to further
contact with DISY.

¶4. (C) Disli attached little significance to the specific
discussions in the two meetings but again praised
Anastassiades' courage in making the trip, which Disli views
as a confidence-building measure. He called Anastassiades
"reasonable." Disli, who arranged the Erdogan and Gul
meetings, told Anastassiades after the Erdogan meeting that
such talks can continue but linked concrete progress to
measures to help ease Turkish Cypriot isolation. Absent such
measures, Disli told us, Erdogan and AK are vulnerable to
criticism from the right-wing nationalist National Action
Party (MHP).
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Thu Sep 08, 2011 12:25 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000879


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs Acting DDG Bilman foresees
no problems finalizing the text of the Ankara Agreement
extension protocol. However, he told us the Commission has
given the Turks contradictory information on whether or not
Turkey needs to sign the protocol before it goes to the
European Parliament. Bilman is certain Turkey will attach a
reservation to the protocol stating acceptance does not
constitute Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus
(ROC) and will submit the protocol to the Turkish Parliament.
Bilman claimed EC officials told the Turks that signing the
protocol requires Turkey to open its ports and airports to
ROC vessels and aircraft; Bilman says this is "completely
unacceptable" to Turkey. End Summary.

MFA Foresees No Problems with the Text

¶2. (C) Bilman told us Turkey wants to begin negotiating the
protocol text at the beginning of March. Bilman estimates
negotiations will take a month but does not anticipate
problems finalizing the text. His instructions, he said, are
to finalize the text as early as possible.

Contradictory Information About When Turkey Needs to Sign
--------------------------------------------- ------------

¶3. (C) However, Bilman told us that the European Commission
is giving Turkey contradictory and confusing signals about
the procedure it wants Turkey to follow after the protocol
text is final. Bilman claims the Turks have been told both
that they do not need to sign (for the Turks, there is no
difference between initialing and signing) the protocol
before it goes to the European Parliament, and that they do
need to sign it before it is presented to the European

¶4. (C) Bilman attributes the two different responses to
Greek Cypriot pressure to make Turkey sign before the
protocol goes to the European Parliament. When Turkey signs,
Bilman is certain Turkey will add a reservation declaring
that the protocol does not constitute Turkish recognition of
the ROC. If the reservation is attached when the protocol
goes to the European Parliament, approval will be more
difficult. Bilman also said the protocol will be submitted
to Turkey's Parliament.

¶5. (C) Bilman claimed the MFA asked the Commission for a
written statement clarifying the procedure but has not
received a response.

Opening Ports and Airports "Completely Unacceptable"
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶6. (C) Bilman claimed EC Enlargement DG Barbaso and EC
Turkey/Cyprus Director Mirel told Turkish EU Ambassador
Demiralp February 10 that signing the extension protocol
requires Turkey to open up its ports and airports to ROC
ships and planes. Bilman declared this "completely
unacceptable" to Turkey.
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