Cyprus-Forum.com

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001190

SIPDIS

EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS: MFA TAKING WAIT AND SEE APPROACH ON
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: NICOSIA 434

Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel O'Grady, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary and comment: In a June 27 meeting, MFA Cyprus
Section Head Can Oztas told us the MFA remains supportive of
current negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots,
but has no plans to propose any concessions or gestures
towards building momentum for a resolution. He rejected
recommendations contained in the recent ICG report for Turkey
to undertake unilaterally the opening of ports and airports
to Greek Cypriot traffic, or to directly engage the Greek
Cypriots. Expressing disappointment over perceived
backsliding on the part of Christofias, Oztas cited the MOU
between UK and ROC (reftel) and language contained in the UN
report attendant to UNFICYP's mandate extension as
indications that Christofias is unreliable. He rejected
Christofias call for the removal of fifty percent of Turkish
forces in the north, saying any reduction in Turkey's
military presence, even a symbolic one, would happen only
after an agreement has been reached, but might take place
before public referenda on the agreement. Blaming the Greek
Cypriot side for foot-dragging, Oztas indicated that Turkey
did not expect full-fledged direct negotiations to begin
until September. Oztas posited that Turkey's basic policy on
Cyprus is unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of
the closure case against the AKP. End Summary.

No Mood to Be Flexible
----------------------

¶2. (C) MFA Cyprus Section Head Can Oztas told us on June 27
that there are no policy discussions taking place in Ankara
on steps Turkey should take to support the negotiations in
Cyprus. He confirmed that Cyprus was not on the agenda
during the National Security Council meeting on June 26.
While acknowledging the May 23 statement by TRNC "President"
Talat and ROC President Christofias was positive, Oztas noted
that recent developments such as the UK-ROC MOU, and the
language contained in the UNFICYP report associated with its
mandate renewal (reftel - both documents omitted language
concerning "two constituent states") indicated that
Christofias was trying to distance himself from the May 23
statement and raised doubts about his reliability as a
negotiating partner.

¶3. (C) Reacting to the June 23 International Crisis Group
report, Oztas said Turkey has no plans to undertake any
unilateral moves. He said implementation of the Ankara
Protocol would occur when a settlement has been reached, not
beforehand. Implementation, even on a provisional, limited,
partial basis is not being considered. Similarly, there are
no plans to directly engage Greek Cypriot representatives.

Movement of Turkish Troops?
---------------------------

¶4. (C) Oztas reaffirmed the commitment to withdraw all but a
residual amount of Turkish troops (650) from Cyprus on the
basis of the Annan Plan upon reaching a settlement.
Referring to Christofias' call for Turkey to withdraw half of
its troops, Oztas said Turkey would never contemplate such a
move. Only if the two parties have reached agreement and
only if the agreement is submitted for referenda might the
Turkish military consider a symbolic troop reduction to build
support for a settlement.

No Red Lines, Just "Dark Orange" Ones
-------------------------------------

¶5. (C) Talat has wide latitude in negotiating with the Greek
Cypriots, and only in areas related to security does Ankara
plan to engage, Oztas insisted. While maintaining that
Ankara has no "red lines" in current negotiations, Oztas
characterized two issues as "dark orange lines" for Turkey.
First, there must be assurances that property restitution
cases currently active in the European Court of Human Rights
against Turkey will be withdrawn and no new cases would be
filed. Second, all property restitution cases would be
resolved on the island without involving Turkey. Unless such
guarantees are made, Oztas reasoned, Turkey fears these cases
will continue even after a final settlement. Oztas pointed
to the Russians taking a similar position during negotiations

for the reunification of Germany.

No Major Changes Anticipated in Turkey's Cyprus Policy
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶6. (C) Regardless of the AKP closure case's outcome, Oztas
viewed any dramatic shift in Turkey's Cyprus policy as
unlikely. Oztas reiterated Turkey's support for the
negotiations and view that the Annan Plan formed the basis of
these talks. He expected full-fledged negotiations to begin
in September, and blamed Greek Cypriot foot-dragging for the
negotiations not starting sooner. Oztas said Talat wanted to
start full-fledged negotiations in June, but Christofias
pushed not to begin them until after August.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08ANKARA1190.html

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001277

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS: PREL ENRG IZ AM CY TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH TURKISH
ADVISOR DAVUTOGLU

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's chief
foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told visiting DAS Matt
Bryza July 11 that Erdogan's July 10 Baghdad meetings were a
"good start." The Turks discussed alternate sources of gas
for the Nabucco pipeline with Iraqi officials, acknowledging
Azeri gas alone would not be sufficient. Turkey's Strategic
Agreement with Iraq, which specifically refers to energy
cooperation, proposes the two prime ministers jointly chair
regular meetings to include both countries' Interior, Trade
and Energy Ministers, he said. Resolving Nagorno-Karabakh
would also improve the energy flow and positively change the
balance of power in the Caucasus, Davutoglu told Bryza.
Improving Turkey's relations with Armenia is also linked to
real progress on N-K, he said. On Cyprus, Davutoglu said a
clear process with concrete action, not ambiguous words, is
essential. End Summary.

Iraq
----
¶2. (C) Erdogan's July 10 Baghdad meetings were positive,
Davutoglu said, particularly compared with the atmosphere
between the two countries just 4-5 months ago. The two sides
are preparing a comprehensive agreement to include regular
meetings co-chaired by Erdogan and PM Maliki and attended by
Ministers of Interior, Trade and Energy. Nechirvan Barzani
was invited to attend the meetings with Erdogan but could not
return from the US in time, according to Davutoglu. "He sent
me a message thanking me for the invitation. Our relations
with Nechirvan are very good; they would be good with Masood
too if he didn't make unfortunate statements. We can't
invite him under these circumstances."

Energy
------
¶3. (C) Turkey's strategic aim is to have a gas pipeline,
parallel to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, that will link to
Turkey's gas grid and Nabucco, Davutoglu stated. Iraqi gas
will be essential to Nabucco's success because Azeri
resources are insufficient, he said, noting the issue was
discussed during Erdogan's meeting with the Iraqis. Bryza
expressed concern with Energy Minister Guler's comments
during July 11 meetings with Bryza and Special Energy Envoy
¶C. Boyden Gray that forecast very little Azeri gas left over
for Nabucco or Europe after Turkey fills its domestic needs
(8-9 bcl); such remarks would undermine confidence in
Nabucco's viability. Additional gas for Nabucco is essential
to meet the dual goals of ensuring Nabucco proceeds and
meeting Turkey's internal needs, Bryza stressed. While
Turkmen gas is key in the long-run, Azerbaijan is the key
partner whose gas is required to launch the Southern
Corridor, he added. Davutolgu emphasized the importance of
the US and Turkey working together on energy issues, from
production to end-user phase.

Armenia/N-K
------------
¶4. (C) Additional progress toward resolving the NK conflict
and Armenian efforts to improve relations with Azerbaijan
will also make the energy situation more efficient, Davutoglu
said. Resolving that conflict will change the balance of
power and release Armenia from Russia's control. Bryza
reported negotiations between the two countries are making
progress, with Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian moderating
their demands and gradually establishing personal trust.
Improved Armenian-Azeri relations opens the way for improving
Turkish-Armenian relations, he said, noting positive signs
from the Armenian president that he is serious about
normalizing relations with Turkey. Yerevan and Baku are
discussing an arrangement by which Armenia would withdraw all
its troops from all seven territories, allowing Azeris to
return, Bryza reported. A corridor with undefined status
would link Armenia to N-K. The deal would result in no
change in N-K's status but would allow for a possible vote on
status in the future. Davutoglu confirmed Turkey's
commitment to help, adding the balance of power in the
Caucasus would be more manageable and a new strategic
competition between NATO and Russia would be avoided. "We
need a constructive vision for the Caucasus," he said.

¶5. (C) Acknowledging President Sargsian's invitation to
President Gul to the September 6 World Cup qualifying match
in Yerevan as a positive sign, Davutolgu said a Gul visit

ANKARA 00001277 002 OF 002


will be difficult for Turkey while Nagorno-Karabakh remains
"under invasion." "We may win Armenia but we cannot lose
Azerbaijan," he stated. Bryza said he understood the GOT is
willing to improve relations with Armenia even if it makes
the Azeris uncomfortable. A "real process" and
confidence-building measures behind the N-K negotiations will
help Turkey by giving the Azeris a guarantee their territory
will be protected, Davutoglu responded.

Cyprus
------
¶6. (C) Turkey fully supports "TRNC President" Talat and
affords him maneuver room, but Greek Cypriot statements about
the talks are impacting the process, Davutoglu said. Bryza
commented that Greek Cypriot President Christofias has shown
courage in moving forward, despite severe domestic criticism
for going too far, too fast. The US hopes the two sides will
be able to announce the start of direct talks at their July
25 meeting. "We want to see light at the end of the tunnel,
not an agreement with an ambiguous future," Davutoglu
emphasized. Turkey expects concrete action not vague words,
or the only solution will be Northern Cyprus's independence.
"We are disappointed that we haven't seen more support," he
said, adding that Ankara cannot accept Turkish Cypriots being
controlled by Greek Cypriots.

¶7. (C) On resolving the impasse over opening ports to Greek
Cypriot vessels, Davutoglu stressed the EU will have to be
creative in finding a solution if they want Turkey as a
member. He admitted December 2009 will be a vital point in
the accession process but noted it is a deadline for the EU,
US, international community and Cyprus more than for Turkey.
He complained France has acted carelessly, citing French
efforts to develop a military relationship with the Greek
Cypriots and a new policy of refusing visas for Turkish
diplomats at France's embassy in Nicosia as evidence. Cyprus
is important to Turkey because of energy in Ceyhan, trade in
Mersin and tourism in Antalya, he explained. "We will never
allow the eastern Mediterranean to be closed to the Turkish
Navy or our commercial ships or give control of those waters
to the Greek Cypriots," he stated. The French may not
understand that Turkey needs Cyprus to project its regional
power.

¶8. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Bryza.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08ANKARA1277.html

[boomerang]

(C) MFA Deputy Under Secretary for the Americas and
Northeast Mediterranean Haydar Berk told visiting EUR DAS
Matt Bryza September 15 the Turks are pleased direct talks
have begun between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides and
remain hopeful substantial progress toward a comprehensive
settlement can be made. That being said, Berk noted there
remain important differences between the two sides and Ankara
is waiting for a few more sessions between the two leaders on
the island to make a more informed assessment regarding the
level of commitment of President Christofias to achieving a
lasting settlement. Berk reiterated long-standing Turkish
positions, including Ankara's support for a "virgin birth" of
a reunified federation, comprised of two constituent states,
and the continuation of Turkey's status as a guarantor state.
Berk emphasized the importance for Turkish Cypriots that
reunification not simply be the Republic of Cyprus subsuming
the Turkish entity and starting over as though from 1964.
Rather, the Turkish Cypriots would expect a new Cypriot
federation to be a loose body in which the Turkish community
has equal political rights with its Greek counterpart.
Eventually, once it became clear that the two communities
could once again live peacefully and with full respect for
each other's rights, the constituent halves could choose to
cede back to the central government certain powers as it
wishes. He cited Australian and American experiences in
which certain powers ebb and flow between the states and the
federal government based on consensus and need. There
remains much suspicion among Turkish Cypriots that the G/C
side will attempt to exert dominance over the North
eventually, post-settlement. The bottom line for Turkish
Cypriots, according to Berk, is that they not fall under
control again of the Greek Cypriots.

¶3. (C) Berk indicated the GOT would welcome the naming of a
special envoy by the U.S., depending of course on the person
named. He noted it might be difficult for the USG to name a
"political-level" individual now, at the end of an
administration. However, Ankara would look forward to
working with a "balanced, fair, professional" person who
could help the U.S. follow the negotiations more closely as
well as help to "massage the process" as necessary. In the
meantime, the GOT will continue to be supportive of the
talks, recognizing it might be some time before it becomes
clear the degree to which Christofias and the Greek Cypriots

ANKARA 00001696 002 OF 003


are serious about reaching a comprehensive settlement. Berk
said he thought we might all have a better idea in this
regard once Talat and Christofias have met with one another
"four or five times."

¶4. (C) Bryza encouraged Turkey to ensure sufficient maneuver
room for Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in settlement talks.
Berk assured Byrza Turkey would indeed do so.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08ANKARA1696.html

[boomerang]

i guess they overlooked noble...

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001810

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: EWWT PBTS ENRG CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY STILL OPPOSES OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION OFF
CYPRUS

REF: 07 ANKARA 2206

Classified By: Economic Counselor Dale Eppler for reasons 1.4 b, d.

¶1. (C) We met October 16 with Basat Ozturk, DDG for Aviation
and Maritime Affairs at MFA, to discuss Turkey,s position on
oil and gas exploration off the coast of Cyprus. Ozturk said
Turkey,s position has not changed from last year (reftel),
and will not be affected by ongoing talks between the
Government of Cyprus (GOC) and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The GOC has not only asserted an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Ozturk said, but also has
tried to extend its continental shelf to cover the same
territory without reaching a delimitation agreement with
Turkey. In Turkey,s view, under both general international
law and the Law of the Sea (to which Turkey is not a party),
Cyprus was obliged to reach a maritime delimitation agreement
with all affected parties, including Turkey, beforehand. It
did not even attempt to do so. Thus, Turkey views the Cypriot
continental shelf claims as illegal. Without a delimitation
agreement in place, Turkey considers all waters more than 12
miles off the coast of Cyprus as "high seas."

¶2. (C) Ozturk said Cyprus signed a maritime delimitation
agreement with Egypt and negotiated one with Lebanon. Turkey
approached both governments and showed them that under the
Turkish proposal for delimitation of the Eastern
Mediterranean, they would have significantly larger
continental shelves than under the Cypriot plan. In Egypt,s
case, the difference is 12,000 square kilometers. As a
result of these discussions, Egypt withdrew from its
delimitation agreement and the Lebanese have frozen talks
with the Cypriots.

¶3. (C) Turkey asserts a continental shelf claim to the west
of Cyprus, between 28 degrees east and 32 degrees -- 16
minutes -- 8 seconds east and north of the line at 34 degrees
south. This claim overlaps partially with the Cypriot EEZ.
Within this zone, Ozturk said, Turkey has a "direct national
interest" and will "actively disrupt" any exploration
activity. Ozturk said that "active disruption" did not need
to be via military force. For example, in the case of
seismic work, Ozturk said Turkish fishing vessels might
repeatedly circle the ship and thus prevent it from taking
accurate readings. Ozturk emphasized that Turkey's national
interests in this zone can only be changed by a delimitation
agreement with a future united Cyprus, and are outside the
scope of the GOC-TRNC talks.

¶4. (C) Beyond its direct interests in this continental shelf
claim area, Ozturk said Turkey has "indirect interests" in
the seabed delimitation off Cyprus on behalf of the TRNC.
Turkey will seek to dissuade companies from doing work in
those areas until there is a final Cyprus settlement. Ozturk
said Turkey has several times successfully dissuaded
companies from bidding on or carrying out exploration in this
zone (see reftel) and will continue to do so.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08ANKARA1810.html

[boomerang]

a lot of wishfull thinking here...

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001910

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE - NETOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2018
TAGS: CY PREL TU US
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CYPRUS WATCHERS DOWNBEAT ON TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 836
¶B. ANKARA 1598
¶C. NICOSIA 703

Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Skepticism about the chances for a Cyprus
settlement continues across a range of Turkish academics and
opinion leaders who track the issue, a small group of whom
the DCM hosted October 31 for a free-ranging discussion. The
prevailing sentiments include:
-- G/C voters turned to Christofias primarily because they
saw themselves "losing ground" in their international image
under Papadopoulos, not because they had become
pro-settlement;
-- Christofias and the G/C side lack motivation to negotiate
because they have nothing to lose should the talks fail;
-- a two-state solution is the best starting point and offers
the most promising chance for a lasting solution, even if
those two states later agree to unify. Our one Turkish
Cypriot participant disagreed with this point;
-- Greek nationalism and the desire to control the entire
island is a significant obstacle to G/C compromise; and
-- Kosovo offers a glaring comparison for the lack of
recognition for the "TRNC." END SUMMARY

Widespread Views: Greek Cypriots want the Whole Island
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶2. (C) Doubts on Greek Cypriot motives unfolded as follows:
The initial optimism about GOC President Christofias had been
misplaced. AKEL has always been "opportunistic," in the past
even lining up with EOKA and favoring Enosis. In the Greek
Cypriot elections which brought Christofias to power, the
main issue had not been achieving a settlement but the G/C
public concern that they were "losing ground" in their
international image because of former GOC President
Papadopoulos's hardline posture. The most important element
to be taken into account is Greek Cypriot nationalism which
insists that the island is Greek and should remain Greek.

Turkish Cypriots are Risking More
---------------------------------

¶3. (C) According to these Cyprus watchers, the risks of
failure in the talks are greater for Turkish Cypriots. This
fact forces them to be more conciliatory. Isolation is a
"secondary concern" for the Greek Cypriots because they
already are EU members. Europe -- which caused T/C isolation
-- has to "pay the price" for bringing the Greek Cypriots
into the EU by supporting Turkish Cypriot independence. The
"essence" of the problem of reunification is whether Greek
Cypriots are prepared to share the island. Greek Cypriots,
the Turks argued, are prepared to take back Turkish Cypriots
only if they come as their "subjects," albeit with
"privileged rights." The Greek Cypriots must be convinced
that they will lose the northern part of the island should
the talks fail. "Threatened recognition" may be the only
viable leverage that will influence Greek Cypriots. Many
Turks see compelling similarities between Cyprus and Kosovo,
and believe it is fundamentally unfair that Europe and the
U.S. have recognized Kosovo but not the "TRNC."

Two States Must Come Before One
-------------------------------
.
¶4. (C) When asked what Turkish Cypriots want to get out of a
settlement, nearly all participants (unhelpfully) argued that
T/C views were not important: the big international players
must ensure the historical wrong of Turkish Cypriot isolation
is corrected. Several argued that the only workable solution
in the long run is recognition of two independent States, one
Greek and one Turkish. Those two states could then sign
various bilateral agreements, such as a non-aggression pact,
and eventually even agree to some form of union. While not
the position of the current Turkish Government, they argued
that this is the personal opinion of most Turks and of many
in the bureaucracy and MFA. Ideally, an overall package that
offers Turkey and an independent northern Cyprus entry into
the EU in return for a settlement could work.

¶5. (C) One minority voice -- a Turkish Cypriot journalist --
disagreed with his Turkish colleagues that international
recognition of a separate T/C state is a prerequisite for a
lasting solution. While pessimistic, he argued that the
current UN talks might be able to bridge the gaps between the
two communities enough to find a workable compromise.

Cyprus According to Soysal
--------------------------
.
¶6. (C) In a separate conversation earlier in October with
Emboffs, former FM Mumtaz Soysal disputed allegations that
the TGS is calling the shots on Cyprus issues. Soysal said
that TGS has redlines: it would never agree to a complete
withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the island. The
Turkish security guarantee is critical. Beyond that,
however, TGS takes little interest in the negotiations.

¶7. (C) Soysal said a settlement will prove elusive because
T/C support for the Annan Plan has waned and the vast
majority of residents in the north will want to retain their
own "state." Turkey really wants to see two founding
states of this new confederation as a final outcome of
negotiations. Turkish Cypriots need to have the legal
ability to declare independence if "things don't go well at
some point in the future."

¶8. (C) Soysal stated that there is a high level of
bitterness among the Turkish public toward Turkish Cypriots,
who saw their strong support for the Annan Plan in 2004 as a
"sell-out" and a repudiation of the decades of strong support
provided by Turkey to northern Cyprus. Soysal argued that
most Turks also saw the vote on Annan as a betrayal of Rauf
Denktash, who remains a revered personality throughout
Anatolia. Turks also view as unfair that the Greek Cypriots'
rejected Annan yet were "rewarded" with EU membership.

Comment
-------
.
¶9. (C) Cutting through the gloomy predictions, it is notable
that even these skeptics acknowledge that the Turkish
Government has given its support to Turkish Cypriot leader
Talat, and that the Annan Plan remains the basic outline of
what Ankara can accept in a settlement. On the down side,
there was also a strong belief that Greek Cypriots have far
less to gain in a settlement than Turkish Cypriots, and are
therefore not engaging seriously. The strong emotional tinge
to the conversations indicates that Cyprus still touches a
raw nerve with Turkish public opinion.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ANKARA1910.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001967

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: MFA ASSERTS EU MOMENTUM CONTINUES, BUT
WON'T SOON INCREASE

REF: ANKARA 1937

Classified By: Acting POL Counselor Christopher Krafft, reasons 1.4 (b,
d)

¶1. (C) MFA European Union Political Affairs Section Head
Yaprak Alp told us that the pace of EU reform in Turkey has
not slowed. As the focus shifts from controversial political
reforms to more technical aspects, Turkey's EU accession bid
simply is no longer front page news and thus many believe the
process has stalled. Turkish delegations regularly travel to
Brussels and negotiations continue at the working level.
Contradicting the sentiment of the European Commission and
those who follow Turkey's EU accession process closely, Alp
noted that a majority of the most controversial issues, such
as the Foundations Law, Article 301, and reforms related to
Turkey's Southeast are, for the most part, done. (Comment:
While the GOT may have met the EU reforms as required on
paper, implementation is far from conclusion.) Furthermore,
the GOT has prepared the strategic proposals on judicial
reform and presented the drafts to Brussels, which Alp
predicted would soon be finalized. Although not standard
practice to acknowledge unresolved issues in the progress
report, the MFA was pleased the European Commission included
complimentary language on judicial reform.

¶2. (C) The Turkish public largely ignored the report due to
the growing focus on technical issues and GOT management of
the message, claimed Alp. As with the most recent
assessment, she explained the MFA drafts its reaction
statement to highlight praise and down play criticism.
Regardless, the Turkish people are fatigued by negative
comments from individual European nations, namely France, and
perceived game playing by Cyprus. Alp said she did not
foresee a further drop-off in support amongst Turks for EU
accession unless the enlargement paragraph in the European
Council's December statement is reminiscent the 2006 version,
which resulted in the freezing of 8 chapters. In addition,
if progress is not made next year toward a comprehensive
settlement on Cyprus, any ROC attempt to inject language into
the December 2009 Council of Europe statement will be a
"potential iceberg."

¶3. (C) Alp characterized the French EU Presidency as having
been largely "neutral" thus far with regard to Turkish
accession. The GOT expects the French Government to try to
open two chapters (freedom of movement of capital and
information society and media) in December. She lamented
that Turkey has met many of the energy chapter's criteria,
but Cyprus continues to block its opening. The MFA is
optimistic about the upcoming Czech Republic Presidency as
the GOC is perceived to be both pro-enlargement and
pro-Turkey. Alp added the Czech Republic began engaging MFA
more than a year ago on EU-related issues specifically. The
GOC is reportedly aiming to open the transportation and
social policy and employment empowerment chapters during its
term.

¶4. (C) Comment: Alp may be correct that accession-related
activities within the GOT continue apace, with staff-level
interaction with the EC fairly constant and screening of
various chapters of the aquis ongoing. However, to say work
on the major reforms is done is wishful thinking on Alp's
part. Despite her optimism, the Justice and Development
Party-led (AKP) GOT has laid down a marker that EU
accession-related reforms will not pick up again until after
the March 2009 local elections. FM Babacan warned EU
ambassadors October 28 that Turkey would continue working on
the Third National Program, but the elections would be the
GOT's top priority. AKP enthusiasm for EU accession
continues to wane as it focuses its attentions not only on
its electoral prospects, but also on regional peace
facilitation efforts (Israel/Syria; Lebanon;
Armenia/Azerbaijan) and its upcoming tenure as a voting UNSC
member. As public apathy continues, the impetus for
increased action on Turkey's EU venture will need to come
from traditional advocates, including Turkey's business
community and other disparate groups ranging from ethnic and
religious minorities to elements of the GOT bureaucracy.
Without it, the GOT will likely continue on what has become a
well-worn path almost since formal negotiations between

ANKARA 00001967 002 OF 002


Ankara and Brussels began, tackling non-contentious technical
issues and ignoring the tough political reforms.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ANKARA1967.html

pretty well says turkey's vocation is over back then...freezing negotiations with the eu when the roc takes over the presidency, is just the excuse turkey needed to finally walk away...with tail between the legs...finally got beaten by the roc...

[boomerang]

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002031

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS: GLASS IS HALF-FULL

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat
portrayed the status of ongoing Cyprus negotiations in
realistic yet optimistic terms in a November 20 speech in
Ankara. Talat was clear in pointing out the trouble spots
where negotiations have to date accomplished little, and
agreed with comments made by several observers that
additional international pressure on the Greek Cypriots would
be necessary to push the pace of talks forward more quickly.
However, perhaps recognizing the pessimistic outlook toward
the talks shared by many Cyprus watchers in Turkey, Talat
noted progress had been made and pushed back on those who
argued that only international community threats to recognize
an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" would
work in forcing Christofias and the Greek Cypriots to get
serious about negotiations. END SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) Talat spoke before a small invited audience of
diplomats, journalists, and think-tankers November 20 at the
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in
Ankara. The talk, billed as a roundtable discussion on
"Cyprus Negotiations: Where Do We Stand?", and follow-on
question and answer session was in English, but Talat made
prefatory remarks in Turkish, primarily aimed at a small
gaggle of Turkish television cameras allowed in for the
opening few minutes. In those remarks, Talat noted that
talks are ongoing, that there has been some progress, that
much work remains to be done, and that ultimate success is
possible if there is flexibility on both sides. He also took
the occasion to criticize an MOU signed recently by the ROC
and Russia in which both promised to enhance bilateral
relations, saying that such "unilateral agreements will not
help the negotiations process."

¶3. (SBU) Once the cameras had been removed from the room,
Talat provided a brief synopsis of what it had taken to get
comprehensive settlement negotiations re-started. He claimed
that the international community's stance toward Kosovo's
independence and a February statement made by then Russian
President Vladimir Putin, accusing the West of a
double-standard in pressing for Kosovar independence but not
insisting on an independent Turkish Cypriot state, had been
helpful in getting the Greek Cypriot public to question the
anti-settlement approach of former President Tassos
Papadopoulos and had helped to bring about the surprise
election of Demetris Christofias.

¶4. (SBU) Talat lamented that despite lengthy pre-election
talks between Christofias' AKEL party and T/C counterparts on
the Annan Plan and how comprehensive settlement negotiations
could move forward quickly were he to be elected, the new ROC
President had backtracked following his election and refused
to accept Annan as the starting point for a new round of
negotiations. Talat attributed this to Papadopoulos'
demonization of Annan. However, the practical effect for the
current round of talks had been that while the G/C side
insists it is not bound by Annan and believes itself free to
offer up new ideas on a host of issues on which agreement had
been reached in the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriots
nonetheless act as if the Turkish Cypriots are indeed bound
by Annan and accuse the T/C side of backtracking or taking a
hard-line approach if Talat puts forward new proposals
himself. As Talat described it, both sides refer to Annan at
times, when it suits their positions, but talks are also
covering ground outside the parameters of Annan.

¶5. (SBU) Talat also provided an overview of the substance of
the talks, noting the parties had engaged in discussions on
power-sharing and governance and had reached some
"semi-agreements." He said there had been agreement on the
"main subject" but some aspects remain on the table. He said
the discussion on competencies was over for now, adding that
there remain "big differences over executive powers."
Acknowledging problems remain in reaching agreement on the
workings of the federal legislature and the GC/TC numerical
division, Talat nonetheless characterized the differences
with regard to the legislature as being "not big." He also
claimed the two sides were close to agreement with regard to
the judiciary. In short, Talat said there really has been
progress, but from his standpoint the pace of progress
remains unsatisfactory.

¶6. (SBU) The Greek Cypriots continue to refuse to accept the
implementation of any formal timetable for negotiations,
without which it will be nearly impossible to move talks
forward sufficiently to maintain momentum. Talat expressed
hope that the international community, and the UNSYG's
Special Advisor, understand the need to bring greater
pressure in order to achieve progress, but had been
discouraged by actions in recent months which he claimed had
had just the opposite effect. He specifically pointed to the

ANKARA 00002031 002 OF 002


June 2008 UNSCR that accepted the UNSYG's report in which
language was changed with regard to the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots, and to bilateral MOUs signed by both Russia
and the UK with the ROC, as examples of actions that lead
Greek Cypriots to conclude there is no penalty for
maintaining the status quo. Subsequent ROC actions that
contribute to or worsen the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots, including ROC insistence on preventing foreign
leaders from meeting with Talat in his office in the north,
only serve to further undermine the negotiating atmosphere.
He said it seems clear the Greek Cypriots feel no compulsion
to move quickly and, in fact, likely would prefer to see
negotiations drag on to the end of 2009, under the
misconception that Turkey's EU accession process and its
commitments under the Ankara Protocol to open ports to
Cypriot vessels will force the Turkish side to make
concessions. In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots are in a
hurry because every day "we lose a little more ground
economically." Talat said he believes the international
community will "begin to intervene at some point," noting
there is no guarantee of that but there have been "some
indications."

¶7. (SBU) Responding to questions regarding the possibility
that international recognition of Kosovo and Russian
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might provide the
Turkish Cypriots greater leverage, Talat made clear he did
not cite Kosovo as an example for the Cyprus situation. He
had noted it merely as having served as a "fearful reminder"
to the Greek Cypriots that independence for the north could
occur. He emphasized that he has "no other ideas beyond a
negotiated settlement" in resolving Cyprus' long-standing
division.

¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: While expressing frustration at the pace of
the talks, Talat was decidedly more optimistic about the
ultimate success of the negotiations than his Turkish
audience.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

SILLIMAN

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ANKARA2031.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002138

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: UNSYG SPECIAL ADVISOR DOWNER TALKS TURKEY ON CYPRUS

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNSYG Special Advisor on Cyprus Alexander
Downer told the Ambassador December 17 he:
-- hopes to learn Turkish bottom lines and who speaks for
the GOT on Cyprus policy;
- depends on the U.S. and U.K. to wield influence on the
process;
- foresees referenda by the end of 2009;
- needs the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to agree to an
eventual cut in Turkish troops on the island down to the 650;
- believes he may be able to sell the Greek Cypriots on a
deal if they get what they're looking for on property;
- worries about the "hard-line" nature of MFA U/S Apakan,
but welcomed the Ambassador,s depiction of Apakan as
someone open to a solution;
- has rented a home on the island and plans to spend
more time there in 2009.
END SUMMARY

¶2. (C) Visiting Ankara for the second time since being
named UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's Special Advisor on Cyprus last
July, Downer said he is hoping to open a channel of
communication with Ankara to increase the flow of
information. During his first visit to Ankara in
September, Downer said Apakan had struck him as a
hard-liner and someone unlikely to display much in the way
of flexibility. However, he had been surprised when Apakan
told him in September that Turkey had only one true
red-line issue with regard to Cyprus -- the continuation of
Turkey's role as a guarantor of Cyprus' security under the
Treaty of Guarantee. Ambassador and DCM characterized
Apakan as a tough negotiator but one who, in our view,
genuinely seeks a fair and equitable settlement of the
Cyprus issue. Apakan has the respect and gravitas to be
able to bring along enough of Turkey,s hard-liners to
make a negotiated settlement "sellable" here.

¶3. (C) Downer expressed hope Apakan's description of
Ankara's sole red-line was correct and meant Turkey would
still be willing to withdraw troops down to the 650 allowed
for under the Treaty of Alliance and as TGS had agreed to
as part of the Annan Plan. If so, he thinks he can sell a
deal to the Greek Cypriots provided they get more of what
they are looking for on property. Downer admitted he is
struggling with how to gain Greek Cypriot buy-in and
indicated he will need to figure out a way to bridge the
yawning gap on property and governance issues. He plans to
offer three workable alternatives for the Presidency in a
proposal being drafted by a Canadian expert on
constitutional and governance matters as a way to help
address differences over governance. Downer expressed some
skepticism concerning the Annan Plan as a basis for the
current round of negotiations, noting it is far too
complicated and lengthy and, in his view, not "workable" --
especially as a document to be presented to voters in a
referendum. He added that Greek Cypriots will need major
changes in the Annan Plan to sell it to their electorate.

¶4. (C) Ambassador noted this opening that has allowed for
resumption of negotiations will not last long and said the
parties will require a strong push to come to an agreement
in 2009 before events conspire to once again consign Cyprus
to an uncertain, divided future. He urged Downer to
provide that push and assured him of strong USG support for
his efforts. The UN, and thus Downer, is the only game in
town; we will support, but the UN/Downer needs to be active
and creative. Downer said he has rented a home on the
island in anticipation of spending more time there in
¶2009. He is aiming to reach a conclusion that would allow
dual referenda in November or December 2009. He added he
is counting on USG and HMG support and assistance to bring
along both negotiating parties, as well as Turkey, to a
common understanding on Cyprus' future. Characterizing ROC
President Christofias as somewhat "anti-American" and
noting his tendency to "swear in private about both the
U.S. and the UK," Downer admitted that it will not be easy
to gain Greek Cypriot buy-in either. He lamented the
ultranationalist and anti-Turkish rhetoric and atmosphere
surrounding the funeral of former ROC President
Papadopoulos earlier in the week, which he described as
"extremely ugly."

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08ANKARA2138.html

[boomerang]

who they kidding...the next day after uninivation their first priority is to break away...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000287

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE; H PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR DURBIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP PGOV CY GR TU
SUBJECT: CODEL DURBIN: TALKING CYPRUS -- AND HALKI -- WITH
THE TURKS

REF: ISTANBUL 73

Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman for reasons 1.4(b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Durbin, led by Assistant Majority
Leader Senator Richard Durbin, met with senior GOT officials
February 19 on bilateral relations, Cyprus, and efforts by
the Greek Orthodox Church to reopen Halki Theological
Seminary for training of priests. During the meetings,
Senator Durbin emphasized the importance with which USG
officials, both in the executive and legislative branches,
view the US-Turkey strategic relationship. He emphasized
that following meetings in Cyprus, he believes 2009 offers a
historic opportunity to achieve a comprehensive settlement
and end over 40 years of
conflict on the island. GOT officials expressed hope that
negotiations between Cypriot leaders Christofias and Talat
will soon become more intense and urged the US to consider
naming a special envoy, who can urge both sides (but
especially the Greek Cypriots) to move forward more
expeditiously. A group of Turkish opinion makers sounded a
pessimistic note on Cyprus negotiations, claiming ROC
President Christofias and the Greek Cypriots have no
motivation to reach a settlement and will seek to draw out
negotiations well into 2010. All GOT interlocutors
emphasized the extreme damage to Turkey-US relations that
would ensue should an Armenian Genocide Resolution pass in
the US House of Representatives or US Senate, or should
President Obama characterize the tragic events of 1915 as
"genocide" in his statement marking April 24 as Armenian
Remembrance Day. END SUMMARY

President Gul
-------------

¶2. (C) Senator Durbin emphasized to President Gul that the
U.S. values Turkey,s friendship and loyalty and expressed
appreciation for Turkish support through its positive
contributions to NATO, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and on
counterterrorism. He also underscored continued strong US
support for Turkey's EU accession aspirations. Explaining
his appreciation for the complicated nature of Cyprus
reunification talks, Durbin expressed hope that a final
solution could be reached this year that would bring to an
end the island's long, sad, bloody history. He also
expressed admiration for T/C "President" Talat, G/C President
Christofias, and their lead negotiators, Nami and Iacovou,
saying that it required a great deal of political courage to
resume talks last year, and expressed hope that Turkey could
do all it can to encourage successful negotiations, to
include possible "symbolic" steps.

¶3. (C) President Gul responded that Turkey has given its full
support to Talat. Turkey is sincere in its hopes for a real
solution and full-fledged cooperation on the island.
However, what is required is a solution that will be viable
and lasting. Gul noted the need to recognize that there are
two different nations with two different peoples existing on
the island. There should first be two constituent states
with a degree of autonomy, states that would later, gradually
find ways increasingly to cooperate and would become one
nation out of functional necessity; economic realities will
help facilitate true reunification. Returning to a situation
in which one community ruled the island with certain
specified "minority rights" guaranteed to the other was not,
in his view, a realistic approach. The EU,s decision to
allow a divided Cyprus into the EU had only further
exacerbated a difficult situation.

¶4. (C) Durbin encouraged Turkey to take bold steps for peace,
noting that if Turkey makes a gesture and the Greek Cypriots
do not reciprocate, the world will know, and he will
challenge the ROC to answer in kind. He also commented that
he was encouraged by his visit and Turkey,s efforts to
resolve its differences with neighbors Cyprus and Armenia.
Gul responded that Turkey is "problem-solving" and recognizes
the need to have good relations with all its neighbors. He
referred to GOT tolerance of more than 70,000 illegal
Armenian workers in Turkey, encouragement of direct flights
between Istanbul and Yerevan, bilateral cultural exchange
programs, and an invitation to Armenia to join the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation organization and GOT accreditation of
the GOAM's Ambassador to its secretariat in Istanbul as

ANKARA 00000287 002 OF 003


evidence of GOT seriousness. "I trust President Sargsian and
believe he trusts me. Let's set aside issues related to a
resolution in the US Congress. We seek good relations with
Armenia and will continue to work toward that." However, Gul
warned that passage of a congressional resolution would make
it impossible to continue the initiative because the
atmosphere would become too poisonous.

¶5. (C) Senator Durbin also raised the long-standing problems
of the Greek Orthodox Church and asked if there is any way
the GOT could find a way to allow the Halki Seminary to
function as intended to train new priests in the Orthodox
faith. Gul responded that GOT officials are sympathetic to
the needs of the Church in Turkey, calling the Patriarch and
church members "our citizens, who provide us with richness of
diversity." He believes a way can be found to solve the
problem, but it has legal ramifications that impact how all
institutions of religious teaching are treated.

Deputy Prime Minister Cicek
---------------------------

¶6. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Cicek said he was well aware of
the long-term importance of US-Turkey ties; he was the only
one still in politics who had worked with former Turkish
President Ozal. Turkey today is working with the U.S.
constructively in a wide region. On Cyprus, Cicek reiterated
that Turkey supports the goal of a settlement, but that any
solution needs to be fair and lasting. The "TRNC" and
"President" Talat are making great efforts to resolve
differences, but unilateral efforts in this regard will not
be enough. He added that one needs to understand the "facts
of the island": that there are two equal communities; the
Turkish Cypriots "are not a minority." He pointed to deals
the Greek Cypriots have signed to purchase arms worth $200
million from France and Russia. Such deals make it difficult
to believe they're seeking a long-term peaceful settlement.

¶7. (C) Senator Durbin pressed Cicek for Turkey to show its
support for peace and stability on Cyprus by symbolic
gestures such as permitting overflights of Greek Cypriot
civilian aircraft on the Turkish Cypriot side, and
establishing an international group to study the future of
Varosha. Cicek replied that Ankara believes there is room
for openings on both sides, but insisted that the Turkish
Cypriots already have taken steps "such as approving the
Annan Plan" and that it is time for the Greek Cypriots to
reciprocate. Still, if the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
is lifted, the Turkish side would be ready to open the
airport (NOTE: This seems to refer to Nicosia Airport, closed
since 1974. END NOTE) Senator Durbin underscored that if
Ankara were to take a step, he would ask the Greek Cypriots
to do the same. He noted that he hopes that in the future
both sides do not look back and say that an historic
opportunity had been missed.

¶8. (C) Durbin also appealed to Cicek to "start a dialogue"
with Greece on reopening Halki Seminary. Cicek responded
that there are no specific regulations against Halki but that
a 1974 general law applies to all theological faculties and
stipulates that they must be connected to state universities.
The law is aimed primarily at regulating private Islamic
schools. Otherwise, "Turkey would turn into Pakistan." He
noted GOT officials have been working on finding a solution
on Halki and sympathized with the Church's wish to train
priests. The Halki question is not political, it is
judicial. Turkey does not want to open itself to radicalism.
At the same time, Cicek asked rhetorically if Greece should
not pay attention to the ethnic Turks living in Thrace, whose
rights are "routinely violated."

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
---------------------------

¶9. (C) MFA Deputy Under Secretary Haydar Berk and DDG for
Northeast Mediterranean Kerim Uras offered CODEL Durbin a
lengthy briefing on Turkey's perspective of the historical
basis of negotiations on the Cyprus issue and said Turkey,s
support for a Cyprus settlement envisions a united island
that would have a "significant, positive" impact on the
eastern Mediterranean. However, Ankara remains concerned
about the current "unfriendly posture" of the Greek Cypriots.
Senator Durbin noted that if Talat and Christofias could be

ANKARA 00000287 003 OF 003


given a helping hand, they could succeed. MFA U/S Ertugrul
Apakan emphasized at a follow-on lunch that the GOT seeks a
special envoy on Cyprus from the US. Not someone so senior
that he or she overshadows UN Special Rep. Downer, but
someone who can ensure the US is engaged. The US represents
fairness, justice, and balance on the Cyprus issue, according
to Apakan. "We need your involvement." Apakan also
underscored the hands-off approach the GOT is taking on
Cyprus negotiations, saying, "Talat does not need us to
negotiate for him." He noted that DDG Uras goes to the
island once every couple weeks to get updates on the
negotiations, but senior officials travel only on a quarterly
basis to the island and, contrary to claims by Greek Cypriots
that he is pulling Talat's strings from Ankara, Apakan
claimed he had not spoken to Talat on the phone "in months."
The problem according to Apakan, is that the Greek Cypriots
"are not doing the intellectual work necessary to find a
settlement, because they don't want a federation, they don't
like power-sharing, and they don't like the idea of a 'new
Cyprus.'"

¶10. (C) Durbin asked if it would be possible for Greece and
Turkey to open a conversation on Turkish schools in Greece
and the Halki Seminary in Istanbul. Berk insisted that
Ankara had asked for such a dialogue two years ago, but had
received no reply from the GOG. He said Turkey has signed 33
agreements with Greece, some with the assistance of the USG,
such as the 1997 Madrid Agreement about the Aegean. The
level of Greece-Turkey trade now stands at 3 billion Euros.
Greek investment in Turkey exceeds 5 billion Euros. It is an
ongoing process. Berk also noted that the two countries
engage in a mechanism called the Exploratory Talks regarding
the Aegean. Senator Durbin said the visit to Turkey by Greek
PM Karamanlis, the first such visit in 49 years, had not
seemed to be recognized by Ankara as a courageous and
valuable gesture. Berk seemed taken aback and replied that
the Turkish Prime Minister himself had
visited Greece "several times," and it was good that
Karamanlis had finally been able to reciprocate. He said
both Athens and Ankara "have complaints" but that Ankara is
trying to take a positive approach. He suggested that the
Greek Government has created a negative public opinion toward
Turkey, and "now they say that public opinion ties their
hands."

¶11. (C) Durbin promised to reach out to FM Bakoyannis on the
issue, which he did in a February 20 phone call following his
meeting in Istanbul with the Ecumenical Patriarch (ref).
Conveying Bakoyannis' expressed willingness to discuss the
issue and the Patriarch's expressed hope that GOT officials
would engage him on concerns of the Church, Durbin spoke with
Dep U/S Berk by phone prior to his return to the US February
¶20. Berk said he was encouraged by the responses and that he
would be happy to meet with the Patriarch personally. They
agreed to keep this initiative quiet for the time being.

CODEL Durbin did not have an opportunity to clear on this
message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Silliman

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09ANKARA287.html

[boomerang]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000341

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: NEW EU NEGOTIATOR DISCUSSES TURKEY'S
ACCESSION FUTURE

REF: ANKARA 298

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOT cannot push for bold EU-mandated
reforms until after the March 29 local elections, according
to Turkey's new EU negotiator Egemen Bagis. Even after the
elections, Bagis noted that he would not have the necessary
clout internally to successfully advocate for the unpopular
changes unless he can demonstrate to the Turkish public that
he can deliver in Brussels. Bagis reported he is working to
boost his credibility by pushing the EU to open for
negotiation three or four chapters by July, instead of the
usual two per EU presidency. Bagis cited pressure from
Cyprus on the Czechs not to open the energy or education
chapters and solicited U.S. help to push those forward. He
noted that although Cyprus reunification talks are
progressing, it is doubtful the two sides can reach progress
by the end of 2009. Nevertheless, he has received assurances
from EU officials that the progress report due later this
year will not be unduly biased against Turkey. The
Ambassador reiterated USG support for Turkey's EU bid, but
warned that the recent tax case brought against the Dogan
media group conveys the wrong image of Turkey in Europe. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) State Minister for EU Affairs and Lead EU Negotiator
Egemen Bagis updated the Ambassador February 25 on Turkey's
accession bid. Bagis said that it is a delicate period, with
Turkey facing local elections in March, European
parliamentary elections in April, German elections this fall,
and a formal review of frozen chapters later in the year.
The Ambassador noted that many in France are predicting
Sarkozy will lift his objection to EU expansion this spring
and underscored that Turkey should not be an obstacle to
France's NATO membership. It is not in Turkey's interest to
react quid pro quo, he warned.

¶3. (C) Bagis cautioned that the GOT cannot take any decisive
or controversial moves, including supporting France's NATO
reintegration, until after the March elections. Turkey will
not have another election for three years, which will allow
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to tackle the
hard reforms necessary to fulfill EU criteria. Nevertheless,
Bagis said he would not have the necessary credibility to
push for domestic change until he has been able to
demonstrate his ability to influence Brussels. The Turkish
public measures EU progress by the number of chapters opened,
not closed. Bagis underscored that to be taken seriously
within Turkey, he would need to convince the Czech Presidency
to show leadership and break the trend of opening two
chapters per term and increase the number to three or four.
He reported that the GOT is working to meet the requirements
to open the taxation and social policy and employment
chapters. However, the Czechs are hesitating on energy and
education due to "threats from Cyprus."

¶4. (C) Bagis noted negotiations between Cyprus and the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) are progressing.
While it is doubtful that the two sides will reach a
comprehensive settlement by the end of 2009, there will not
be a full breakdown either. Regardless, he has received
assurances from Brussels that the EU review of frozen
chapters related to Turkey complying with its commitments
under the Ankara Protocol later this year would not be biased
against the GOT if a Cyprus settlement is not reached. He
posited that Nicosia has no incentive to pursue
reconciliation. The Greek half of the island has far better
infrastructure, economy, and standard of living, all of which
could be hurt by reunification. Furthermore, the EU has
offered Cyprus neither a carrot nor a stick. Bagis asserted
that Cypriot President Christofias needs a reason to
compromise, such as the EU naming an arbitrary date at which
it would consider letting an independent "TRNC" join. Bagis
added that Ankara has received guarantees from the major
"TRNC" parties that no matter who wins the April
parliamentary elections, Talat will continue his role as
chief negotiator.

¶5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated USG support for Turkey's EU
bid, adding that Europe needs Turkey. Bagis warned that
voicing such support too publicly might offend many
Europeans. He encouraged the U.S. to limit its public
statements and to make a stronger push in private,

ANKARA 00000341 002 OF 002


specifically for opening the energy and employment chapters.
He also stressed how important it is that President Obama not
use the word "genocide" in his April 24 statement
commemorating Armenian Remembrance Day, for the sake of
maintaining the bilateral relationship.

¶6. (C) The Ambassador warned that the recent tax case brought
against the Dogan group, Turkey's largest media company, has
not helped Turkey's image in Europe. It gives the impression
Prime Minister Erdogan has initiated a personal vendetta
against Dogan, even tasking the Finance Ministry to
investigate its finances. The GOT must leave the media
alone; even a hint that AKP leadership seeks to rein in its
domestic critics provided opponents of Turkey's accession
with more ammunition. Bagis indicated that this was a tax
matter and that essentially no one was above the (tax) law.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ANKARA341.html