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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 12:06 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006467



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016


¶B. SECSTATE 189542

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) Turkish MFA A/US Ertugrul Apakan travels to Helsinki
today, accompanied by Cyprus Deputy Director General Levent
Bilman, for a day of technical talks November 22 on the
Finnish Turkey/EU/Cyprus proposal. The talks will also serve
as preparation for meetings FM Gul will have with the Finnish
FM and EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn on the margins of the
EuroMed conference November 27.

¶2. (C) Apakan phoned Ambassador late November 21 and relayed
that Turkey does not want Varosha in the package, period.
Apakan and others have come increasingly close to drawing a
red line at inclusion of Varosha; they have finally done so
and carry that message to Helsinki. On all other issues,
there is flexibility, Apakan stated, and Turkey is trying to
see what it can do. Turkey hopes there can be enough work
done that the Finnish proposals can be put on paper. Turkey
appreciates US support with the EU and hopes it can continue,
especially with the EU,s East European and other new members.

¶3. (C) In a separate conversation, the Finnish Ambassador in
Ankara confirmed the Helsinki meetings will take place. She
said Apakan had been insistent that this remain close hold.
Her discussions have mirrored ours -- no on Varosha, yes on
opening Ercan airport to direct flights from Europe. She
remains less than sanguine about Turkish flexibility. She
was coy on what talks -- if any -- may be taking place in
parallel or separately with the Greek and/or Turkish
Cypriots, but it sounded as if no specific talks were
planned. "The subject now is Turkey," she said.

¶4. (C) The next big play will be an EC meeting planned for
December 6, its last ahead of the GAERC on December 11-12 and
the European Council meeting on December 14-15. The Finns,
goal is to present a clear and final picture on
ports/airports by the 6th and for the EC then ideally to
agree on appropriate recommendations. The Finn said that the
Europeans, goal is not to have the Council meeting be
dominated by Turkey issues and that the GAERC should handle

¶5. (C) According to the Finnish Ambassador, the current plan
B, which the Finns don't much like, is a freezing of some
chunks of the negotiations -- presumably a to-be-determined
number of Acquis chapters -- for a couple of years;
sufficient time to get through the respective election cycles
in Turkey, Greece and the ROC. The language concerning this
would affirmatively call for a review at the end of that time.

¶6. (C) Comment: The Turks are headed to Helsinki, prepared
to discuss non-Varosha options; it is a red line for the
Turkish military. They may be receptive to a minimal package
that, per ref B, includes temporary opening of one or more
ports in exchange for at least partial lifting of Turkish
Cypriot isolation. Otherwise, they seem to be preparing for
some form of suspended animation
. End comment.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 12:56 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006573


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016


¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassadors of Finland, Germany and the US,
plus the UK DCM, met December 4 to review Turkey's efforts
with the EU and compare notes on recent talks with the Turks.
All agreed that the key next step is an apparent proposal or
package being readied by the GOT. Among ideal elements would
be policy statements by the Turkish government that it will
submit the Ankara Protocol for parliamentary approval;
calling for parliamentary revision or repeal of Article 301;
opening a Turkish port for direct trade with Cyprus; and
appealing for the UN to re-launch formal Cyprus settlement
negotiations. UK FCO Director for Europe is in Ankara
December 4, and Swedish FM Bildt holds talks here December 5.
End Summary.

¶2. (c) According to the Finnish ambassador, FM Gul used a
lunch December 1 with the EU ambassadors here to unload on
the "unacceptability" of the EC recommendations and call for
their change. He complained that the Finnish PM, earlier
this month, called off efforts to find a formula on ports and
trade before Turkey "even had a chance" to present its new
ideas. PM Erdogan and Finnish PM Vanhanen also met December
1 for 90 minutes alone, and the Finn got more of the same,
plus complaints that the EU does not understand the situation
in Turkey or the Cyprus problem, the EC's recommendations are
unacceptable, and the EU Presidency should show leadership.
Vanhanen, according to the Finnish ambassador, defended the
EC recommendation as a solid basis for discussion in the
Council and a compromise between widely divergent opinions
with the EU, but Erdogan would have none of it. The Finnish
ambassador commented that the Turks have no idea how bad
opinion is in European capitals.

¶3. (c) The Europeans all remarked that they see little
prospect of reducing the number of frozen/suspended chapters
below eight, and they thought it at least as likely that the
number will rise. They agreed that a key issue for Turkey
will be whether a clear signal is given on opening some
chapters. Three or four are apparently more or less ready to
open and don't have unmet benchmarks. They concern routine
issues such as statistics and financial controls. The
Europeans noted that a couple of Turkish journalists have
declared that unless there is an EU decision to open at least
four chapters (regardless of what else is in the EU
decision), they will accuse the government of failing on the
EU front.

¶4. (c) Ambassador noted our concerns about holding up too
many chapters, unencumbering the opening of other chapters,
avoiding ultimatums, and not compromising Cyprus settlement
issues. He described his conversations with Turkish leaders
(septel), which largely track with what the Europeans have
heard, with obvious adjustment that Ankara wants our help in
paring back EU demands/conditions that it deems unacceptable.

¶5. (c) The European diplomats had heard the same talk we have
about a possible new Turkish proposal that could include a
port opening and perhaps some other actions. They believed
that the key thing for Europe is that any steps Turkey take
be without precondition, though they realized this is
unlikely. Turkish proposals conditioned on the EC agreeing
on no, or at least fewer, suspensions of chapters seem more
likely. Among elements that appeared to be possibly feasible
and/or on the table already are:

-- a GOT statement of commitment to implement the Ankara
Protocol and to submit it for parliamentary approval;

-- a similar GOT statement calling on parliament to eliminate
or change Article 301 to more closely conform to EU standards;

-- a GOT declaration identifying a port for direct Cypriot
trade/access to Turkey; and

-- a government call for the UN to re-launch Cyprus
settlement negotiations (which would put Papadopoulos on the

¶6. (c) The Turks might also include in this a provision on at
least temporary direct Turkish Cypriot trade with the EU, but
the Europeans thought it would be more effective as a call
for such trade rather than listed as a condition for a port
opening. All agreed that Turkey is likely again to raise
Ercan and that this is a non-starter.

¶7. (c) All the participants agreed that a key next ingredient
is more pressure on Cyprus and perhaps Greece. They noted,
as Gul did to the Ambassador earlier in the day, that
Secretary Rice had a critical influence at the eleventh hour

with Papadopoulos in October 2005. Something similar at the
right moment now could be very helpful. The German wondered
whether there could be some gestures toward the Turkish
Cypriots, such as charter flight to Ercan or a high level
visit, but disclaimed Germany's ability or willingness to
take such a step.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 12:59 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006600



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(C) Swedish Ambassador told us that during Swedish FM
Bildt's December 5 visit to Ankara, Foreign Minister Gul
conveyed GOT disappointment that the Finnish Presidency
abruptly ended its Cyprus initiative. The Turks had been
surprised and seemed to want to return to the Finnish
proposal, or "Plan A." Bildt said the Swedes shared their
surprise but urged the GOT to move on, as the Finnish
proposal was dead.

2.(C) Gul emphasized the Turks' overriding interest in
keeping the accession negotiations moving forward. He
implied the Turks would continue lobbying to reduce the
number of suspended chapters, but the Swede's conclusion was
that Turkey can accept the EC's recommendation. Bildt said
Sweden will keep working for a milder package, but counseled
Gul not to expect a better result from the Council. He said
that a Turkish initiative could moderate the result and help
the Swedes persuade colleagues to shift the current EU
discussion away from technical Cyprus-related issues and
toward a larger reflection on the EU's medium and long-term

3.(C) Both Gul and FM/PM adviser Davutoglu were emphatic with
Bildt that they would accept no proposal that would suspend
the whole process now or in 12-18 months. If the EU adopted
such a measure, "Turkey will suspend its relations with the
EU", they stated. Bildt agreed that a suspension or de facto
suspension would be dangerous and advised Turkey should not
accept it. He encouraged the GOT to make clear its readiness
to press ahead, its commitment to do so, and then continue
the reform process, given that much remains to be done.

4.(C) PM Erdogan, who mostly listened, acknowledged Bildt's
point that the EU must strike a fine balance between showing
there are repercussions for the GOT's failure to implement
the Ankara Protocol and the problem of its own
non-fulfillment of undertakings to end Turkish Cypriot

5.(C) The Swedish Ambassador subsequently suggested to MFA
A/US Apakan that the GOT consider as elements of a possible
Turkish initiative the following:

-- Reiterate the GOT's commitment to implement fully the
Ankara Protocol without delay, provided that isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots ends;

-- Call for a re-launch of the UN process in 2007;

-- In the interim, open a port and/or an airport on a
temporary basis; and

-- Make a clear public statement of an intent to revise
Turkish Penal Code Article 301.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 1:05 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006712



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016


Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b),

1.(C) Summary: In a December 19 press conference, FM Gul
delivered the GOT's official response to the EU's decision to
partially suspend Turkey's EU membership negotiations. Gul
grudgingly accepted the decision, bemoaned the EU,s "lack of
vision" for failing to recognize Turkey's strategic
importance, and said the suspension of eight of the remaining
34 chapters in Turkey's EU negotiations was due to an
internal EU crisis. Despite these criticisms, he reiterated
Turkey's determination to become a full member and said the
GOT would continue its reform process, for Turkey's sake as
much as to meet EU requirements. Gul's remarks reflect the
ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) stance that the
outcome was acceptable, if not what they had hoped for. The
AKP played up the message that resonates most with the
Turkish public -- the government held firm on Cyprus -- while
avoiding a full suspension of negotiations that would prevent
further progress. End summary.

2.(U) FM Gul criticized the EU's December 11 decision to
suspend negotiations on eight chapters as a "lack of vision"
that failed to recognize Turkey's strategic importance. He
accused the EU, which he said is facing an "internal crisis,"
of using Turkey's failure to open its ports and airports to
Greek Cypriot traffic as a pretext for the partial
suspension. While Turkey "always fulfilled" its
responsibilities to the EU, Gul noted, the EU failed to meet
its obligation to end the economic isolation of Northern

3.(U) Gul nonetheless underscored Turkey's continued
determination to achieve full membership, noting, "From time
to time there may be ups and downs, but everyone is loyal to
the main goal." Gul said the GOT would continue to implement
reforms, not to make concessions to the EU, but in order to
strengthen rule of law and "elevate Turks to the level of
developed democracies."

4.(U) Gul praised the Finnish Presidency's efforts to advance
negotiations with Turkey by resolving the Cyprus issue. He
called on Germany to open negotiations on additional chapters
at the outset of its EU Presidency, and to lead the EU in
recognizing Turkey's contributions to resolving global
problems. Gul said that Cyprus talks must proceed under a UN
framework, and that a comprehensive solution will require
Greek and Turkish Cypriot participation.

5.(C) Comment: Gul's relatively controlled public remarks
are consistent with prior comments by PM Erdogan and other
GOT officials following the December 11 GAERC decision to
suspend eight chapters (reftel). The Turks seem to have
registered the advice from allies such as British PM Blair
(who stopped over in Ankara on December 15) to tone down the
negative rhetoric in order to calm the debate over Turkey's
EU membership and allow efforts to help Turkey take hold.
Though disappointed by the outcome, government officials have
acknowledged that the decision allows negotiations to
continue on other chapters and at the technical level, a
result accomplished without the AKP having to take the
politically sensitive step of compromising on the hot-button
Cyprus issue. The government's measured response seems to
have paid off, with the COREPER's December 20 decision to
invite negotiations on the enterprise and industrial policy
chapter. End comment.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 1:10 pm

.(C) Cyprus: Erdogan appealed for more effort to resolve
Cyprus. He said it was unjust that Greek Cypriots voted
against the Annan plan but were "rewarded" by being accepted
into the EU, while the Turkish Cypriots remained isolated.
He asked that the US pressure Republic of Cyprus President
Papadopoulos and the GOG to take concrete steps toward an
overall settlement. He urged US steps to de-isolate the
north. Direct flights into Ercan airport in northern Cyprus
would be a good achievement. Burns said the US is urging
UNSYG Ban to engage on Cyprus and would continue to encourage
the EU to lift the north's isolation. Burns also reaffirmed
the USG's full support for Turkey's accession to the EU.
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Sat Sep 10, 2011 1:20 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000711



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017

¶B. ANKARA 588

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkey's MFA characterizes recent Greek
Cypriot steps to re-start UN-brokered talks and to facilitate
a re-opening of the Ledra Street crossing of the Green Line
in central Nicosia as "just for show." The GOT believes G/C
President Papadopoulos is feeling pressure from the EU and is
doing whatever he can to alter his image as an
obstructionist, with no intent of actually following through
with genuine dialogue. Meanwhile, they describe "TRNC
President" Talat as "nervous" and concerned about being
pressured to move forward with the UN talks without agreed
terms of reference. As Turkey nears presidential elections
next month and parliamentary elections later in the year,
hot-button nationalist issues such as Cyprus have taken on
even greater significance. As a result, the ability of Talat
and the Turkish Cypriots to maneuver is likely to remain
severely constrained, with GOT officials demonstrating little
creativity on how to get Cyprus talks back on track. END

G/C Moves Just "For Show"

¶2. (C) Charge met March 26 with MFA Deputy Under Secretary
for Northeast Mediterranean and Americas Haydar Berk about
the latest snag in moving ahead with UN-brokered talks
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Berk's recent visit to
the island and his meetings with "TRNC President" Talat and
others. Berk claimed the GOT continues to support the UN
process, though he emphasized that Talat, Pertev and others
suspect the ROC's latest steps are merely "for show" in order
to reduce EU pressure on Nicosia.

¶3. (C) Berk dwelled on Talat's concern that the Greek
Cypriots will want to initiate a discussion on the property
issue in the technical committees, then point to T/C
intransigence when they refuse to engage on an issue they
believe should more rightly be covered in the expert working
groups as one of the issues to be resolved under a
comprehensive settlement. He admitted there had been hope
within the GOT and in Northern Cyprus that Papadopoulos'
recent initiative was a sign of a new level of flexibility on
the G/C side. However, as discussions continued, Berk
claimed it became clear that the Greek Cypriots were
summarily dismissing T/C concerns regarding the property
issue and their expectation that working group and technical
committee titles would accurately reflect what the Turkish
Cypriots thought should be discussed (e.g. power-sharing when
discussing "governance"; security guarantees for the T/C
community when discussing "defense").

How To Get Back on Track?

¶4. (C) Charge responded that Papadopoulos' recent moves had,
in our view, been successful in painting Talat as the
intransigent party, and suggested it would be in Talat's best
interest to agree to move forward with UN talks. Doing so
could facilitate progress, if only incremental, and help
insulate the Cyprus issue from the mad dash to capture the
nationalist vote that currently characterizes the Turkish
political scene. Charge also noted the perception that the
Turkish military had taken a much harder line on
Cyprus-related issues in recent months and said this was both
unnecessary and unhelpful.

¶5. (C) Berk acknowledged Turkey's electoral politics
complicate matters with regard to Cyprus, but instead
emphasized the GOT view that political steps on Cyprus should
be reciprocal and simultaneous. He referred to Talat's
decision in December to remove the Ledra Street footbridge,
noting that Talat had pressed hard to accomplish it.
However, because the move had not been reciprocal,
Papadopoulos' latest initiative, which in Turkish eyes merely
"catches him up" with the T/C position, now raises the
expectation that Talat must do more or else be seen as the
intransigent party. This despite the fact, according to
Berk, that the T/C concerns associated with the UN talks
noted above have not been addressed.

¶6. (C) Responding to our question on how Ankara hoped to move
the process forward, he said that Talat was "more nervous
than we expected" during their March 17-18 visit to the
island and unlikely to overcome his concerns. Talat wished to
"re-evaluate the entire process" before deciding how to
proceed. Berk also expressed the view that if the USG could
take "two or three bold steps" (e.g. allow direct flights
between Ercan airport and U.S. POEs), it would help to

ANKARA 00000711 002 OF 002

pressure Papadopoulos to take more seriously the need to
engage with Talat as an equal partner. Charge outlined steps
the USG has already taken to help alleviate the economic
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and said the focus now
should be managing the situation and keeping the technical
talks on track -- not waiting for a grand initiative from the

¶7. (C)[b]COMMENT: As noted ref c, TGS has laid down markers
that it sees itself as the ultimate protector of Turkish
national interests, including (or especially) Cyprus. The
GOT, or at least senior levels at MFA, appear to have little
stomach for inserting themselves in a Cyprus issue that has
always been a lightning rod for Turkish nationalists. The
debate swirling around Turkey's presidential election process
-- and the degree to which nationalist issues have moved to
the center of that debate (ref b) -- makes it all the more
likely that Talat and the Turkish Cypriots will have little
room to maneuver. Despite our continued arguments (and the
inherent logic) in support of continued T/C engagement in UN
talks, we see little prospect for Turkish concurrence.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Mon Sep 12, 2011 12:18 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001216



E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017


Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (C) MFA U/S Ertugrul Apakan told Ambassador on May 15
that Turkey hopes the UN report on Cyprus will contain a
reference to the May 28, 2004 UN report. Apakan complained
that the buffer zone was being extended at the expense of
Turkish Cypriots. He provided Ambassador with a paper
containing talking points which note that Turkish side wants
to maintain the July 8th approach, but that process risks
being deadlocked and President Papadopoulos has resorted to
delaying tactics (para 4).

¶2. (C) The UNSYG report on Cyprus was due soon, Apakan noted,
and Turkey hopes that it will retain reference to the 28 May
2004 UN report, as contained in previous years' reports. The
report emphasizes the need to ease the economic isolation of
the Turkish Cypriots.

¶3. (C) Turkey is not pleased that the buffer zone is being
extended at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots, Apakan told
the Ambassador. This "trick" will not be tolerated; the
buffer should include equal territory from both sides. This
is the main issue blocking movement towards re-opening the
Ledra Street crossing, according to Apakan.

¶4. (SBU) Begin talking point text:

The Turkish side keeps its constructive approach vis-a-vis
the 8th of July process. Hence the non-paper presented by
Pertev on the 26th April.

Unfortunately, this goodwill is not reciprocated. The
non-paper conveyed by Conis on 11th of May clearly reflects
that the Greek Cypriot side is preserving its intransigent
attitude. They insist that the issue of property is
discussed at the Technical Committees. They refuse to add
power-sharing to governance and guarantees to security.
However, this is the terminology which the Turkish Cypriot
side has taken from the UN documents.

The whole process risks being deadlocked due to the
unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side. Papadopoulos is
resorting to delaying tactics. It is apparent that his aim
is to bury the Direct Trade Regulation. The 8th of July
process presents a unique opportunity for him to escape the
pressure of the international community.

Likewise, the so-called goodwill gestures of the Greek
Cypriot side of the last months have turned out to be fake.
Take, for example, the opening of the Lokmaci Gate.

Despite the willingness by the Turkish side to open the gate
since November 2005, the crossing is yet to open. Had the
Greek Cypriot side not put preconditions at every turn, it
would have been opened by now.

For purposes of clarification, I would like to underline that
the military unit in the area belongs to the Turkish Cypriot
forces and not to the Turkish Peace Force, and there is no
Turkish Cypriot military post at the TRNC side of the gate.

Papadopoulos is now trying to create more confusion by
bringing up the question of the status of the area which is
clearly a TRNC territory since 1974. Papadopoulos knows that
once the status issue is opened it will be subject of
discussion for many years. Thus it will prevent the opening
of the gate. Therefore, the issue of status should be
disassociated from the opening of the gate which is a
practical matter. This understanding has already been
adopted during the opening of other gates.

We hope that the Permanent Members of the UNSC will not give
credit to the Greek Cypriot maneuvers.

The upcoming UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) report
will be published soon. We hope that, like in the previous
one, a reference is again made to the 28 May 2004 report of
the former UNSG which, inter alia, addressed the unjust
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people and called for its

Recently, our Permanent Representative to the UN sent a
letter to the UNSG Mr. Ban in which he expressed Turkey's
expectation for the endorsement by the UN Security Council of
the said report.

In this letter a copy of which I am presenting to you, he
drew attention of the UNSG to the provocative policies
pursued by the Greek Cypriot administration to represent the
whole island.

ANKARA 00001216 002 OF 002

In the UNFICYP report, we hope that the views and concerns of
the Turkish Cypriot side expressed in the letter dated 26
January 2007 addressed by the TRNC Foreign Minister to the UN
Secretary General will be duly taken into account.


Since this will be the first UNFICYP report by the new
Secretary General, it is very important that it turns out to

be an objective one which aptly respects the established UN
terminology, and that it does not contain any material
mistakes. We trust that you will do your utmost in this

End talking point text.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Mon Sep 12, 2011 12:23 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001261



E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017


¶1. (C) According to the British ambassador in Ankara, PM
Blair and Chancellor Merkel made little progress with French
President Sarkozy in recent discussions regarding Turkey and
the EU.

¶2. (C) Blair reportedly talked at length with Sarkozy
regarding Turkey during their meeting in early May. He made
a detailed pitch for how and why continuing the accession
process is in Turkey's interests. Sarkozy was blunt in his
reply: he made a campaign commitment and had to stick with
it. He made some reference to pursuing privileged
partnership via a Mediterranean Union.

¶3. (C) Merkel's approach was tactical. She said she did not
want a bad EU Summit in June and implored Sarkozy not to make
too much fuss about Turkey. The French president was
non-committal and said he would not be able to speak further
on the matter until after the mid-June French parliamentary

¶4. (C) The UK ambassador opined that Sarkozy may back off
when EU leaders meet -- in order to accommodate Merkel, if
nothing else. He expected, however, that the Sarkozy problem
will not go away. A key event later in 2007 will be the
October-November review of Turkey's EU progress report, which
won't be very good anyway. The Brit recommended that
President Bush be primed to make the case strongly with
Sarkozy on why discontinuing Turkey's EU effort at this time
will undermine Western interests, including among moderate
Arab and other Islamic world countries.

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at this time?...meaning when exactly?... :lol:
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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Mon Sep 12, 2011 12:34 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001540




E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: GOT officials have raised concerns with us
regarding language in the draft UN Security Council
resolution on UNFICYP mandate renewal. The GOT believes the
resolution, as it stands, fails to portray fully and
objectively the situation in Cyprus. In particular, GOT
officials regret that the Security Council has failed to
explicitly endorse UNSYG Annan's conclusion in his 2004
report that the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots must
be brought to an end. They also emphasized Turkish Cypriot
support for demining but lamented the European Union's
insistence that the first 4 million Euros (of a total 259
million Euros in EU funding provided for economic development
on the island) be earmarked for demining activities. They
reiterated GOT concern with the July 8 process as well, in
particular, Greek Cypriot attempts to include property issues
in the debates of several different working groups. END

¶2. (C) During June 13 and 14 meetings with the Ambassador and
with EUR DAS Matt Bryza, MFA Deputy Under Secretary for
Northeast Mediterranean and the Americas Haydar Berk
expressed concerns regarding the text of the UNSCR on UNFICYP
renewal. Berk proceeded down a list of talking points, as

-- The Cyprus issue remains unresolved due to an overwhelming
negative Greek Cypriot vote for the Annan Plan. It is indeed
a great loss that such a unique opportunity was missed.

-- In connection with preambular paragraph two, the GOT would
like to underline once again that the consent and cooperation
of all sides are bedrock principles for the success of a
peacekeeping operation. The present paragraph ignores this

-- "The activities in the buffer zone" referred to in
preambular paragraph five mostly stem from incursions and
violations of the Greek Cypriots attempting to tip the scales
in their favor on the ground. The buffer zone makes up
almost three percent of the whole land mass of Cyprus and
territorial arrangements will be an important aspect of a
final solution. Therefore, these attempts aimed at changing
the status quo in the buffer zone cannot be portrayed as
innocent and should have been noted with regret.

-- The "TRNC" is strongly for the clearance of remaining
minefields along the buffer zone, as referred to in
preambular paragraph eight. However, the European Union's
insistence that the first four million Euros of a total of
259 million Euros provided for economic development in the
north of the island be earmarked for demining is not
acceptable to the "TRNC" authorities. Moreover, the
reference made to "Turkish Forces" in this paragraph is
uncalled for and should have been deleted.

-- Regarding preambular paragraph ten on opening additional
crossing points, the T/C side has demonstrated its
willingness to open the Ledra Street crossing point with the
same arrangements already in place at existing crossing
points. However, with regard to operative paragraph six on
demarcation, the GOT believes that the Security Council
should have refrained from "micromanaging" the matter by
referring to the demarcation of Ledra Street in particular.
Berk noted that this is a matter that both sides should be
able to sort out easily. With the reference to opening a
crossing at Ledra Street "taking into account arrangements
already in place" in preambular paragraph ten, the language
in operative paragraph six contradicts this by insisting on
demarcation at Ledra Street, which is not part of "existing
arrangements already in place." Berk said the UN, T/Cs and
G/Cs should concentrate on opening crossing points through
practical arrangements as called for in preambular paragraph
ten, rather than attempting to solve very sensitive and
contentious issues such as demarcation of an area where the
parties have longstanding differences of opinion regarding
the ceasefire line. He added that taking up the issue of
demarcation in connection with opening the crossing at Ledra
Street will only serve to further complicate the matter and
play into the hands of the Greek Cypriots who do not want to
open the crossing for both political and commercial reasons.

¶3. (C) Berk also reiterated GOT and T/C complaints about G/C
efforts to raise property issues in multiple working groups
established within the July 8 process, an effort the Turkish
Cypriots will continue to resist. Berk noted the T/C side
wants to ensure there are agreed upon titles for the working
groups and technical committees as well as finite timeframes
in which discussions will be held to avoid the G/C side using

ANKARA 00001540 002 OF 002

the process to delay final settlement negotiations
indefinitely. DAS Bryza noted that ROC President
Papadopoulos' strategy appears designed to keep Turkish
Cypriots on the defensive and he believes he has the
momentum. He urged the GOT to press the Turkish Cypriots to
remain engaged and to force Papadopoulos to show his true
intentions. Berk agreed but said the best way to do this is
to bring both parties together to negotiate comprehensive
settlement issues. Only then will the world see that the
Greek Cypriots see the July 8 process as a means to stall the
comprehensive settlement process and lessen international
pressure on themselves.

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Re: wikileaks turkey

Postby boomerang » Mon Sep 12, 2011 12:41 pm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001749



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2017


¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassador encouraged Turkey, in
conversations with MFA U/S Apakan and Deputy U/S Berk July 6
and 7, to look for ways to avoid the appearance of
intransigence on Cyprus and take advantage of Papadopoulos'
vulnerability at home and in some EU capitals. He also urged
a forthcoming attitude toward proposed Papadopoulos/Talat
meetings and cautioned against continued sniping by Ankara at
UNSYG Special Representative Moller. Berk repeated Turkish
boilerplate. Apakan reiterated Turkey's hard line on the
July 8 process, but seemed to appreciate that a more nuanced,
tactical approach could be useful looking toward autumn
difficulties in the EU and maneuvering the Cypriots toward
real negotiations in 2008. We will continue to push this
theme. End Summary.

¶2. (c) During a meeting July 7 on various subjects
(septels), Ambassador asked Apakan's views on mooted
Papadopoulos/Talat meetings connected with the anniversary of
Gambari's July 8 process and with the work of the Committee
on Missing Persons. Apakan had just received a report on the
meetings idea, which he ascribed to Moller, and indicated
Ankara would be sorting out its views in coming days.

¶3. (c) Ambassador urged that Turkey consider how best to use
the current situation tactically. He said Papadopoulos is
under pressure at home and in some European capitals for
being too intransigent. This had led him to take certain
actions that, whether fair or not and whether Ankara likes it
or not, have made him and the Cypriot government appear to be
more flexible -- and Turkey less so. The appearance of
Turkish intransigence will not serve Turkey's interests in
the Cyprus negotiations and even less in its EU accession
work. While Turkey's options may be limited now by
parliamentary elections that are only two weeks away, it
should have more maneuvering room after.

¶4. (c) Looking past those elections, Ambassador continued,
Ankara has an opportunity to wrong foot Papadopoulos just as
he is now wrong footing Turkey. Pressure on him to be more
forthcoming is likely to continue as Cypriot elections
approach early next year. Agreeing to a formula that would
enable the Gambari process finally to move forward is more
likely to expose Papadopoulos' underlying inflexibility than
Ankara's current stonewalling ever will. Perhaps Turkey
could use this to lock in something it seeks. At a minimum,
it could confront and perhaps reverse the perceptions game
which it is now losing and which could be dangerous for
Turkey as it looks toward an EU progress report in November
and an EU summit in December.

¶5. (c) Ambassador also urged a positive response to the
proposed Papadopoulos/Talat meetings. If, as may be
reasonable, Turkey's July 22 parliamentary election makes
this inopportune now, then perhaps an adequate course would
be to do nothing and avoid responding until after July 22.
He strongly urged against any immediate, negative reply.

¶6. (c) Apakan replied with some distaste about the Gambari
process and Moller. He complained that the Cypriots insist
on raising property issues where they don't belong. The
Greek Cyprots want to ensure that the Gambari process is a
charade and that settlement negotiations never take place.
However, Apakan did express interest in the tactical
arguments. He noted the challenges Turkey will face late
this year in the EU. Decisions will depend on the next
government. Ambassador noted that constant sniping at Moller
has the perverse effect, perhaps especially in New York, of
ensuring that the SYG's special representative stays on. The
UN institutionally does not like the reality or appearance of
one side vetoing its mediators. If Turkey would shut up on
the matter, normal personnel rotations might take their
course, Ambassador suggested.

¶7. (c) In a separate conversation July 6, Deputy U/S Berk
complained that small confidence building measures (CBMs)
which some (including the US) are pushing cannot be separated
from a comprehensive solution, where all issues will be on
the table. Short term, the Greek Cypriot election cycle
prevents such a negotiation, but all efforts and preparation
should still be focused on comprehensive discussions. Berk
was not optimistic on the long run either. Polls of youth
attitudes on both sides of the island now show support for a
two-state solution. In principle, the two governments on
Cyprus support a confederation, but differ on what this
means. In Turkey's case, he said, the Annan parameters are
still valid when the negotiation process resumes. It is
impossible to start from zero, though some parts can be
re-negotiated. Berk appealed for continued US interest and
efforts with the Greek Cypriots and the UN.

ANKARA 00001749 002 OF 002

¶8. (C) Ambassador said the US is interested in exploring
ways to move the process forward. CBMs may be problematic,
but they are options. He made the same points as noted above
with Apakan on the importance of Turks not letting themselves
be portrayed as intransigent or unwilling to negotiate at a
time when the Greek Cypriots are looking more flexible. Berk
appreciated US efforts and advice. He said the GOT will look
for creative ways to keep the Greek Cypriots from exploiting
the situation.

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