Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

Comment: Any issue related to the status of Cyprus
continues to be highly sensitive for the GOT. Even though it
was only a restatement of existing US policy, the recent USG
statement that the "GOC is a sovereign nation with the right
to request bids for oil exploration" upset the Turks and
overshadowed the more welcome US message supporting a
comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. Underlying this
frustration is the Turkish conviction that the discovery of
oil or gas off the southwest coast of Cyprus will make
reunification even more difficult. End comment.

http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/08/07ANKARA2206.html

It's either the americans are toying or dropping subtle hints to the turks...

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 009051

SIPDIS


CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: TURKEY: AK PARTY SEES DENKTAS AS OBSTACLE TO
CYPRUS SOLUTION


REF: ANKARA 8976


Classified by Acting DCM Scot Marciel. Reason:1.5(b)(d)


¶1. (C) Summary: The political debate in Ankara regarding
Turkey's EU candidacy and the future of Cyprus is revealing
sharp differences between the ruling AK (Justice and
Development) Party/Government and the Establishmentarian
foreign policy class, including elements that predominate in
the MFA. The fulcrum of the debate is "TRNC President"
Denktas. Hailed by the Establishment as the one and only
representative of Turkish Cyprus, Denktas is seen by AK as a
major liability, complicating efforts to find a solution to
the decades-old Cyprus dispute and threatening Turkey's own
EU bid. While the MFA continues to rally around Dentkas, AK
is subtly trying to undermine him. AK officials support
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot equities on the island, but
calculate that the voting public is nevertheless increasingly
weary of the stalemate and receptive to the notion that
Establishmentarian intransigence is counterproductive. End
summary.


¶2. (C) The outcome of the Dec. 12-13 EU summit Copenhagen is
regarded by Turks as a mixed blessing. The EU admitted the
Republic of Cyprus as a member while giving Turkey a
conditional date of Dec. 2004 for the start of formal
accession talks (reftel). While they accept that the summit
generated considerable progress in Turkish-EU relations
(though not as much as Turkey would have liked), the
cognoscenti recognize that the GOT's (and "TRNC President"
Denktas') failure to ink a Cyprus deal in Copenhagen set back
the Turkish cause on the island and in Brussels. This has
prompted the Turks to engage in the time-honored practice of
shifting blame; it also is providing an opportunity for Turks
to question some of the basic assumptions of the GOT's
traditional policy toward Cyprus. The noteworthy aspect of
this reevaluation is that it is being generated primarily,
albeit carefully, by AK in conjunction with some newfound
provisional allies in the press.


-- On Dec. 17, AK Leader Erdogan publicly noted that AK and
the "TRNC" share the same views on Cyprus, but emphasized
that there is "no overlap" at all between the AK position and
the Turkish State's traditionalist approach. Foreign
Minister Yakis later observed publicly that if a solution is
not found on Cyprus, the Turkish military would be regarded
as "an occupying power" on EU territory.


-- Yakis' statements prompted a rebuttal from Deniz Baykal,
leader of the opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) and
political standard-bearer of the Establishment. Baykal
called for Yakis' resignation, asserting that "of the six
billion people on Earth, the Turkish Foreign Minister should
be the last person to say such things. I don't know how we
can correct the damage."


-- In a statement issued Dec. 18, the MFA supported ongoing
negotiations on the Cyprus disupte but decried the admission
of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, charging that it was
unacceptable legally or politically. A GOT "Foreign Policy
Summit" -- featuring Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, the TGS Chief,
President Sezer, P.M. Gul, FOMIN Yakis, MFA u/s Ziyal, and
Denktas -- endorsed the MFA statement and mutuality of views
between the GOT and the "TRNC."


¶3. (U) Reaction among opinion makers reflects the divide.
The pro-CHP "Cumhuriyet" endorsed Baykal's call for Yakis'
ouster and underscored the growing distance between AK and
"TRNC President Denktas Others, including "Milliyet's" Sami
Kohen and "Radikal's" Ismet Berkan and Murat Yetkin, leaned
the other way. Kohen described Denktas as an obstacle to a
Cyprus solution, and as a liability to Turkey. "Hurriyet's"
Cuneyt Ulsever on Dec. 18 also drew attention, for virtually
the first time, to the pecuniary interests in Cyprus among
Turkish Cyprus hard-liners, notably former foreign Ministers
Sukru Sina Gurel and Mumtaz Soysal, who is currently a close
Denktas confidant. In the days before Copenhagen, Soysal, a
dyed in-the-wool secularist formerly with CHP, accused
Erdogan of being an "infidel" (gavur) for straying from the
Establishment position on Cyprus.


---------
AK's View
---------
¶4. (C) In private meetings with us, AK officials dispense
with diplomatic niceties regarding Denktas. On Dec. 17, an
AK Parliamentary Group Deputy Chief described to us how
before AK came to power, the idea of publicly questioning
Denktas was akin to the third rail of Turkish politics. "We
are the ones who opened the door to criticism of Denktas,"
not only for his handling of the Cyprus problem per se, but
for helping to generate the economic morass on the island
that has perpetuated poverty among Turkish Cypriots and
Anatolian settlers in the north. On Dec. 18, Erdogan's former
Chef de Cabinet, now an M.P., and several associates asserted
to D/Polcouns that "Denktas is, and always has been, the
biggest obstacle in the way of a solution on Cyprus and has
to go." Picking up on Ulsever's article, the AK officials
asserted that part of what perpetuates the status quo in
Cyprus, and in GOT Cyprus policy, is the personal financial
and other stakes Denktas and many influential mainland Turks
maintain in the "TRNC."


----------------------------------------
Comment: "Government" vs. "State" Policy
----------------------------------------


¶5. (C) Undercutting Denktas is a tricky business that runs
the risk of backfiring. Over the decades, the "TRNC" leader
has built up relations with the Turkish Establishment that
have insulated him from public scrutiny here. Moreover,
there appears to be little obvious daylight between the MFA
and the TGS on Cyprus-related issues. Denktas and his allies
have also been able to play the nationalist card effectively
in Turkey, raising the specter of betrayal as a club to keep
critics in line. As Soysal once noted to us, "Istanbul
capitalists might be willing to sell out on Cyprus, but
fortunately Turkish policy is made in Ankara." He was not
referring to Erdogan.


¶6. (C) The rise of AK, and a broader popular consensus in
favor of EU accession, is beginning to shake some old
assumptions. Reflecting the Soysal approach, the MFA took
the unusual step after the Nov. 3 elections that brought AK
to power of publicly suggesting that governments come and go,
while "State policy" -- on Cyprus and in other areas --
endures and is not subject to change. At a minimum, Turks
are now beginning to appreciate that there are major downside
costs for Turkey to the business-as-usual approach to Cyprus
issue.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/12/02ANKARA9051.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001255

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PREL EWWT TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY FORBIDS ENTRY OF GREEK CYPRIOT SHIPS INTO
TURKISH PORTS


Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, Reason 1.5 (b,d)


¶1. (C) MFA Director for Bilateral Political Affairs Ahmet
Banguoglu called DCM February 25 regarding Greek
Cypriot-flagged ships delivering U.S. military equipment
and/or supplies to a Turkish port. Banguoglu said he had
been instructed to inform the embassy that, without
exception, Greek Cypriot owned, flagged, or registered ships
were not and would not be allowed to enter Turkish ports.
Banguoglu noted that the Turkish government was "unhappy"
that the U.S. had been so insensitive as to load equipment
bound for Turkey on Cypriot-flagged vessels.


¶2. (C) Banguoglu said the Dutch had also raised the
possibility of delivery of the Patriot Weapon Systems to
Turkey on Greek Cypriot-flagged ships. After the GOT had
informed them that use of these ships was not possible, the
Dutch had found other means of delivery. DCM noted that the
U.S. understood that at least one Greek Cypriot-flagged ship
had entered port in Istanbul in 2002. Banguoglu responded
that no such incident had taken place; even if it had, it was
an accident, could not be a precedent, and would not be
repeated.


¶3. (C) Ambassador also raised the issue with MFA U/S Ziyal,
who confirmed GOT policy. Mission believes this is the final
word on this issue.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/02/03ANKARA1255.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002155

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOT CONCERN ABOUT CYPRUS EU ACCESSION
DOCUMENTS


(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5(b)(d)


¶1. (C) In a March 28 meeting with DCM, MFA Cyprus DG Apakan
raised GOT concerns about the draft EU protocol on Cyprus
that will be attached to the accession partnership documents
new members will sign on April 16.


¶2. (C) According to Apakan, the draft copy of the protocol
obtained by the GOT crosses Turkish red lines by: (1)
referring to the "Republic of Cyprus," not to the "New
Partnership;" (2) essentially ruling out long-standing
principles of bizonality on the island; (3) ignoring the
declaration at the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999 that "all
relevant factors (i.e., lack of a solution on Cyprus) would
be considered" in the context of whether to admit the island.
Apakan implied that admitting a divided Cyprus ran contrary
to this sentiment; (4) and closing the door on the
possibility that a solution will ever be reached.


¶3. (C) If there is any hope for a settlement, room in the
document must be preserved for the application of these
principles, Apakan stated. Therefore the UN, and the USG,
should lobby EU members on Turkey's behalf to ensure that the
final version of the protocol reflects these principles.


-----------
DCM Replies
-----------


¶4. (C) DCM noted that Embassy would be pleased to relay
Apakan's views to Department. He also noted that, however:
(1) GOT concerns are now with an EU process over which the
United States, not being a member, has no control; which was
why (2) the USG had so strongly urged Turkey in the run up to
the EU's Copenhagen summit in last December -- and indeed
since the Helsinki summit, when the EU formally accepted
Turkey's candidacy -- to come to terms on Cyprus.


-----------
TGS Drop-By
-----------


¶5. (C) TGS Greece-Cyprus department head RADM Kadir Sagdic
subsequently dropped in on the meeting and made the following
points: (1) the USG's "mistake" regarding Cyprus was to have
"fallen under the spell" of UK Cyprus negotiator Hannay --
whom, Sagdic charged, was on the take, having received some
USG 5 million in payoffs from the Greek Cypriots; and (2) it
"would be better from the U.S. point of view" if two
sovereign and independent states were to be established on
Cyprus, which could, in theory, merge at some future date,
when they would simultaneously join the EU. DCM reiterated
the points he had made earlier to Apakan. (Comment: Sagdic
was essentially calling on the USG to recognize the "TRNC."
His views are among the most extreme at TGS. End comment.)
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2155.html

[boomerang]

(C) Groucho Marx once defined comedy as someone else's
grandmother rolling down the hill in a wheelchair, and we
take this minor fiasco in that spirit. But this documentary
will feed Turkish paranoia. Turks are masters at creating
conspiracy theories out of thin air; now they have real
evidence to embellish and build upon.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2340.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002342

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: UN/CYPRUS: DEMARCHE TO TURKEY ON US-UK DRAFT
RESOLUTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 10


REF: A. SECSTATE 91728
¶B. ANKARA 2155


(C) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5(b)(d)


¶1. (C) D/Polcouns delivered ref A talking points April 10 to
Necip Eguz, MFA DDG for Cyprus-Greece-Aegean affairs. Eguz
noted that, as far as he knew (at 1700 local time) the UN was
still negotiating the text and that no consensus had been
reached. Moreover, he took issue with what he saw as the
continuing effort to "point fingers at ("TRNC President")
Denktas," and to make him wear the jacket for the failure of
the talks.


-----------------
April 9 with Eguz
-----------------


¶2. (C) In an April 9 meeting with DCM and D/Polcouns, Eguz
noted several GOT concerns. First, the Russians, Chinese,
and French were pushing changes to the resolution that would
include in the revised text a reference to Resolution 1251 --
"essentially an UNFICYP-extending plan" -- and to "reduction
of foreign troops" on Cyprus. "Why should that be in there?"
he asked. "It will only make things worse." Eguz
volunteered that USG is working to improve the draft
resolution, emphasizing that any improvements should "keep
the door open" to the Annan Plan and the UNSYG's good offices
mission. Second, the "beauty contest" by which Denktas would
be explicitly blamed in the draft for the failure of the
talks was "absolutely unacceptable, unnecessary, and without
merit." Eguz reiterated that, in the meantime, the MFA had
worked with Denktas to come up with potential
confidence-building measures, including above all granting
Greek Cypriots direct access to and trade rights in northern
Cyprus.


¶3. (C) DCM emphasized that: (1) the UN/EU process had been
key to maintaining pressure on the Greek Cypriots; with the
failure of the talks, a key source of leverage against the
Greek Cypriots had been frittered away by the GOT -- "that's
the reality of the situation"; (2) that even while elements
of the MFA are insisting on incorporating the Annan Plan, TGS
officials have, in essence, pressed us to recognize a
sovereign and independent "TRNC" (ref B), which does not
square with Eguz' points (Eguz replied defensively that "I
never said we didn't have problems with the Annan Plan"); 3)
it is important, therefore, that Annan Plan be the basis of
continued negotiations -- and that the GOT accept this as
gospel even after Cyprus on April 16 signs the EU Accession
Protocols, which the Turks regard as problematic in that it
fails to refer to UN-related equities.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2342.html

[boomerang]

O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002371

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS: TURK WAXES INDIGNANT AT GREEK
CYPRIOT UN GAME PLAN


(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).


¶1. (C) MFA Deputy U/S for Bilateral Political Affairs Baki
Ilkin summoned reps from UNSC member countries April 11 to
convey in a meandering fashion Ankara's concern with the
"funny game" being played by Greek Cypriots in the UN.


--------------
It's Not Fair!
--------------


¶2. (C) While admitting that Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas
had been outmaneuvered by Cyprus President Papadopoulos at
the Hague, Ilkin decried Greek Cypriots for: (1) wanting to
leave out any reference to the Annan Plan in a UNSC
resolution; and (2) attempting to delay a resolution until
after April 16, when Cyprus will officially join the EU. His
main objective was clearly to suggest that Denktas not be
criticized, since the discussion of the resolution showed the
Greek Cypriots' true reaction to the Annan Plan. "The Greek
Cypriots will be rewarded for leaving out the Annan Plan,
which they previously had accepted. How can Greek Cypriots
get the credit?" he pleaded.


¶3. (C) Ilkin further noted that he, "personally," did not
object to the inclusion of a reference to the Annan Plan in a
UNSC resolution but said that was up to the Council members.
That said, "I can't say if Turkey views the draft resolution
positively" -- nor whether the GOT or Denktas accepts the
Annan Plan as the basis of negotiations. In reply, DCM
pointed out that US supported quick passage of a resolution
that: (1) contains a clear reference to UNSYG's Good Offices
mission; and (2) will keep the Annan Plan at the center of
future negotiations.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2371.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002812

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2013
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS: TURKS ENCOURAGED BY FREE FLOW OF
PEOPLE ON ISLAND BUT WORRIED GREEK CYPRIOTS TRYING TO
UNDERMINE UNFICYP

(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b,d).


¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA is encouraged by the flow of
people between the two sides on Cyprus and plans to open
additional gates. Nevertheless, MFA is concerned that the
Greek Cypriots are attempting to restrict UNFICYP's important
role in the buffer zone, which would undermine the current
positive atmosphere on the island. End summary.


¶2. (C) MFA Cyprus DG Ertugrul Apakan summoned US and UK reps
to discuss the flow of people between the two sides. Apakan
averred that Turkey views positively the large numbers of
people who have traveled to the north and south. Noting that
there has been only one security incident thus far, Apakan
explained that according to Turkish figures since April 23,
107,125 Greek Cypriots and 29,613 Turkish Cypriots have
crossed to the other side. Turkey wants to maintain the
current positive atmosphere on Cyprus and has no intention to
rescind allowing passage between the two sides, he said.


¶3. (C) Apakan noted that Turkish Cypriot authorities are now
allowing tourists to stay in the north for three days and
plan to open a total of four gates on the Turkish Cypriot
side. In response to DCM's query on where Turkish policies
will lead, Apakan replied that Turkey wants to remove
barriers to a lasting, negotiated solution. Apakan cited
what he said was F.M. Gul's recent statement in Brussels that
Turkey "wants to bridge gaps and differences based on the
Annan Plan" but stopped short of embracing the UNSYG's plan.


¶4. (C) Nevertheless, Apakan noted, there are unsubstantiated
reports that some groups are trying to create provocations
that could spoil the current environment. Apakan claimed
that unions are attempting to organize potentially
destabilizing demonstrations on May 1 and that Greek Cypriot
motorcyclists may plan some unspecified "unhelpful" action.


¶5. (C) Even more troubling to Turkey, Apakan explained, is an
apparent statement by the Greek Cypriot Interior Minister
calling for UNFICYP to cease its role in regulating the
buffer zones between border gates. Apakan explained that
although they do not perform any inspections themselves, UN
peacekeepers in the buffer zone play a vital role in
facilitating the free passage of Greek and Turkish Cypriots
between sides -- a role, he said, which is within the
existing UNFICYP mandate. Apakan repeatedly stressed that
GOT wants UNFICYP to stay and maintain its current functions.
He further noted that Turkish missions abroad will be
contacting USG, UN, and UK officials to convey Turkish
sensitivities. We indicated that the U.S. would continue to
support UNFICYP fulfilling its mandate and promised to inform
the Dept and USUN of Turkey's concerns.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/03ANKARA2812.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003412

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY: WHAT NOW?


REF: A. NICOSIA 901
¶B. ANKARA 2155
¶C. ANKARA 2431


(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson. Reason:1.5(b)(d)


¶1. (C) Summary: Assessments of how Turkey should move on
Cyprus vary in both the GOT and Turkish State. Some (e.g.,
FonMin Gul) are working to overcome what they recognize as
pressure on Turkey's interests following the failure of the
UN-sponsored Cyprus talks and the EU's decision to accept a
divided Cyprus as a member. However, while promoting the
recent series of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
confidence-building initiatives, others in the MFA
bureaucracy and elsewhere remain reluctant to take bold steps
toward a comprehensive solution, even though they recognize
that such moves would help improve Turkish-EU and
U.S.-Turkish relations. These holdouts continue to reject
the UNSYG plan (Annan III) as the basis for further
negotiations. End Summary.


--------------------------------------
Pyrrhic Victory for the Establishment?
--------------------------------------


¶2. (C) Turkey (both GOT and elements of the State) put itself
in a bind by insisting it could not handle Iraq and Cyprus
simultaneously, and then failing to take clear and beneficial
decisions on both.


¶3. (C) On Cyprus policy, The ability of the pro-status-quo
camp in Ankara to prevent Erdogan from embracing Annan III
appeared at first to be a victory for an Establishment that
fears the AK Party and P.M. Erdogan as existential threats to
its dominance.


-- TGS J5 Lt. Gen Turgut told visiting DAS Pascoe May 22 that
the key to a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem was
ensuring that the Turkish and Cypriot communities live on the
island as equal partners. Turgut said that if Turkey had
accepted the Annan III plan, in ten years time, there would
not be any Turkish residing on the island. All of the "rich"
would buy all of the land the "poor" would be left with
nothing, forced to leave. Turgut predicated that in the end,
"you would have another Palestine." He added that Turkish
Cypriots who demonstrated against Denktas and the status quo
are "communists."


-- Erdogan initially strongly criticized Denktas and the
GOT's business-as-usual approach on Cyprus, but ultimately
succumbed to Establishment pressure and backed off.
Erdogan's May 9 visit to Cyprus reflected this retreat as he
called simultaneously for both Annan III and a "sovereign
TRNC" in an attempt to placate both hard liners and those
looking for a new opening. Now, however, the Erdogan
government, with FonMin Gul taking the lead, is once again
looking for room to maneuver.


-- At the same time, as the draftsman of Turkey's Cyprus
diplomacy, the MFA, though charged with damage control and
responding to a barrage of international criticism, is
ultimately hewing to its Establishment line, one that FonMin
Gul criticized as a "non-solution solution" in the beginning
of his short tenure as P.M. MFA officials are trying to
shift blame for the failure of the talks from Turkey and
Denktas, and toward the UN and EU for seeking too high a
price from Ankara. They argue that progress on Cyprus
requires keeping the door open to an Annan Plan -- even as
they reject the plan itself as a basis for negotiations (ref
C).


¶4. (C) Trying a different tack on May 22, MFA U/S Ziyal
asserted to Ambassador and DAS Pascoe that the principal
reason Turkey ultimately rejected the Annan Plan was its
"unacceptable" requirement that "100 thousand Turkish
Cypriots" -- 50% of the population, according to Ziyal --
would eventually have to leave home. Ambassador Pearson
replied that the figure cited by Ziyal does not coincide with
our understanding, and that Turkish and U.S. diplomats in
Ankara should be willing to conduct a review of the numbers
-- and what was or was not called for under the plan. Cyprus
DG Apakan later reiterated Ziyal's point, adding that it is
also "too much" to expect that Turkey and the "TRNC" would
simultaneously accept the return of "85-90 thousand" Greek
Cypriots to the north.
----------------------------------------
GOT Taking Steps -- or Walking in Place?
----------------------------------------


¶5. (C) According to Apakan, Turkey is evaluating its Cyprus
policy in the wake of the failed talks on three "fronts": the
UN, the EU, and the "realities on the ground" on the island.
The GOT is trying to change the environment on Cyprus
through measures that "do not substitute, but will
facilitate" and reinvigorate efforts to find a comprehensive
settlement, he said. Denktas, he stated, has taken the
initiative in recent weeks by opening the "TRNC" border to
Greek Cypriot tourists, allowing them to visit their former
homes for the first time since 1974 and generating good will
on the island. DAS Pascoe responded that the evident good
will on both sides gives the lie to the arguments that Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriots could never get along -- and
demonstrates instead the desire on both sides to cut a deal.
Apakan demurred. Apakan also noted the GOT's decision,
announced by Erdogan May 16, to allow Greek Cypriots to
travel to Turkey.


¶6. (C) The next step, Apakan argued, should be taken by the
other side -- to end the de facto embargo of the north.
"There is neither an EU nor UN decision imposing a formal
embargo on the 'TRNC,'" he said. An axiom of the methodology
of conflict resolution holds that settlements are reached
between equal sides, Apakan asserted. To redress the
imbalance and as a prerequisite for a solution on Cyprus, the
"TRNC" should be allowed direct access to the wider world.
"End the embargo and the Cyprus problem will be settled," he
opined.


------------
Implications
------------


¶7. (C) At a political level the GOT recognizes it is in a
bind over Cyprus. At the same time, the MFA's impulse is
directed primarily toward damage control, not by any sense
that Turkish policies are a dead end. Opening the "TRNC"
border and allowing Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey,
though laudable, do not signal a sea-change in Turkey's
approach to Cyprus. In fact, the rigidity of the TGS and MFA
approach to Cyprus policy is a manifestation of a wider,
systemic problem of State Establishment (vice civilian
government) dominance of government policymaking, and of the
alignment of political players in Turkey's rough-and-tumble
domestic political theater. Those without strong emotional,
political, or pecuniary ties to Denktas and the current
GOT-"TRNC" machinery, e.g., Erdogan and Gul, have
demonstrated that they want to make a breakthrough. At the
same time, those who rigidly adhere to traditional Turkish
State policy -- and those who recognize the tactical problems
associated with appearing opposed to change but continue
nevertheless to hew to the Establishment line -- have the
upper hand, discouraging the kind of comprehensive
risk-taking that might pave the way for a solution on Cyprus.
Consequently, Turkish flexibility on Cyprus may only be
possible as an outcome of AK's ongoing effort to crack the
Establishment's policymaking dominance.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/05/03ANKARA3412.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003487

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: MFA D/U/S ILKIN'S MAY 27 CYPRUS BRIEFING
TO ANKARA DIPLOMATIC CORPS


REF: ANKARA 3412


(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason:1.5(b)(d)


¶1. (C) Summary: MFA Deputy U/S Baki Ilkin briefed
representatives of EU and Permfive countries May 27 regarding
GOT and "TRNC" efforts to reinvigorate the Cyprus process.
Ilkin asserted that decisions by "TRNC" leader Denktas and
the GOT allowing Greek Cypriots to visit the north and the
Turkish mainland are helping to improve the atmosphere on the
island. He volunteered, however, that such steps do little
directly to ameliorate the core disputes between Greek- and
Turkish Cypriots on issues including territory, restitution,
and Greek Cypriot right of return to the north. End summary.


¶2. (C) Ilkin noted at the outset that in the aftermath of the
latest, unsuccessful round of UN-sponsored Cyprus talks, all
sides needed to bridge the widening "confidence gap." As a
result, at Denktas's initiative, the "TRNC" decided last
month to allow Greek Cypriots to visit their former homes in
the north, a move matched by the GOT's decision to permit
Greek Cypriot tourism in Turkey. According to Ilkin, some
300 thousand Greek Cypriots have taken advantage of the move
to see the north; some 150 thousand Turkish Cypriots have
visited the south. Currently, Greek- and Turkish Cypriots
are crossing the border at rates of up to six thousand and
three thousand per week, respectively. Some 1,000 Turkish
Cypriots go south daily to work, he added. The Greek Cypriot
side, Ilkin alleged, is trying to place some restrictions on
those visiting the north: any foodstuffs brought back from
Turkish Cyprus in excess of half a kilo can be confiscated at
the border; moreover, the Greek Cypriot Parliament is looking
at legislation to make it a criminal offense for any Greek
Cypriot to spend the night in the Turkish sector.


¶3. (C) Ilkin noted that such measures, while helping to
improve the atmosphere on the island, "do not solve the
problem by themselves." In that vein, the "TRNC" and the GOT
are willing to discuss the issues. However, Ilkin said he
wanted to make it clear that: 1) the "TRNC," not/not the GOT,
will continue to be the Greek Cypriots' interlocutor in any
talks; and 2) the UNSYG's Cyprus plan (Annan III) cannot be a
"basis" for further negotiations -- that would eliminate
"room for maneuver." Instead, 3) the plan could serve as an
instruments to bridge the gaps; "elements" of the plan could
be salvaged and discussed if indeed this would be useful in
making progress. If the plan were a "basis", preserving its
balance would leave too little space for negotiation between
the two sides. Denktas and the GOT are willing to see a
negotiation of the two side's request for changes to the
plan. "The problem is that the disagreement between the
sides is on the same four or five issues," Ilkin said. This
makes compromise difficult. Nonetheless the "TRNC" is
evaluating how to proceed, despite the Greek Cypriot
"pre-conditions" enumerated by President Papadopoulos


¶4. (C) Ilkin asserted that lifting the embargo on the "TRNC"
was key to establishing increased confidence to underpin
future negotiations. He noted that the EU was considering a
package toward this end, but said the GOT was withholding
judgment pending: 1) the actual publication of the package
and 2) Denktas' evaluation of it.


¶5. (C) During the Q and A segment, several EU diplomats urged
the GOT to act with dispatch to get the process moving again,
noting that there is not all that much time until Cyprus
officially joins the EU next May; it will shortly again
become a fish-or-cut-bait situation. UK Ambassador
Westmacott observed that by not accepting Annan III as the
"basis" of negotiations, it appeared the GOT is trying to
start again from scratch. This he said, would only doom the
Cyprus process to failure again. Ilkin demurred with an arch
joke, saying that he "knows how to play softball and
hardball."


¶6. (C) Comment: Ilkin's briefing reflected the GOT stance
reported reftel, but did little to advance the prospects for
a Cyprus settlement process that gets back on track quickly.
End comment.
PEARSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/05/03ANKARA3487.html